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A Tribute to Herbert W. Reichert 
When in the fall of 1974 it became increasingly clear that Herbert W. 
Reichert's health was rapidly deteriorating and that he would not be 
physically able to carry on either his teaching duties or his scholarly activ-
ities in the spring of 1975, his colleagues and friends began to explore ways 
of honoring him for his many contributions to both the field of Germani cs 
and the Department of Germanic Languages at Chapel Hill. Fortunately, 
Professor Reichert, who was unaware that some of his colleagues were 
pondering a Festschrift in his honor, indicated his wish to issue in book form 
some of his previously published essays dealing with Nietzsche's influence 
on five modern German authors. As he realized, time would not permit him 
to carry out his original design of completing a comprehensive study of 
Nietzsche's impact on all the major modern German authors. 
These five essays then, although originally intended as building blocks 
for an edifice that must now remain unfinished, form the core of the present 
Festschrift. In their essentially unaltered form-editorial revisions and 
emendations have been kept to a minimum-Professor Reichert's essays 
reflect both his concentration on one area of research and his critical acumen 
in the application of one single methodological approach. Anyone familiar 
with Herbert Reichert's research with regard to Nietzsche knows that he 
did not confine himself to interpretive studies; in fact, he had to engage in 
some pioneering and laborious spade-work, which resulted in the Inter-
national Nietzsche Bibliography (1st ed. 1960; co-editor Karl Schlechta), 
before he could begin formulating his influence studies. His endeavors were 
duly recognized when he was named the American representative of the 
German Nietzsche Society in 1957 and, one year later, was awarded a 
Guggenheim Fellowship which enabled him to continue his research on 
Nietzsche. 
The appended bibliography of Herbert W. Reichert's writings attests 
to his wide range of interest. Indeed, his contributions are so numerous that 
only a very few can be mentioned here. There are two authors who, next to 
Nietzsche, attracted Professor Reichert's special attention. His interest in 
the Austrian dramatist Arthur Schnitzler led to his affiliation with the 
International Arthur Schnitzler Research Association, an organization 
which he served as Vice President. But the writer who first stimulated his 
lX 
intellectual curiosity and who continued to occupy him was the Swiss poet 
and novelist Gottfried Keller. 
In 1949, two years after Herbert Reichert had come to Chapel Hill as 
an Assistant Professor, his Basic Concepts in the Philosophy of Gottfried Keller 
was published as volume I of the "University of North Carolina Studies in 
the Germanic Languages and Literatures." It is only appropriate that now, 
more than 25 years and 80 volumes later, a book honoring Professor 
Reichert should appear in the same monograph series which he helped 
initiate and to which he gave his unstinting support both as a member of the 
Publication Committee and as chairman of the Department. 
Even a cursory survey of Herbert Reichert's scholarly achievements 
would not be complete without mentioning his pedagogical endeavors. 
His desire to promote the study of German and to enrich and supplement 
the academic curriculum is evident from his editions of readers for advanced 
students, articles on pedagogy, the direction of plays in German, the 
presentation of courses in German on television, and the enlivening of 
Oktobeifeste and similar departmental festivities with accordion music. It 
came hardly as a surprise that, in recognition of his outstanding contribu-
tions to the teaching of German, Herbert Reichert was elected national 
President of Delta Phi Alpha and, in 1970, became a permanent honorary 
member of that organization. 
In honoring the scholar and teacher one should not overlook those 
traits ofHerbert Reichert which endear him to his students, colleagues, and 
friends. As a man who refused to be confined to the ivory tower of aca-
demia, he participated in life to the fullest extent. As a vigorous and 
enthusiastic outdoorsman he excelled in competitive sailing, enjoyed skiing 
with his family, and occasionally taught students and colleagues-often 
many years his juniors-a healthy lesson in tennis. The same Joie de vivre or, 
more appropriately, Lebenefreude may be gleaned from Herbert Reichert's 
translations and adaptations of "ribald" tales for popular magazines-a 
pursuit in which he forsook the well-trodden paths of scholarly writing in 
favor of more unconventional modes of expression. 
In dedicating this volume to Herbert W. Reichert we pay tribute to a 
colleague and friend, who, as a man, a teacher, and a scholar has so richly 
contributed to the life of the profession in general and to the growth of 
this Department in particular. 
Chapel Hill, N. C. 
February 1975 
X 
Siegfried Mews, Editor, UNCSGL&L 
Christoph E. Schweitzer 








Anne F. Baecker 
University of North Carolina 
Greensboro 
Max Lorenz Baeumer 
University of Wisconsin 
Madison 
Judy Bartenstein 






University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
Jeffrey B. Berlin 
State University of New York 
Binghamton 
Norman H. Binger 





Elizabeth E. Bohning 
University of Delaware 
Newark 
Frank L. Borchardt 
Duke University 
Durham, North Carolina 




University of Rochester 
Rochester, New York 
George C. Buck 
University of Washington 
Seattle 
Emmi Colton 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
Horst S. Daemmrich 
Wayne State University 
Detroit, Michigan 
Willard Ticknor Daetsch 
Ithaca College 
Ithaca, New York 
Xl 
W. Grant Dahlstrom 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
Donald George Daviau 
University of California 
Riverside 
Barbara Eger 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
William Eickhorst 
Unicoi High School 
Erwin, Tennessee 
Graydon L. Ekdahl 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
Raymond A. English 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
Hansford M. Epes, Jr. 
Davidson College 
Davidson, North Carolina 
Joerg and Renate Fichte 
University of Denver 
Denver, Colorado 
Walter Karl Francke 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
Ralph S. Fraser 
Wake Forest University 





Werner P. Friederich 





Alice Carol Gaar 
Auburn University 
Auburn, Alabama 
Robert and Valerie Greenberg 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
Reinhold Grimm 
University of Wisconsin 
Madison 
Doris Starr Guilloton 
New York University 
New York 
Donald P. Haase 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
James Hardin 
University of South Carolina 
Columbia 
Diether H. Haenicke 





Robert M. Helm 
Wake Forest University 
Winston-Salem, North Carolina 
Gerd Hillen 
University of California 
Berkeley 
Sarah Belinda Horton 








Gerda G. Hurow 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
Sidney M. Johnson 
Indiana University 
Bloomington 
Otto W. Johnston 
University of Florida 
Gainesville 
Calvin N.Jones 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
Alexander Kallos 
College of William and Mary 
Williamsburg, Virginia 
John Esten Keller 
University of Kentucky 
Lexington 
Giinter F. Klabes 
Vassar College 




John G. Kunstmann 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
Albert L. Lancaster 
Virginia Military Institute 
Lexington 
George S. Lane 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
Richard H. Lawson 
San Diego State University 
San Diego, California 
Donald J. Lineback 
Hollins College 





University of Alberta 
Edmonton, Canada 
William Harold McClain 
The Johns Hopkins University 
Baltimore, Maryland 
Volker Meid 
University of Massachusetts 
Amherst 
Siegfried Mews 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
Joseph Mileck 
University of California 
Berkeley 
P. M. Mitchell 
University of Illinois 
Urbana 
Walter J. Mueller 
University of Alaska 
Fairbanks 
Charles Murin 
University of Montreal 
Montreal, Canada 
Helen M. Mustard 
Columbia University 
New York 
James Carneal O'Flaherty 
Wake Forest University 
Winston-Salem, North Carolina 
Wolfgang Paulsen 
University of Massachusetts 
Amherst 
Herbert Penzl 
University of California 
Berkeley 
Virginia Fan Price 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
Richard M. Reiten 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 




Linda Ruth Revis 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
William H. Rey 
University of Washington 
Seattle 
Cambron Leigh Rice 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
Walter L. Robinson 






Technische Universitat Berlin 
Germany 
Jorg Salaquarda 
Freie Universitat Berlin 
Germany 
Herman and Marion Salinger 
Duke University 
Durham, North Carolina 
Wilmer D. Sanders 
Wake Forest University 
Winston-Salem, North Carolina 
Marvin and Roslyn Schindler 
Wayne State University 
Detroit, Michigan 
Ulrich Emil Schonenberger 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
George C. Schoolfield 
Yale University 
New Haven, Connecticut 
Hans Joachim Schrimpf 
Ruhr-Universitat Bochum 
Germany 
Adolf E. Schroeder 
University of Missouri 
Columbia 
Ernst Schurer 
University of Florida 
Gainesville 
Christoph E. Schweitzer 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
Ingo Seidler 
University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor 
Lester W. J. Seifert 
University of Wisconsin 
Madison 
Timothy Frederick Sellner 
Wake Forest University 
Winston-Salem, North Carolina 
Richard K. Seymour 





Sofus Emmelov Simonsen 
North Carolina State University 
Raleigh 
Thomas F. Skinner 
Hermann Lietz-Schule 
Haunetal, Germany 
Richard A. Smith 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
Sidney R. Smith 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
Rainulf A. Stelzmann 
University of South Florida 
Tampa 
Albrecht B. Strauss 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
Wolfgang Friedrich Wilhelm Taraba 
University of Minnesota 
Minneapolis 
David S. Thatcher 
University of Victoria 
Victoria, Canada 
Gerhart Tracy Waldorf 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
Adolph H. Wegener 
Muhlenberg College 
Allentown, Pennsylvania 
A. Leslie Willson 
University of Texas 
Austin 
Dorothy M. Ziegler 
Summit, New Jersey 
xv 
Department of Germanic Languages 





Department of German 
Bowdoin College 
Brunswick, Maine 
The General Library 




Department of Romance and Germanic Languages and Literatures 
University of Cincinnati 
Cincinnati, Ohio 
Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures 
East Carolina University 
Greenville, North Carolina 
Department of Germanic and Slavic Languages and Literatures 
University of Florida 
Gainesville 
Gettysburg College Library 
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania 
Hollins College 
Hollins College, Virginia 




Department of Germanic and Slavic Languages and Literatures 
Kent State University 
Kent, Ohio 
Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures 
University of Kentucky 
Lexington 
Department of Germanic and Slavic Languages 
State University of New York 
Buffalo 
Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures 
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill 
Foreign Languages Department 
Principia College 
Elsah, Illinois 
Department of Modern Languages and Literatures 
Swarthmore College 
Swarthmore, Pennsylvania 
Department of Germanic Languages 
University of Virginia 
Charlottesville 
Wake Forest Library 
Wake Forest University 
Winston-Salem, North Carolina 
Department of Romance and Germanic Languages and Literatures 
Wayne State University 
Detroit, Michigan 
Western Michigan University Library 
Western Michigan University 
Kalamazoo 
XVll 
Department of German 
University of Wisconsin 
Madison 





The author and the editor wish to thank the publishers and/or editors 
who gave their permission to reprint the following, previously published 
essays: 
1. "Nietzsche's Geniemoral and Schnitzler's Ethics," a revised version of 
"The Ethical Import of the Artist in the works of Arthur Schnitzler," 
Modern Austrian Literature, 6/1-2 (1973), 123-50. 
2. "Nietzsche und Carl Sternheim," Nietzsche Studien, 1 (1972), 334-52. 
3. "Nietzsche and Georg Kaiser," Studies in Philology, 61 (1964), 85-I08. 
4. "Nietzschean Influence in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften," German 
Quarterly, 39 (1966), 12-29. 
5. The Impact of Nietzsche on Hermann Hesse. Mount Pleasant, Michigan: 
The Enigma Press, 1972. 
Further, the financial assistance of the University Research Council 
of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill-which subsidized 









When I first determined to write this book over twenty years ago, my 
intent was to provide a comprehensive presentation of Nietzsche's impact 
on modem German literature. I realized, of course, that the subject chosen 
would transcend the limits of any book-length study, would indeed tran-
scend the capabilities of any single scholar. But I felt that if the project 
became the main endeavor of my academic career, the ultimate product of 
my effort might well be worthwhile. 
My initial focus was directed toward those literary giants, Thomas and 
Heinrich Mann, both of whom were powerfully stimulated by Nietzsche. 
And, as the months and years passed, I began to accumulate significant data 
on other writers including Christian Morgenstern, Paul Ernst, Frank 
Wedekind, Hermann Broch, Gerhart Hauptmann, Stefan George, Richard 
Dehmel, Reinhard Sorge, Ernst Jiinger, Ernst Wiechert, Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal, and Rainer Maria Rilke. I was happy with the progress I 
was making. 
At the same time, it became increasingly clear to me that the book was 
going to take longer than anticipated. The reasons were these. First of all, 
I soon discovered that impact studies tend to involve a considerable amount 
of reading, not only of the published works, but also of the unpublished 
materials and correspondence of a given author. Then it developed that 
some of my most stimulating research, particularly that pertaining to 
Thomas and Heinrich Mann, never came to a satisfactory resolution; be-
cause the source material was almost limitless, I was continually tempted to 
probe further and more deeply. Lastly, the absence of, and obvious need 
for, an adequate Nietzsche bibliography led me to enter into the time-
consuming task of editing with Karl Schlechta The International Nietzsche 
Bibliography, which has also become a continuing project.1 
1 The International Nietzsche Bibliography (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1960; Rev. and expanded ed., 1968). Supplements to The International 
Nietzsche Bibliography were published in Nietzsche-Studien. Internationales ]ahrbuch fur die 
Nietzsche-Forschung, 2 (1973), 320-39, and 4 (1975), 351-73. Present plans call for a third, 
I 
So it was that the work progressed slowly, so slowly in fact, that the 
individual studies that I completed were written not as chapters of a book, 
but rather as autonomous articles for diverse journals. Nevertheless, I was 
not unduly concerned, for I felt that, with little additional effort, the 
differing formats could be brought into harmony. It was my belief that I 
had plenty of time. Unfortunately, I was wrong. Sudden terminal illness 
has numbered my days. Because of my personal crisis, the unfinished studies 
will now remain unfinished, and the finished essays will retain their original, 
disparate form. 
My sadness at not being able to complete everything that I had set out 
to do has been considerably lessened by the fact that a growing number of 
scholars has in recent years been attracted to the general area of Nietzsche 
impact studies. In addition, it is consoling to know that the relationship of 
Morgenstern, Ernst, and Broch to Nietzsche has been examined in sound 
and comprehensive Masters' theses written under my direction. 2 
In all, there are five studies. Three of these deal with German authors, 
the dramatists Carl Sternheim and Georg Kaiser and the novelist Hermann 
Hesse; two deal with Austrians, the dramatist Arthur Schnitzler and the 
novelist Robert Musil. Fortunately, these five provide a fairly general 
coverage with regard to time, geographical location and genre. 
Before concluding these remarks, I should like to make it very clear 
that what I have sought to do is not so much to show general similarity of 
viewpoint as to demonstrate real impact. Hence I have concentrated more 
on catch-words, slogans, themes, and motifs than on intriguing parallelisms 
in outlook or style that may or may not derive from Nietzsche. Let there be 
no mistake. I respect comparative studies and consider them important. 
However, I feel that Nietzsche was one of those unique individuals who 
not only mirror the Zeitgeist, but who through their unusually articulate, 
colorful and novel thoughts, help to form it. I believe that Nietzsche not 
only reflected the same cultural background as other eminent contempo-
raries, but, to a considerable extent, influenced his time, on an almost global 
expanded edition of the International Nietzsche Bibliography, updated by David S. Thatcher 
of the University of Victoria, B.C., by the De Gruyter Publishing Company in Berlin in 
1977. 
2 Irmen H. Horne, "Nietzsche und Christian Morgenstern" (M.A. Thesis, University 
of North Carolina, 1971), 115 pp. William F. Lowe,Jr., "The Ethic of Paul Ernst as Mani-
fest in His Tragedies" (M.A. Thesis, University of North Carolina, 1965), 96 pp. George 
K. Miller, "Friedrich Nietzsche and Hermann Broch: Similarities and Influences" (M.A. 
Thesis, University of North Carolina, 1973), 76 pp. 
2 
scale. Thus, in the following studies I have discussed only such matters 
which, I feel, can reasonably be traced back to the inspiration of Nietzsche 
himself. 
I would like to express my warm thanks to Dr. Barbara Eger and to 
Prof. Siegfried Mews for generous and expert editorial assistance. 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina January 1975 
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Nietzsche's Geniemoral and Schnitzler' s Ethics 1 
In an article written in 1963, I sought in a very tentative fashion to 
demonstrate that Nietzsche had stimulated the thinking of the Austrian 
writer Arthur Schnitzler. 2 My introductory comments alluded to the fact 
that both approached homo sapiens from a strongly psychological viewpoint 
and that they shared such ideas as determinism, the subjective nature of 
truth, and the power of the subconscious. However, it was apparent to me 
that even if Schnitzler had derived all or a part ofhis psychological approach 
from Nietzsche, this could only be shown in a very circumstantial manner, 
as psychology and psychoanalysis were becoming generally popular, and 
Siegmund Freud lived only a few blocks away from Schnitzler in Vienna. 3 
I was particularly interested in ascertaining whether Nietz'sche's unique 
Geniemoral, which had caught the fancy of so many writers of the time, had 
not also had some effect on Schnitzler. Reading through Schnitzler' s work, 
it seemed at first that he himself was not going to be of much assistance. 
The references to Nietzsche were sparse and merely referred to him as an 
eminent modern thinker. The most detailed reference occurred in the 
novel Der Weg ins Freie (1903), in which friendly old Dr. Stauber men-
tioned favorably several ethical thinkers, including Nietzsche with his 
1 This study is essentially a reworking of an earlier article entitled "The Ethical Import 
of the Artist in the Works of Arthur Schnitzler," Modern Austrian Literature, 6/1-2 (1973), 
123-50. 
2 "Nietzsche and Schnitzler," Studies in Arthur Schnitzler, University of North 
Carolina Studies in the Germanic Languages and Literatures, No. 42 (Chapel Hill: Univer-
sity of North Carolina Press, 1963), pp. 95-rn7. 
3 Gerd Klaus Schneider in his 1968 University of Washington dissertation, "Arthur 
Schnitzler und die Psychologie seiner Zeit unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung der Philoso-
phie Friedrich Nietzsches," deals with this similarity of psychological outlook. Schneider 
relies entirely on parallelism of thought to deduce Nietzschean impact. He is content to 
operate on the following hypothesis: "If it can be shown that Nietzsche's psychological 
insights are similar to the psychological theories as they existed in Schnitzler's time, then it 
is possible to assume that Nietzsche also influenced the psychologist Schnitzler" ( cf. pp. 1 
and 3 59). 
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Obermensch idea, but then added that he did not believe that any of these 
ideas were essentially new.4 A careful survey of the plays, however, led me 
to believe that some impact by Nietzsche was possibly discemable in the 
Geniemoral of Schnitzler's artists and artist-types. 
I developed this idea briefly in the article and, as was to be expected, 
the reaction of the critics to my thesis was mixed. I was disturbed to note, 
however, that William H. Rey in his comment stated that I had returned to 
the superficial and outmoded thinking of the hostile Schnitzler critics of 
the earlier part of the century. 5 Quite to the contrary, I felt that I was 
showing something new and, at the same time, favorable to Schnitzler. 
To remedy this misunderstanding I directed a second article6 specifically 
at Rey's remarks, whereupon he was good enough to acknowledge the 
complexity of the situation in an understanding personal letter. Yet four 
years later a dissertation written under Rey's direction clearly rejected the 
notion that there could be a possible influence of Nietzsche's Geniemoral 
on Schnitzler's ethics.7 To compound the confusion, other Schnitzler 
critics, in their desire to stress the ethical nature of Schnitzler's writing, 
were emphasizing the role the doctors and the doctor types as the author's 
principal spokesmen. Therefore, it seemed that the situation was getting 
blurred and that Schnitzler, rather than being wronged by me, was being 
done an injustice by his would-be benefactors. Schnitzler's "moral nature" 
was emphasized to such an extent that his quality and his depth as an artist 
were being overlooked. So for a third time I decided to investigate the 
ethical import of the artist in the works of Arthur Schnitzler. 
In the following discussion, my comments will be directed towards 
answering three principal questions. First, does it seem likely or even 
possible that Nietzsche's Geniemoral influenced the morality of Schnitzler's 
artists and artist types? Second, is it conceivable that these artists are spokes-
4 Arthur Schnitzler, Die Erziihlenden Schriften (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 
1961), I, 775. S. Fischer also published two volumes of Die Dramatischen Werke (1962) and 
one volume of Aphorismen und Betrachtungen (1967). Henceforth all page references to 
Schnitzler's published works will be to this edition and will appear in parentheses in the 
body of the text. The two volumes of dramatic works will be referred to as D W l and II, 
the two volumes of narrative prose as ES I and II, and the volume of aphorisms as A. 
s William H. Rey, "Beitrage zur amerikanischen Schnitzlerforschung," German 
Quarterly, 37 (1964), 286-88. 
6 "Schnitzlers egoistische Kiinstlergestalten," Journal of the International Arthur 
Schnitzler Research Association, 4/2 (1965), 20-27. 
7 Cf. Schneider, pp. 31-37. 
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men for Schnitzler himself, or are they merely the object of his wrath? 
Third, to what extent do the doctors and doctor types serve as the author's 
mouthpiece? 
One of Schnitzler's best known artists is Filippo Loschi in Der Schleier 
der Beatrice ( 1899), a poet of Bologna at the time of the Renaissance. He is 
presented as a genius whose poetry is highly esteemed by everyone in the 
city. At his death the Duke says of him: 
Ein Lied von dem, verweht's der Zufall nicht-
Ist ew'ger als der kiihnste unsrer Siege, 
Der wieder nur Vergangliches erringt ! 
Denn dieser war ein Bote, ausgesandt, 
Das GriiBen einer hingeschwundnen Welt 
Lebendig jeder neuen zu bestellen 
Und hinzuwandeln iiber allen Tod. (DWI, 676--77) 
Loschi himself is free of any doubts as to his ability. But his self-esteem as 
an artist seems to be the only thing about which his feelings do not waver, 
for he is a person of tempestuous passions and volatile emotions. He had 
worshipped his fiancee, the Countess Teresina Fantuzzi, and immortalized 
her in his verse. Then, in a pique he left her and at a street dance fell madly 
in love with a commoner, Beatrice Nardi. A few days later his ardor for 
Beatrice turned to ice when she naively revealed an unconscious admiration 
for the Duke. And so it continues. 
However, Loschi's volatile and contradictory nature is neither petty 
nor insincere; he simply lives entirely in the experience of the moment. 
Thus, when he is filled with his love for Beatrice, he dreads the thought of 
death and purchases horses at an exorbitant price so that he and Beatrice 
can flee the besieged city. One might say that at this particular moment his 
love oflife makes him a coward. Yet, not an hour later, when he becomes 
disillusioned with Beatrice, he gives the horses away, spends the night in 
revelry, and has no thought ofleaving. Now he appears brash and heroic. 
Similarly, while in love with Beatrice he callously ignores all appeals to 
remember his vow to Teresina. But as soon as his love for Beatrice fades,· 
he berates himself for having deserted Teresina, and seeks death at the 
hands of her brother. 
Loschi's actions reflect not only his character but his outlook. He 
likens his moods to the changing seasons and views his vacillation as an 
expression of the law of nature: 
6 
Wer spricht von Schuld? Im Herbste fallen Blatter, 
Im Friihjahr sprieBen andre ! Sagt 1hr drum, 
DaB einer schuldig ward? Ich bin es nicht ! 
Es sei, daB Schuldigsein bedeutet: ew'gen 
Gesetzen unterworfen sein. Ist's so, 
Dann wartet Schuld von Kindheit auf in uns, 
Wie unser Tod in unserm Busen harrt, 
Solang wir atmen. W enn ich schuldig bin, 
So ist die Jugend ein Geschenk der Holle, 
1st Schonheit Stinde und das Gliick ein Gift, 
So tiickisch wie kein andres. (DWI, 561) 
The only obligation he will acknowledge is to his own feelings of the 
moment: 
Wahn ist nur eins: das nicht verlassen konnen, 
Was uns nichts ist, ob Freund, ob Frau, ob Heimat,-
Und eins ist Wahrheit: Gliick, woher es kommt ! (DWI, 567) 
He regards himself free of conventional restraints and above the common 
run of men: "Wo ich bin, gilt nicht, was unten/ Schicksal und Weg 
bestimmt" (DWI, 569). Rather than surrender Beatrice, he is prepared to 
sacrifice Bologna, "als meines Gliickes wiird'ger Opferbrand" (ibid.). 
Whatever one feels about Loschi, the fact remains that morally con-
sidered he is a fickle egotist and a creature of whims. It must not be for-
gotten, however, that his bond with the fleeting moment also has a positive 
side, which may be seen in his profound awareness of the beauty and 
uniqueness of existence. Indeed, it would not be incorrect to say that his 
ethical vacillation was the necessary counterpart of his poetic insight. 
Loschi's appreciation of life is most apparent in the scene in which 
Beatrice pleads with him that they die together. He knows what it is to 
lose life, to die. So terrible is this realization that he cannot believe Beatrice 
is aware of the full import of her words. Repeatedly he tries to impress 
upon her the meaning of her request and finally in desperation, convinced 
that she still does not understand, he resorts to a brutal ruse, pretending 
that the wine they have been drinking has been poisoned. Beatrice emits an 
anguished cry which he interprets as a sign of fright and panic. Completely 
disillusioned, he sends her back to the Duke and himself now really quaffs 
a poisoned draught. It is bitterly ironic that his final homage to life is to 
commit suicide. The Duke speaks in the spirit ofLoschi when, going forth 
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to do battle against hopeless odds, he says: "Das Leben ist die Fi.ille, nicht 
die Zeit,/ Und noch der nachste Augenblick ist weit !" (DWI, 679). These 
are the last lines of the play and express a basic theme. 
Because of Loschi's importance to our understanding of Schnitzler's 
artists, we should like to quote one of the more significant passages which 
reveal the intensity and depth of his outlook: 
Nicht wunderlich, for dich nicht!-Nein!-Du bist 
Zu staunen nicht gemacht. Niemals hat dich 
Des Daseins Wunder namenlos erschreckt, 
Nie bist du vor der Buntheit dieser Welt 
In Andacht hingesunken, und daB du, 
Die Beatrice ist, und ich, Filippo, 
Sich unter den unendlich vielen fanden, 
Hat nie mit tiefem Schauer dich erfiillt .... 
All dies ist Dasein-das bist du, das ich, 
Hier unten ruht die Stadt, drin atmen Menschen, 
Dort stiirzt ins W eite StraB' und StraBe hin 
Ins Land, ans Meer,-und iiberm Wasser wieder 
Menschen und Stadte;-ober uns gebreitet 
Dies blauende Gewolbe und sein Glanz, 
Und alles dies ist unser, denn wir sind! 
Und morgen schon gehort es uns so wenig, 
Als alles Lichtes Wunderfiille Blinden, 
Gelahmten aller Wege Lust und Fernen. (DWI, 634-35) 
Thus we are presented with the strange dilemma that it is the fickle and 
egotistical artist alone who can fully appreciate the miracle oflife and the 
incomprehensible annihilation of death. 
Not long thereafter Schnitzler portrayed the Renaissance artist anew 
in the one-act play, Die Frau mit dem Dolche (1900). This artist, an unknown 
master who died around 1530, comes briefly to life in the day-dream of a 
young woman. 
Pauline, the wife of an acclaimed playwright, has met her admirer 
Leonhard in an art gallery. Leonhard seeks to win her by making it clear 
that her husband is a consummate egotist who has twice betrayed her. Not 
only did he deceive her with another woman, but then when Pauline 
forgave him, he used the episode as the basis ofhis successful play, exposing 
her to public ridicule. Yet Pauline is proud of her husband and sure of his 
love. 
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But as she gazes up at a beautiful painting above her bearing the 
caption, "Die Frau mit dem Dolche," she suddenly identifies with the 
character and relives the scene. It is she, Paola, who has stabbed the young 
man, her lover, out of a sense of shame and frustration. Why? Because her 
returning husband had not taken offense and avenged her when Lionhardo 
not only confessed that he had slept with her but insisted that her painter-
husband Remigio exact the full penalty. To her consternation, Remigio's 
sole reaction to the confession had been "Gleichgiiltigkeit" (DWI, 716) 
and to the stabbing, ecstatic joy over her graceful pose which is just what 
he needed for his painting : 
War dies der Sinn? 1st mein Ge bet erhort, 
DaB for mein Bildnis mir Erleuchtung werde? 
Ja, so vollend' ich's ! Der du dies gefiigt, 
0 Himmel, eine Stunde lang gewahre 
Der Seele Frieden, Ruhe dieser Hand. (DWI, 718) 
Recovering from her day-dream, Pauline considers for a moment and 
then without love but with a sense of determination, promises Leonhard 
the tryst he has sought. She now realizes that all artists, including her 
husband, are inherent egotists true only to their art. 
The theme of the nature of the artist is taken up in another one-act 
play written in the same year, Lebendiie Stunden. Rather than being a 
Renaissance virtuoso, the protagonist Heinrich is a young contemporary 
writer who has not yet made a name for himself. It is clear, however, that 
he is to be considered as a representative of the true artist; this is evident from 
the statements of his opponent Hausdorfer who is angry with him but 
admits his uniqueness. After rhetorically asking the gardener Borromaus 
whether he knew what it meant to be a poet, Hausdorfer says: "Nichts 
wissen Sie, gar nichts. Wir wissen das alle nicht, wir gewohnlichen Men-
schen, die nichts weiter konnen als ihre Garten bepflanzen ... '' (DWI, 692). 
Although it has been an easy matter to replace him, Hausdorfer, just 
another white-collar worker when he had retired, it was not always so 
easy to replace a poet who is a rare and unique being: 
Aber ein Dichter-das ist schon eine andere Art von Mensch wie unsereiner, 
Borromaus. Wenn so einer in Pension geht, kann's passieren, daB die Stelle 
recht lang unbesetzt bleibt. Ja, so einer muB auf sich schauen, das ist er der 
Welt schuldig-verstehen S', Borromaus? (DWI, 693) 
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It is because Hausdorfer considers Heinrich to be a real artist that he doubts 
the latter's protestations of sorrow over his mother's death. "Ich kenne 
dich ! Euch alle kenn' ich, ich wei8, wie ihr seid" (DWI, 697), Hausdorfer 
asserts and explains what he means, by relating how a composer he knew 
had written a song while his only child lay dead in the same room. Such 
behavior has convinced Hausdorfer that all artists are arrogant egotists: 
"Seid ihr nicht einer wie der andere? Hochmiitig seid ihr-das ist es: 
hochmiitig, alle, die Gro8en wie die Kleinen!" (DWI, 702). The events of 
the play justify Hausdorfer's belief, for it develops that Heinrich has 
virtually murdered his invalid mother. By failing to conceal his sense of 
frustration at having to care for her when he could have been writing, he 
induces her to take an overdose of morphium. 
But again the artist has a more favorable side. With respect to the 
composer, it is not sure that Schnitzler agreed with Hausdorfer's interpre-
tation of the apparently callous composer's feelings. Certainly, the words 
of the composer when he entered, ''Horen Sie, Herr Hausdorfer, das ist fiir 
mein armes Buberl. Grad ist mir die Melodie eingefallen" (DWI, 698), 
do not necessarily indicate that he was devoid of feeling. As Schnitzler 
once said in defining the artist, "Beim Dichter ist die Linie des Lebens und 
des Schaffens ein und dieselbe" (A, 150). 
Even more significant for an understanding of the artist as presented 
in the play is the final confrontation between Hausdorfer and Heinrich. 
The former contends that a few hours of the sick mother's life were worth 
more than all of Heinrich's art. Heinrich replies with dignity and passion: 
Lebendige Stunden? Sie leben doch nicht !anger als der letzte, der sich ihrer 
erinnert. Es ist nicht der schlechteste Beruf, solchen Stunden Dauer zu 
verleihen, iiber ihre Zeit hinaus.-Leben Sie wohl, Herr Hausdorfer. Ihr 
Schmerz gibt Ihnen heute noch das Recht, mich miBzuverstehen. Im 
Friihjahr, wenn Ihr Garten aufs neue bliiht, sprechen wir uns wieder. Denn 
auch Sie leben weiter. (DWI, 702) 
Heinrich is convinced that it is the noble task of the artist to preserve the 
fleeting beauty of such "living hours," and that when Hausdorfer has 
gotten over his sorrow, he will recognize this fact. As in the case ofLoschi, 
the egotism of the artist is grounded in his existential awareness and his 
dedication to art. 
Perhaps Schnitzler's most penetrating analysis of the artist is to be 
found in Der einsame Weg ( 1904). There are several artist-figures in this play, 
IO 
but the one most fully characterized is the painter Julian Fichtner who has 
the spark of genius. This is attested to by the wise and gentle artist and 
art-critic, Professor Wegrat. In the latter's opinion, Fichtner was the "most 
promising" artist he had ever known. To Dr. Reumann's assertion that 
people usually manage to achieve what they are capable of achieving, 
W egrat had this answer: 
Nicht immer. Julian war gewiB zu Hoherem bestimmt. Was ihm gefehlt 
hat, war die Fahigkeit, sich zu sammeln, der innere Friede. Er konnte sich 
nirgends dauernd heimisch fiihlen; und das Ungliick war, daB er sich auch 
in seinen Arbeiten sozusagen nur voriibergehend aufhielt. (D W I, 772) 
In personality and attitude Fichtner resembles his forebears, Loschi, 
Remigio and Heinrich. He had been passionately in love with his friend 
Wegrat's fiancee, Gabriele, and then, suddenly awakening as if from a 
state ofintoxication, deserted her the night before their intended elopement. 
He terminated a second love-affair abruptly when he learned that his 
sweetheart, the actress Irene Herms, had while on tour shown a passing 
interest in another man. Like his fellows, Fichtner is an egocentric, fickle, 
ruthless artist. He has had only one purpose, one love in life: his art. He 
admitted jilting Gabriele because he feared that marriage would interfere 
with his career. Without a hint of pathos or remorse, he stated that had 
she committed suicide on his account, the sacrifice would not have been 
too great. Indeed, he says the days after his desertion were among the 
happiest and most rewarding in his life (DWI, 811-12). 
In the play Fichtner is past his prime; his artistic powers have waned, 
his goals have faded. The inner fire no longer suffices and he has become 
lonely. He now seeks the affection of his son who has lived all these years 
as the child of another. His attempt meets with failure. Felix chooses to 
remain with his kindly foster-father, Professor Wegrat, who has shown 
him so much love and affection. 
Is Fichtner castigated more harshly than his predecessors? Has Schnitz-
ler changed his attitude toward the artist? We think not. Let us examine 
the facts. 
There is nothing either petty or dissembling about Fichtner. Particular-
ly in his heart-to-heart talk with his son Felix, in which he tells the latter 
the entire story of his desertion of Gabriele, he is honest and sincere. 
Although he hopes to win Felix as his friend, his words remain calm, 
devoid of sentimentality or false pathos. He does not seek to justify or 
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minimize his guilt-it is here that he says that the sacrifice of Gabriele's life 
would not have been too great for the end involved. It is here that he admits 
having felt no remorse for his deed. 
But how can we truly tell what is in the heart of a man when he is his 
own witness? We cannot. And so it is important to consult the opinion of 
another character, the artist van Sala, often viewed as the best self-portrait 
of Schnitzler himself. Von Sala is a sophisticated, rather reserved dramatist 
who eschews sentimentality and hypocrisy. His career has been marked 
with success, but his wife and daughter have died and he, too, is now aging 
and lonely. It must be observed that in all matters of social intercourse and 
etiquette van Sala has observed the proper forms, and he has the admiration 
and respect of his friends. 
Von Sala has known Fichtner for many years, has in fact been closer to 
him than almost any other person, although his reserve prevents him from 
thinking in terms of such sentimental relationships as friendship: 
Sie wissenja, daB Sie mir viel lieber sind als die meisten andern Menschen. 
Wir bringen einander die Stichworte so geschickt-finden Sie nicht? Es 
gibt pathetische Leute, die solche Beziehungen Freundschaft nennen. 
Obrigens ist es nicht unmoglich, daB wir uns im vorigen Jahrhundert 
"du" gesagt, am Ende gar, daB Sie sich an meinem Busen ausgeweint 
hatten. (DWI, 780) 
Formerly, when Fichtner had not been on one ofhis frequent journeys, the 
two men had taken long walks together and discussed "die tiefst' und 
hochsten Dinge dieser Welt" (ibid.). Thus it is apparent that von Sala is a 
brusquely ho~est and unsentimental person who is intimately familiar with 
Fichtner. What is his judgment? 
He tells Fichtner that he has no right to his son's affection, but that his 
only guilt lies in the fact that he is an artist, that he is a person who despite 
the best of intentions cannot be unselfish, cannot give of himself, cannot 
truly love, and must inevitably face old age alone. These words are no mere 
attempt at consolation, for van Sala is speaking not only to Fichtner, he is 
also speaking to himself. At bottom he feels, Fichtner and he are two of a 
kind who have belonged to no one and who are damned in old age to 
loneliness. Even if Felix had consented to view Fichtner as his father, even 
if the latter had a wife by his side, and children and grandchildren at his 
feet, indeed even ifhe were surrounded by bacchantes, he would still have 
to face old age alone: 
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Und was hiilfe es Ihnen, wenn er [Felix] bliebe? Was hiilfe es Ihnen selbst, 
wenn er irgend etwas wie kindliche Zartlichkeit zu Ihnen empfande? ... 
Und wenn Sie eine Frau an Ihrer Seite hatten, waren Sie heute nicht 
allein? . . . Und wenn Kinder und Enkel um Sie lebten, waren Sie es 
nicht? ... Und wenn Sie sich Ihren Reichtum, Ihren Ruhm, Ihr Genie 
bewahrt hatten-waren Sie es nicht? ... Und wenn uns ein Zug von 
Bacchanten begleitet-den Weg hinab gehen wir alle allein ... wir, die selbst 
niemandem gehort haben. (DWI, 826; emphasis added) 
For the egotistical artist is incapable of experiencing love: 
Was hat das, was unsereiner in die Welt bringt, mit Liebe zu tun? Es mag 
allerlei Lustiges, Verlogenes, Zartliches, Gemeines, Leidenschaftliches sein, 
das sich als Liebe ausgibt-aber Liebe ist es doch nicht ... Haben wir jemals 
ein Opfer gebracht, von dem nicht unsere Sinnlichkeit oder unsere Eitel-
keit ihren Vorteil gehabt hatte? ... Haben wir je gezogert, anstandige 
Menschen zu betriigen oder zu beliigen, wenn wir dadurch um eine Stunde 
des Gliicks oder der Lust reicher werden konnten? ... Mein lieber Julian, 
wir haben die Tiiren offen stehen und unsere Schatze sehen lassen-aber 
Verschwender sind wir nicht gewesen. Sie so wenig als ich. Wir konnen 
uns ruhig die Hande reichen, Julian. (DWI, 826--27) 
It may be argued that even von Sala lacks the proper perspective to 
judge Fichtner objectively. In this case, we may turn once again to Professor 
Wegrat, the director of the art academy, who combines in his personality 
the "Beamten" and the artist-as he says ironically of himself: "Der malt 
jedesJahr sein braves Bild fiir die Ausstellung und kann beim besten Willen 
nicht anders" (DWI, 772). Wegrat is both insider and outsider. He is an 
artist of sorts but he is also a deeply unselfish person-like Doctor Reu-
mann. And so when Reumann pointedly remarks, referring to Fichtner, 
that it was a moot question who fostered art and aided the world more, 
"Beamte wie Sie, Herr Professor, oder ... die sogenannten Genies" (DWI, 
772), Wegrat's reply is of utmost importance. Eschewing false modesty, 
he insists that the accomplishments of the genius stand above discussion-
like the elements: "O, es fallt mir gar nicht ein, den Bescheidenen zu spielen. 
Aber was die Genies anbelangt, von denen wollen wir lieber nicht reden. 
Das ist eine Welt fiir sich und auBerhalb der Diskussion-wie die Elemente" 
(DWI, 772). 
In W egrat' s opinion, Fichtner was an artistic genius. Ifhe had achieved 
only moderate success in his life-time, that was to be attributed to his innate 
restlessness. Ifhe appeared irresponsible and egotistical, that was not for the 
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likes of Reumann or himself to judge. The gemus stands outside the 
bounds of convention. 
While writing Der einsame Weg, Schnitzler was also at work on his 
novel, Der Weg ins Freie (1908), a good part of which was completed in 
1903. Hence it is not altogether surprising to discover in the novel a pair of 
artists, Georg von W ergenthin and Hermann Bermann who, although 
considerably younger than Fichtner and von Sala, have a relationship 
somewhat similar to that which exists between the latter two. W ergenthin, 
twenty-seven years old, is a composer, musician and conductor whose 
songs have already won some critical acclaim. He possesses talent and 
deeply loves music. As the novel ends he is happily advancing to his first 
major position as conductor of the orchestra at the court theater in Detmold. 
Wergenthin is superficially considerate and tender, but he cannot 
really give of himself. In his affair with Anna Rosner-a main theme in the 
novel-he resembles Fichtner. From the beginning he knows it will be a 
passing affair like the others: "Denn da8 auch dieses A benteur, so emst und 
hold es begonnen, zu einem Ende bestimmt war, wu8te Georg selbst in 
dieser Stunde, nur ohne jeden Schauer" (ES I, 712). As with his former 
sweethearts, he experiences a sense of freedom when he leaves Anna: 
Ein ahnliches Gefiihl der Befreitheit kam freilich beinahe jedesmal iiber ihn, 
wenn er, auch nach schonerem Zusammensein, von einer Geliebten 
Abschied nahm. Selbst als er Anna an ihrem Haustor verlassen hatte, vor 
drei Tagen, nach dem ersten Abend vollkommenen Gliicks, war er sich, 
friiher als jeder anderen Regung, der Freude bewuBt geworden, wieder 
allein zu sein. Und gleich darauf, ehe noch das Gefiihl des Danks und die 
Ahnung einer wirklichen Zusammengehorigkeit mit diesem sanften, sein 
ganzes W esen mit so viel lnnigheit umschlieBenden Geschopf in seiner 
Seele emporzudringen vermochte, flog durch sie ein sehnsuchtsvoller 
Traum von Fahrten iiber ein schimmerndes Meer, von Kiisten, die sich 
verfiihrerisch nahern, von Spaziergangen an Ufern, ... von blauen Femen, 
Ungebundenheit und Alleinsein. (ES I, 712; emphasis added) 
During Anna's pregnancy, Georg has moments when he is convinced 
that he is deeply in love with her (ES I, 823), but he is generally more 
inclined to view the whole situation as a "Malheur." At times he simply puts 
her out of his mind and on one occasion composes a song "als Anna und 
das Kind fiir ihn vollig vergessen waren" (ES I, 951). On a warm summer 
night he is attracted to Therese Golowski and, almost in Anna's sight, kisses 
Therese in frustrated desire: "Ihre Lippen ruhten aufeinander, einen kurzen 
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Augenblick, der mehr erfiillt war von der wehen Lust der Liige als von 
irgend einer andern" (ES I, 822). Not long thereafter, the mention of 
another old flame sets Georg's heart to pounding: "Der Name Sissy zuckte 
an Georgs Herzen vorbei, wie ein glitzernder Dolch. Er wuBte es plotzlich, 
in wenig Tagen wiirde er bei ihr sein. Seine Sehnsucht schwoll so machtig 
auf, daB er es selbst kaum begriff" (ES I, 844). When the child arrives it is 
still-born, and Anna experiences great mental anguish and physical suf-
fering. Nevertheless, only a short time later Georg returns her to her parents 
and with no feeling of remorse sets out on his new career: 
Georg aber war es gut und frei zumut. Er faBte den EntschluB, die drei Tage, 
die jetzt ihm gehorten, so verniinftig als moglich auszuniitzen. Das beste 
war wohl, irgendwo in einer schonen, stillen Landschaft allein zu sein, 
auszuruhen und sich zur neuen Arbeit zu sammeln ... In Georgs Seele war 
ein mildes Abschiednehmen von mancherlei Gliick und Leid . . . und 
zugleich ein GriiBen unbekannter Tage, die aus der W eite der Welt seiner 
Jugend entgegenklangen. (ES I, 958) 
In the same lightly ironic way that von Sala understands Fichtner, Bermann 
understands W ergenthin and absolves him of guilt: 
Und ich versichre Sie ... Sie haben damit gewiB keine sogenannte Schuld 
auf sich geladen. Bei einem andern war es vielleicht Schuld gewesen. Aber 
bei Ihnen, der von Natur aus-Sie verzeihen schon-ziemlich leichtfertig 
und ein biBchen gewissenlos angelegt ist, war es gewiB nicht Schuld. (ES 
I, 957) 
Whereas Fichtner and W ergenthin have mvch in common, they are 
not like two peas in a pod. The former was characterized as a genius too 
restless to realize his full potential, the latter is ultimately seen to be more 
interested in appreciating and understanding music than in composing. 
W ergenthin reaches this understanding of himself while attending a per-
formance of Tristan and Isolde: 
WuBte er denn, ob ihm gegeben war Menschen <lurch seine Kunst zu 
zwingen, wie dem Meister, der sich heute hier vernehmen lieB? Sieger zu 
werden iiber das Bedenkliche, Klagliche, Jammervolle des Alltags? Un-
geduld und Zweifel wollten aus seinem lnnern emporsteigen; doch rasch 
bannten Wille und Einsicht sie von dannen, und nun fiihlte er sich wieder 
so rein begliickt wie immer, wenn er schone Musik horte, ohne daran zu 
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denken, daB er selbst oft als Schopfer wirken und gelten wollte. Von allen 
seinen Beziehungen zu der geliebten Kunst blieb in solchen Ausgenblicken 
nur die eine i.ibrig, sie mit tieferem Verstehen aufnehmen zu durfen, als irgend 
ein anderer Mensch. Under fi.ihlte, daB Heinrich die Wahrheit gesprochen 
hatte, als sie zusammen durch einen von Morgentau feuchten Wald 
gefahren waren: nicht schopferische Arbeit,-die Atmosphdre seiner Kunst 
allein war es, die ihm zum Dasein notig war; kein Verdammter war er wie 
Heinrich, den es immer trieb zu fassen, zu formen, zu bewahren, und dem 
die Welt in Sti.icke zerfiel, wenn sie seiner gestaltenden Hand entgleiten 
wollte. (ES I, 921; emphasis added) 
To repeat: W ergenthin comes to the realization that his ultimate 
objective is the understanding and appreciation of music. Does this imply 
that he is a pseudo-artist, comparable to the Literat in the field of creative 
writing? We do not think so. Wergenthin has, in analyzing himself, 
virtually given a definition of the born conductor. His strength lies not in 
creation but in interpretation. What is of greatest importance: his heart is in 
his art, his music, whether in creating or in interpreting, and not with such 
matters as power, wealth, advancement or intrigue. Wergenthin is in the 
last analysis an artist, 8 even if perhaps not the greatest. But in delineating 
the nature of the artist, it will be recalled that Hausdorfer made no neat 
distinctions. For him artists were essentially alike, great and small. To 
confirm this line of reasoning, we have the same recourse as in Der einsame 
Weg to consider the greater artist, in this case Heinrich Bermann.9 
8 Even if one were to conclude that W ergenthin is an aesthete and dilettante rather 
than an artist, he is no more selfish or narcissistic than the true artists, so that the ethical 
import remains the same. 
9 As in the case of von Sala, Bermann is frequently identified with Schnitzler. Cf. for 
example the essay by H. B. Garland, "Arthur Schnitzler," German Men of Letters, II, ed. 
Alex Natan (London, 1963), p. 72: "Heinrich Bermann, the Jewish author, has long been 
known as a self-portrait, and the tormenting relationship with the actress, the sadistic 
refusal alike to forgive or to relinquish, and the conclusion in her suicide are closely paral-
leled by an episode in Schnitzler's life." Garland believes that the author projected "facets 
of his own erotic life into two sharply differentiated characters" and that not only Ber-
mann's but also von Wergenthin's "erotic life is unmistakably that of his creator." Franc,:oise 
Derre, L'Oeuvre d'Arthur Schnitzler (Paris, 1966) notes that Bermann is ''l'un des plus 
etroitement lies aussi a Georg von W ergenthin" (p. 260). Although she feels that Bermann' s 
discussion of the need to avoid truth in drama reflects Schnitzler's view on the subject and 
is a "defense anticipee et ironique de Professor Bernhardi'' (p. 263), she is careful not to make 
him one with his author. The fact is that Schnitzler outwardly sought to distance himself 
from Bermann, describing the latter as follows: "ein hagerer, bartloser Mensch mit 
diisteren Augen und mit etwas zu langem schlichtem Haar ... und <lessen Gebaren und 
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We have already seen that Wergenthin viewed the thirty-year old 
playwright "auf dem Wege zum Ruhm" (ES I, 942) as a "Verdammter ... 
den es immer trieb zu fassen, zu formen, zu bewahren" (ES I, 921). Bermann 
himself makes it clear that the only moments he, with his cynical and 
pessimistic cast of mind, really treasures are those of creative activity. 
Although he is quite ready to admit that "Ruhm, Reichtum, Wirkung in 
die Weite" are things that are illusory and can be dispensed with, he is 
unwilling to give up his faith in "etwas so Unzweifelhaftes ... wie es die 
Augenblicke des innern Kraftgefiihls sind" (ES I, 694). When the older and 
highly successful novelist Nurnberger seeks to elicit a disavowal with the 
remark: "Inneres Kraftgefiihl ! W arum sagen Sie nicht gleich Seligkeit des 
Schaffens?" Bermann calmly retorts: "Gibts, Nurnberger!" 
Like Loschi, the playwright is brusquely honest and of vascillating 
mood. At times he despises himself. "Und wenn das einmal geschehen ist, 
gibt es keinen Tropf und keinen Schur ken, mit dem wir uns nicht innerlich 
gegen uns selbst verbunden" (ES I, 670--71). At other times he feels superior 
and immune to conventional assessment: "Es gibt auch andre Stimmungen, 
in denen mir uberhaupt nichts und niemand etwas anhaben kann. Da hab 
ich nur dieses eine Gefiihl: was wiBt Ihr denn alle, was wiBt Ihr denn von 
mir ... " (ES I, 671). 
Like von Sala with Fichtner, Bermann considers himself essentially 
similar in character to W ergenthin. It is significant that in the quotation 
given above, in which he berates himself, he had continued: "Entschuldigen 
Sie, wenn ich 'wir' sage .... " Bermann's character is particularly well 
illuminated in his relations with his distant actress-sweetheart. He writes 
her long and recriminatory letters accusing her of being unfaithful, but he 
has no desire to marry her or even to be with her, as he prefers "lieber 
Schmerzen als Verantwortungen" (ES I, 729). Although because of her he 
experiences "Qualen der Eifersucht," he has no compunctions at spending 
his evenings with an attractive blonde-"um sich zu betauben" (ES I, 708). 
A passage in a letter from the actress that hints at infidelity causes him more 
anguish than his deranged father who is confined to a mental institution or 
his mother and sister "die verzweifeln" (ES I, 679); but when the actress 
visits him to effect a reconciliation, he coldly rejects her. Her threats of 
Aussehen ... an einen fanatischenjiidischen Lehrer aus der Provinz erinnerte" (ES I, 647), 
unelegant in dress and tactless in his behaviour. Nevertheless Bermann shares with Schnitz-
ler his keen knowledge of the human psyche, his pessimism and scepticism, and his dedica-
tion to art. 
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suicide leave him unmoved, and when she ultimately takes her life, he 
stoutly denies any guilt: 
Denken Sie, eine Frau, die Sie liebt, wiirde Sie verfolgen, eine Frau, vor 
deren Beriihrung Ihnen aus irgendeinem Grunde graut, wiirde Ihnen 
schworen, sie bringt sich um, wenn Sie sie verschmahen. Waren Sie ver-
pflichtet ihr nachzugeben? Konn ten Sie sich den leisesten V orwurf machen, 
wenn sie wirklich aus sogenannter verschmahter Liebe in den Tod ginge? 
Wiirden Sie sich als ihr Marder fiihlen? Das ist <loch lauter Unsinn, nicht 
wahr? Also wenn Sie glauben, daB es <las sogennannte Gewissen ist, <las 
michjetzt peinigt, so irren Sie sich. (ES I, 893) 
After the suicide Heinrich is in strangely good humor, which Nurn-
berger attributes to the fact that tragic events may indirectly flatter the 
vanity of "such individuals," who may even feel that the event can be of 
value to their art: 
Menschen, die sich so viel, fast ausschlieBlich mit sich selbst beschaftigen 
wie er, verwindenja seelische Schmerzen iiberraschend schnell. Auf solchen 
Naturen, und wohl nicht nur auf solchen, lastet <las geringfiigigste phy-
sische Unbehagen viel driickender als jede Art von Herzenspein, selbst 
Untreue und Tod geliebter Personen. Es riihrt wohl daher, daB jeder 
Seelenschmerz irgendwie unserer Eitelkeit schmeichelt, was man von 
einem Typhus oder einem Magenkatarrh nicht behaupten kann. Und beim 
Kiinstler kommt vielleicht dazu, daB aus einem Magenkatarrh absolut 
nichts zu holen ist ... (ES I, 93 r) 
It is clear from the passage that Nurnberger views Heinrich as a typical 
egocentric artist.10 
Bermann was also egotistical in his relations with other people, as 
W ergenthin realized earlier, accustomed to associating with them only as 
long as they provided a suitable subject "fiir seine psychologischen In-
teressen" and then dropping them again "mit der groBten Rucksichts-
losigkeit" when he felt like it (ES I, 768). 
It should be clear, then, that Wergenthin and Bermann, like Fichtner 
and von Sala, differ in their personality and in their ability, but they do have 
one basic thing in common : they both are changeable, ruthless, egotistical 
10 Nurnberger is at first referring to the egotist per se, but his final sentence makes it 
clear what he says is particularly true of the artist-and that Nurnberger has the artist 
particularly in mind. 
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artists. They are also counterparts to von Sala and Fichtner in their capacity 
as aging artists, who must pay the price for their egotism in unloved 
loneliness. 
Georg Merklin in Der Puppenspieler (1906) is also such a person. In his 
prime he toyed with the affections of those who loved him, arrogantly 
fancying that he was playing the role of destiny in their lives. Years later, 
he discovers that destiny has played a joke on him: the less gifted but also 
less selfish objects of his fun-making have gained the warmth and affection 
of family life, while he is doomed to loneliness. However, as one can argue 
that there is no evidence that he is really talented or that his contempt for 
the hack-writing he does is not just another case of "sour grapes," we will 
turn to an aging artist of real stature, Casanova. 
As William Rey has pointed out,11 the great lover in the novella, 
Casanovas Heimfahrt (1918), is not only a genius in the erotic sphere, he 
has the potential to be a genius in many areas: 
Ja, hatte er in jiingeren Jahren MuBe und Geduld gehabt, sich mit derlei 
Arbeiten emstlicher zu beschaftigen,-das wuBte er wohl-den ersten 
dieses Fachs, Di ch tern und Philosophen, hatte er es gleichgetan: ebenso 
wie er als Finanzmann oder Diplomat mit groBerer Beharrlichkeit und 
Vorsicht, als ihm eigen war, zum Hochsten ware berufen gewesen. (ES 
II, 269) 
Casanova resembles Fichtner in his lack of patience. But whereas the latter 
grew restless for a change of scene, Casanova threw "alle seine Lebensplane 
hin, wenn ein neues Liebesabenteur lockte" (ES II, 269). 
In the novella, Casanova has grown old, his skin has become yellow 
and wrinkled, the girls no longer smile at him, and his pride has suffered. 
But in his tremendous egotism, his almost heroic arrogance, he refuses to 
yield. The story deals with one incident in his futile battle against old age 
and death. 
The beautiful and intelligent Marcolina has displayed disinterest and 
even a trace of disgust in his presence. Enraged, Casanova devises an 
ingenious and successful scheme to win her for a night. In the dark Mar-
colina believes that she is with her young lover, the lieutenant Lorenzi. But 
Casanova's vanity induces him to remain with Marcolina, rather than to 
leave as originally planned before dawn. He falls asleep and when he 
awakens the girl is looking down at him in shame and disgust. Had her eyes 
11 William H. Rey, Arthur Schnitzler (Berlin, 1968), p. 32. 
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said "Dieb-Wiistling-Schurke" his ego would have survived, but her 
glance reveals only the two words "Alter Mann" (ES II, 3 IO). Humiliated 
he takes his leave, to be stopped a few moments later by Lorenzi who 
challenges him to a duel. Casanova senses danger but has no fear. Seeing 
the handsome youth standing there, the image of himself thirty years 
earlier, to whom only hours before he had said "Wir sind vom gleichen 
Stoff gemacht, sind Bruder im Geiste" (ES II, 296), Casanova is tempted 
to throw away his sword and embrace Lorenzi. But the latter's eyes are 
cold and the duel begins. The lieutenant appears like a young God and 
Casanova's sense of frustration reawakens. With the thought, "Er ist nur 
jung, ich aber bin Casanova" he stabs Lorenzi through the heart (ES II, 313). 
He looks down at the dead youth for a moment, murmurs "Gliicklicher," 
and then kisses him on the forehead (ES II, 3 14). The futility of his action 
has become apparent to him; for the egocentric artist there is no escape 
from the despair and loneliness of old age. 
As Lorenzi is the mirror image of Casanova when he was young, it is 
understandable that he shares the latter's egotistical and, one is tempted to 
stress, Nietzschean Geniemoral. Casanova had quickly recognized this 
similarity of outlook: 
Sie haben gar keine Vorurteile, so wenig als ich sie babe oder jemals hatte; 
und was ich von Ihnen zu verlangen willens bin, ist nichts andres, als was 
ich selbst an Ihrer Stelle unter den gleichen Umstanden zu erfiillen mich 
keinen Augenblick besonnen hatte,-wie ich mich auch tatsachlich nie 
gescheut babe, wenn es das Schicksal oder auch nur meine Laune so for-
derte, eine Schurkerei zu begehen oder vielmehr das, was die Narren dieser 
Ertle so zu nennen pflegen. (ES II, 296) 
Lorenzi demonstrates his "immoralism" by making love on the same 
night to Marcolina, whom he adores, and to the Marchesa, from whom he 
accepts expensive gifts. He betrays Marcolina to Casanova in order to free 
himself from embarrassment and debt, and then later gives his life in a duel 
to save her honor. Like Filippo Loschi, Casanova and Lorenzi lend their 
actions dignity, despite their total disregard for conventional standards, by 
their willingness to stake their lives on the outcome (ES II, 296). 
A striking parallel to Casanova may be seen in the protagonist of a 
play written eight years earlier, Das weite Land. Hofreiter, a factory owner, 
is anything but the typical captain ofindustry. The detailed stage directions 
make it evident that he is an artist type: 
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Schlank, nicht sehr groB, schmales, feines Gesicht, dunkler Schnurrbart, 
englisch gestutzt; blondes grau meliertes, rechts gescheiteltes Haar. Er tragt 
Zwicker ohne Band, den er manchmal abnimmt; geht etwas nach vorn 
gebeugt. Kleine, ein wenig zusammengekniffene Augen. Liebenswiirdige 
weiche, beinahe weichliche Art zu reden, die manchmal ins ironisch Bissige 
umschlagt. Seine Bewegungen sind geschmeidig, aber verraten Energie. 
Er ist mit Eleganz, ganz ohne Geckenhaftigkeit gekleidet. (D W II, 228) 
His friend, Dr. Mauer attests to his great charm: "Ich mag mich iiber ihn 
noch so rasend geargert haben,-sobald er seine Charmeurkiinste spielen 
laBt, bin ich ihm <loch wieder ausgeliefert auf Gnade und Ungnade" 
(DW II, 248). 
Like Casanova, Hofreiter experiences the thrill oflife in erotic adven-
tures and, again like Casanova, undergoes with advancing age the frustra-
tions of the egotist. Although in his case the girl, Erna, is willing, Hofreiter 
realizes-as Casanova did not-that to have an affair would not bridge the 
gap of age, would not give him back his youth. And so he renounces. But 
his frustration is as bitter as Casanova's and vents itself in the same way. 
For no other reason than his hatred of triumphant youth, he kills the young 
lover of his wife. 
Lastly, let us consider the writer Anastasius Treuenhof, in Schnitzler's 
posthumously published drama, Das Wort, on which th~ author began to 
work around 1901 and continued at intervals to work until shortly before 
his death in 193 r.12 Schnitzler's notes of 1920 reveal that he conceived of 
Treuenhof (modelled after Peter Altenberg) as a true artist: "Treuenhof 
soll ja der einzige sein, der Talent hat, die anderen haben nur Willen."13 
Kurt Bergel reasons that Schnitzler never published the play because he 
could not reconcile the portrait of the artist with an incident that required 
the superficiality and irresponsibility of the Literat: 
Einmal wollte er <las Portrat eines Dichters geben mit all dem Genialen und 
auch Scharlatanhaften, all dem Feingefiihl und der Selbstsucht, die dem 
Original im Cafe Central eigen waren. Andererseits hatte er einen 'V orfall,' 
der die Oberflachlichkeit und Verantwortungslosigkeit des Literaten 
bloBlegte. Um die Unverantwortlichkeit, die im MiBbrauch des Wortes 
liegt, iiberzeugend darzustellen, muBte Schnitzler seinem Treuenhof einen 
12 Das Wort, ed. Kurt Berge! (Frankfurt am Main, 1966), p. 5. 
13 Ibid., p. I 5. 
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groBen Teil seiner Sympathie entziehen: so wurde dieser immer mehr zum 
Literaten, so daB man ihm schlieBlich weder Genie noch menschliche 
Warme zu glauben vermag.14 
Excluding, then, the last scene in which Treuenhof causes Willi to commit 
suicide, we see again a brilliant, egotistical, ruthlessly honest artist who 
cannot with the best of intentions give of himself, who esteems the beauty 
oflife in all its dismal meaninglessness, and who ends alone. 
To recapitulate: we have presented a sampling of the more important 
artist types in Schnitzler's writings. They are all different, each possessed of 
his own individuality. At the same time, they all have certain things in 
common: disdain for the common man, disregard for all men, and an 
overwhelming self-esteem. Fickle and passionate, they have a deep appre-
ciation for the beauty of life and the experience of the moment. They 
live only for their art, whether this be painting, writing, or love-making-
in a sense, they are true disciples of Nietzsche and his Geniemoral. 
The question now arises: to what extent, if any, does the artist-figure 
represent a projection of Schnitzler' s basic views? How relevant is the 
portrayal of the artist to the author's ethical outlook? One must proceed 
with caution, as it obviously does not follow that a character necessarily 
expresses or represents an author's views. Specific evidence must be supplied 
to indicate the contrary, if we are not to assume that an author has created 
freely from his imagination. We believe, however, that in the present 
instance such evidence is available. Here is our reasoning. 
To begin with, the freedom of the writer is a strange thing. It is 
actually rare that one encounters a serious writer who does not deal with 
issues that lie close to his heart. Even the so-called notable exceptions, like 
Zola and Georg Kaiser, when examined closely, do not violate this rule; 
the idea, for example, that Zola proceeded with scientific objectivity in 
writing Les Rougon-Macquart or that Georg Kaiser was truly a Denkspieler 
has largely been discounted. 
Furthermore, some authors are less free in dealing with their subject 
matter than others. In fact, a number get so involved with their creations 
that the characters seem to take on a life of thei~ own. It appears that 
Schnitzler was a subjective writer of this sort. Certainly, it is interesting to 
note that although Otto Brahm several times requested he write a comedy, 
14 Ibid., p. 26. Indeed, Schnitzler felt that Altenberg was a unique combination of 
Dichter and Literat. 
22 
and, that it would have been decidedly to Schnitzler's advantage to do so, 
his plays invariably ended up as tragi-comedies. 
Such general arguments as these do not, of course, prove anything. 
But they do suggest the possibility that Schnitzler may have been seriously 
interested in his artist-figures and may even, to a degree, have identified 
with them. 
If Schnitzler had disavowed his artists on moral grounds, as has 
sometimes been maintained, it would seem to imply that he attributed to 
his artist-figures a degree of moral free will. Yet this rarely seems to be the 
case. Indeed, few of his characters have any large measure of free will; they 
live in a world of dreams and illusions and are frequently controlled by 
their emotions. Even his most voluntaristic protagonists appear as puppets 
in the hands of destiny. Helene, in Der Junge Medardus (19rn), for example, 
professes to believe only in the strong assertion of the will: "Es gibt kein 
Gliick, es gibt nur den Willen, das Schicksal zu zwingen. Es gibt keine 
Freunde;-nur den Willen, iiber Menschen Herr zu sein. Der Wille ist 
alles, Bertrand" (DWII, 136). Yet she yields despite herself to the impulse of 
love and her courageous plans are thwarted by tragic misunderstanding. 
Her lover, Medardus, is also a defiant voluntarist, but he, too, falls victim 
to his feelings and tragic coincidence, so that ultimately his freedom is 
restricted to dying a meaningless death in defiance of Napoleon. 
To be sure, if we turn to some of the later utterances, such as the 
section Schicksal und Wille in Buch der Spruche und Bedenken (1927; A, 30-36), 
we find that Schnitzler occasionally poses the necessity of assuming free 
will and deprecates the consequences of irresponsible action. But as one 
peruses the numerous other aphorisms in the section, the preponderant 
emphasis on causality, destiny and the inevitable course of history becomes 
apparent. In any case, it does not seem that Schnitzler had as yet foresworn 
determinism in the years in which he conceived virtually all of the artists 
to whom we have referred: 1890-19rn. 
Now, in establishing a positive linkage between Schnitzler and his 
artists, it can be shown that he held the artist per se in high esteem. An 
admittedly late but nonetheles~ significant, non-fictional statement of this 
attitude may be found in the essay, Der Geist im Wort und der Geist in der Tat 
(1927), in which Schnitzler strove to evaluate "die Beziehung zwischen den 
Urtypen des menschlichen Geistes" (A, 136). Here the Dichter (who repre-
sents not only the literary artist but the creative personality in general) is 
highly regarded and placed virtually at the top of the scale. Above him 
stands only the prophet who is next to God. Under the Dichter on the one 
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hand are the statesman, priest and politician, on the other the historian, 
philosopher and journalist. At the bottom of the scale, incidentally, we find 
the Literal; below him stands only the Bosewicht who is next to the devil. 
In the essay Schnitzler obviously still holds to the view that the Dichter 
and the Liter at are as different as day and night. Yet he finds that at times it 
is exceedingly difficult to distinguish between them and resorts to an 
unexpected moral yardstick. Flatly stating that the Literal can also create 
masterpieces, he defines the Literal as a narcissistic individual and the 
Dichter simply as "ein groBer Mensch" (A, I 51). Of the true artist, Schnitz-
ler can still maintain, however: "Keiner ist so sehr wie er Mensch von 
Gnaden des Augenblicks" (A, I 50). 
The essay shows, then, despite some not insignificant changes of 
opinion, that Schnitzler still held the artist in the same high esteem implicit 
in his earlier writings. His long-abiding interest in the Literal is here also 
revealed for what it naturally had to be, a phase of his deep concern in the 
artist. The Literal was the reverse side of the coin, as it were. 
Our hypothesis still faces a significant obstacle: the frequently ex-
pressed belief that the physicians among the author's characters are his true 
spokesmen. In a recent study,15 Maria Alter has elucidated the complexity 
and multiplicity of Schnitzler's doctors and concluded that they fall into 
two basic groups, the "good" and the "bad" doctors, who, we might add, 
stand in a relationship comparable to that between the Dichter and the 
Literal. Taken as a whole, the good doctors are an admirable group of men 
who accept the Hippocratic oath as their personal ethic. What has not been 
widely recognized, however, is that even these good doctors have their 
weakness. Alter agrees on this point but believes the weakness to lie in a 
conflict between the physician and the man: "Stripped of literary distor-
tions, the portrait of the Schnitzlerian physician appears inevitably two-
faced: tilted toward the human side, it shows the ugly face of man; tilted 
toward the professional side, it shows a nonconformist idealist.''16 She 
believes in the case of Dr. Reumann, for example, that his life is a lie because 
he cannot reconcile "the primitive drive to assert his own interests" with 
an "acquired personality which dovetails with his medical conscience": 
But the greatest lie is Reumann's own life. No doubt, it is an admirable 
lie insofar as its altruism puts the welfare of others above one's own peace; 
15 Maria Alter, "Schnitzler's Physician: An Existential Character," Modern Austrian 
Literature, 4/3 (1971), 7-23. 
16 Ibid., p. 18. 
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without that lie Reumann would not be a "good" physician; but its basic 
meaning remains unchanged by Schnitzler's approval: Reumann lives a 
role, wears a mask, hides his real self, dissimulates an unresolved conflict.17 
We believe this interpretation to be in error. The conflict in Reumann is not 
so much between the man and the doctor as between conflicting aspects of 
his own real, not assumed, personality. Let us consider the situation briefly. 
Reumann's problem has to do with Johanna W egrat. He loves her 
deeply but cannot find the courage to declare himself. At the same time he 
cannot bring himself to leave, and turns down an excellent position in 
order to remain near Johanna; he feigns other reasons for staying, of course, 
but Johanna's mother Gabriele readily sees through this subterfuge. 
Bitterly, Reumann must watch. driven by desire on the one hand and 
damned to silence by his lack of self-assertiveness on the other, while 
Johanna directs her love to the aging artist, von Sala. 
It is indefensible to imply that Reumann does not declare his love 
because it conflicts with his professional ethics. Marrying Johanna would in 
no way compromise his ethical code or his being a doctor, it reflects no 
conflict between doctor and man. One might say that his unassertive 
nature is one reason why he has become a doctor; he is a "born" doctor. 
His name Reumann-der Reuende-has ironic significance. 
Similar ironic nomenclature with similar import is apparent also in 
the case of Dr. Mauer in Das weite Land. As Alter correctly states, he is "one 
of the most positive physicians in Schnitzler's writings."18 But whereas she 
notes no weakness in Mauer, merely commenting that in his role there are 
few opportunities for action, the fact is, he, too, has a flaw. To be sure, this 
is no superficial weakness. Mauer is a good physician, a fine and upright 
man. The flaw is a purer version of Reumann's: he is the epitome of the 
good doctor. 
What we mean becomes clear in the scene between Mauer and Erna, 
the girl he loves. Mauer is more aggressive than Reumann and is actively 
courting Erna in competition with the egotistical and dashing Hofreiter-a 
"good" doctor who clearly doesn't feel that marriage would conflict with 
his professional conscience. In a sense, Mauer has an advantage over Hof-
reiter in that he is proposing marriage. Moreover, he has the masculinity 
and brusque forthrightness of Schnitzler's strongest artists. Erna is well 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., p. r6. 
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aware of what he has to offer her and tells him so: "Sie sind wirklich ein 
anstandiger Mensch, Doktor Mauer! Man hat so das Gefiihl, wenn man 
Ihnen einmal sein Schicksal anvertraut ... da ist man dann im Hafen. Da 
kann einem nichts mehr geschehn" (DW II, 253). 
He is a good man. He would make a good husband. He offers security, 
a haven, a wall (Mauer!) against a hostile world. But Ema is not sure that 
security and goodness are the end-all of existence. She has an intuition that 
there are other values, perhaps higher, perhaps lower, that may be more 
meaningful: 
Nur weiB ich nicht recht, ob dieses Gefiihl der Sicherheit etwas so besonders 
Wiinschenswertes bedeutet. Wenigstens fiir mich. Wenn ich ganz auf-
richtig sein soll, Doktor Mauer, mir ist manchmal, als hatt' ich vom 
Dasein auch noch andres zu erwarten oder zu fordern als Sicherheit-und 
Frieden. Besseres oder Schlimmeres-ich weiB nicht recht. (DW II, 253) 
Ultimately Ema, characterized as an intelligent girl with character, decides 
in favor of a liaison with Hofreiter. 
A similar evaluation of the doctor takes place in Bacchuifest (1915). 
Agnes is the wife of a gifted playwright, Felix Staufner. Not only does he 
leave home for weeks at a time to find the solitude necessary for his work, 
he is not above a romantic liaison on occasion. Piqued and lonely, Agnes, 
in tum, has an affair with Guido Wemig, a doctor-of chemistry, to be 
sure-but like the other "good" doctors, the essence of bourgeois virtue. 
He resembles Mauer in being masculine, reliable, conventional, possessive 
and a bit dull. To Agnes, who finds reliability at this point very gratifying 
in her loneliness, he seems an ideal person and she agrees to marry him. 
However, as they discuss their future life together, Agnes begins to sense 
what everyday life with W emig will be like; he tells her that they will have 
a respectable household and that such questionable types as artists will 
never cross the threshold. When Felix joins them and Agnes has a chance to 
compare the two men, she quickly decides to stay with her husband. Living 
with the fickle and egotistical Felix may have its problems, but she finds it 
preferable to the dull respectability of life with Guido. 
It is clear that even the best of Schnitzler' s doctors are not the embodi-
ment of human perfection and that the problem faced by Ema and Agnes 
is the author's own dilemma, which is present in so many of his plays. How 
nice it would be if all men were reliable and altruistic like Mauer, Reumann 
and Wemig. But such people are unfortunately also a bit dull and conven-
tional. Their interest lies in such things as security-Nietzsche's "last man" 
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comes to mind. Their personality forces them to forego the great experi-
ences of life, "Besseres oder Schlimmeres," as Erna puts it, which are 
beyond the pale of conventional men. 
This does not mean that Schnitzler totally rejected the doctor but that 
he views the latter as a type, with strengths and weaknesses, which is not 
unequivocally superior to the artist. It is interesting to note that in the 
aforementioned essay the doctor is rated highly but not quite as high as the 
Dichter. Whereas the Dichter was evaluated on a diagram entitled Der 
Geist im Wort, the doctor is relegated to the diagram Der Geist in der Tat. 
Here the doctor ( = Heilkiinstler) is two notches below the prophet, one 
notch lower than the Dichter on the other diagram. On the second diagram 
the hero stands directly below the prophet. But these details are admittedly 
trivial. What is important is that the diagrams show that Schnitzler viewed 
the ideal doctor and the ideal artist as noble human types-with the artist 
perhaps a shade nobler. 
Hans Weigel summarizes Schnitzler's situation simply and accurately: 
"Was er gewesen war, stilisierte er als Anatol und Max, Fritz und Theo-
dor."19 Doctor-types and artist-types may be found in Schnitzler's earliest 
work and may be traced back to responsible chaps like Max and to aesthetes 
like Anatol. And as Weigel says, Schnitzler was never just the one or the 
other. He was the "Lebejiingling" Anatol, but he was more than that. He 
was also Max. The doctor in him always registered objections to the 
egotistical artist-this is apparent in all of his artist characterizations. But 
the artist in him, like the wolf in Hesse's Steppenwolf, constantly reminded 
him with rasping irony that bourgeois virtues did not lead to the essence 
of being. 
We may now return to the three questions posed at the beginning of 
this chapter. As regards the first question, clearly all of Schnitzler's artists 
with their peculiar admixture of creativity, sensitivity, ruthlessness, 
egotism, and loneliness bear a close spiritual kinship to the creative and 
lonely superman in Nietzsche's Thus Spake Zarathustra, who eschews 
conventional morality and acts only in accordance with his own inner 
command. Consequently, the possibility of Nietzschean influence on 
Schnitzler's ethics is not to be ruled out. As for the second question, we 
have seen that Schnitzler thought highly of the artist; thus it should be 
obvious that his artists and artist-types must speak for him. With respect to 
the last question, what about the doctors? Obviously, they too, are spokes-
19 In his introduction to Liebe, die starb vor der Zeit (Wien, 1970), p. 13. 
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men for the author, even though their views are often diametrically 
opposed to those of the artists. Here is perhaps the basic tension which 
underlies much ofSchnitzler's writing. Like Faust, he had two souls within 
his breast. He saw life both through the eyes of the artist, egotistical and 
sensitive, and through the eyes of the unselfish doctor. For this reason 
Schnitzler in his writing occasionally did attack the egotistical artist whom, 
at such times, he viewed from the doctor's perspective. But it must not be 
forgotten that even the best among Schnitzler's doctors are characterized 
consistently as somewhat dull and lacking in imagination. 
Few characters speak for the whole Schnitzler, but perhaps the last 
words of Heinrich Bermann in Der Weg ins Freie may be so interpreted: 
Ich hab mich ohne Schuld gefiihlt. Irgendwo in meiner Seele. Und wo 
anders, tiefer vielleicht, hab ich mich schuldig gefiihlt ... und noch tiefer, 
wieder schuldlos. Es kommt immer nur darauf an, wie tief wir in uns hin-
einschauen. Und wenn die Lichter in allen Stockwerken angeziindet sind, 
sind wir doch alles auf einmal: schuldig und unschuldig, Feiglinge und 
Helden, Narren und Weise. (ES I, 957) 
For the aging Schnitzler, the dilemma is even better stated by his only lady 
genius, Marcolina in Casanovas Heimfahrt: 
Die Unendlichkeit und die Ewigkeit zu erfassen wird uns immer versagt 
sein; unser Weg geht von der Geburt zum Tode; was bleibt uns iibrig, als 
nach dem Gesetz zu leben, dasjedem von uns in die Brust gesenkt ist-oder 
auch wider das Gesetz? Denn Auflehnung wie Demut kommen gleicher-
maBen von Gott. (ES II, 280) 
It may therefore be concluded that Nietzschean morality plays a pervasive 
role in the dialectic of Schnitzler's thought. 
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Nietzsche und Carl Sternheim 
Seit iiber vier Jahrzehnten befaBt sich die Kritik mit der Frage, ob und 
wieweit Nietzsche auf den Dichter Carl Sternheim eingewirkt hat. Schon 
1925 konstatierte Ludwig Marcuse eine Beziehung zwischen dem "Ober-
biirger" Sternheims und dem Gedankengut Nietzsches und Wedekinds.1 
ZehnJahre spater verstarkte Wolfgang Paulsen diese Auffassung in seinem 
Buch Expressionismus und Aktivismus.2 Als Paulsen sich jedoch im Jahre 
1956 mit Sternheim griindlich auseinandersetzte, wollte er nichts mehr 
"von einer unmittelbaren Abhangigkeit von Nietzsche" wissen.3 George 
und Wedekind "seien die beiden Pole in Sternheims Dichtung."4 Eher als 
zum Obermenschen wiesen die Helden Sternheims eine Verwandtschaft 
mit dem amerikanischen Typ des "rugged individual" auf. 5 In seinem 1960 
herausgegebenen Buch iiber Georg Kaiser raumte Paulsen iiberraschender-
weise die Moglichkeit einer Nietzsche-Beeinflussung wieder ein, fiigte 
allerdings noch hinzu, daB Kaiser, Sternheim und andere expressionistische 
Dichter sich ihre Nietzsche-Kenntnisse "meist durch Osmose angeeignet" 
hatten. 6 
In seiner vorziiglichen Ausgabe des Sternheimschen Gesamtwerks 
(1963-1970) ordnete und bearbeitete Wilhelm Emrich viel neues Material, 
beschrankte sich aber im V orwort hinsichtlich unsres Themas auf die 
Bemerkung, Sternheims Gedankengange seien nicht neu und schon "von 
Stimer, Nietzsche, Bakunin, den sogenannten Anarchisten, zum Teil auch 
von heutigen Existentialisten geauBert" warden. 7 Wolfgang Wendler 
1 Ludwig Marcuse, "Das expressionistische Drama," Literaturgeschichte der Gegenwart, 
hrsg. Ludwig Marcuse (Berlin, 1925), II, 149-50. 
2 Wolfgang Paulsen, Expressionismus und Aktivismus (Bern und Leipzig, 1935), S. 76. 
3 Wolfgang Paulsen, "Carl Sternheim: Das Ende des Immoralismus," Akzente, 3 
(1956), 278. 
4 a.a.O., S. 284. 
5 a.a.O., S. 278. 
6 Wolfgang Paulsen, Georg Kaiser: Die Perspektiven seines Werkes (Tiibingen, 1960), 
S. ro4. 
7 Carl Sternheim, Gesamtwerk, hrsg. von Wilhelm Emrich, 9 Bde. (Berlin, 1963-
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andererseits hob 1966 gerade den Nietzsche-EinfluB mit der SchluBfol-
gerung wieder hervor, "Nietzsche ist also grundlegender als jeder andere 
fi.ir Stemheim wichtig gewesen."8 Weil aber Wendler mit Paulsen einig 
war, daB sich "nirgends ... ein tieferes Eindringen in Nietzsches Gedanken-
gut belegen" laBt und weil er noch dazu iiberzeugt war, Nietzsches EinfluB 
beruhe "weniger auf einzelnen Gedanken, die Stemheim iibemahm, als auf 
der Wirkung von Nietzsches Art zu denken," so lieB es Wendler bei einigen 
im ganzen zutreffenden aber allgemeinen Bemerkungen bewenden.9 
Unsere Untersuchung wendet sich nochmals dem Problem Nietzsche 
-Stemheim zu, in der Uberzeugung, es sei noch nicht griindlich erortert 
worden. Obwohl wir den bedeutenden Studien von Paulsen und Wendler 
in vielem zustimmen, so meinen wir doch, den EinfluB Nietzsches etwas 
praziser bestimmen zu konnen. Dabei sind wir uns der ganzen Fragwiirdig-
keit des "EinfluB"-Begriffs bewuBt: selten iibemimmt der Mensch die 
Gedanken eines anderen, ohne sich selbst schon mehr oder weniger zu 
demselben Standpunkt durchgerungen zu haben.1° EinfluB bzw. Wirkung 
kann aber auch so verstanden werden, daB man damit lediglich auf die 
scharfere Begriffsbildung hinsteuert, die einer Beschaftigung mit sympa-
thischem Gedankengut entwachst. 
Es geht uns nicht nur darum, Stemheim als Nietzsche-Anhanger 
darzustellen, sondem auch darum, die noch heftig umstrittene W eltan-
schauung Stemheims zu beleuchten. Verherrlichte er den Oberbiirger oder 
den Spie8biirger? Sind seine Ausspriiche, besonders die fiir die Offentlich-
keit bestimmten, eigentlich emst zu nehmen? Soll man sein Denken als 
logisch oder nur als pathologisch betrachten ?11 Wir sehen den inneren Sinn 
1970), Bd. 1, S. 9. Alie ferneren Hinweise auf das Werk Sternheims, den Roman Europa 
ausgenommen, beziehen sich auf diese Ausgabe. Zitatbelege werden in Klammem im 
Text direkt nach dem Zitat gegeben. 
8 Wolfgang Wendler, Carl Sternheim (Frankfurt am Main, 1966), S. 243. Oberar-
beitung seiner 1963 abgeschlossenen Dissertation. 
9 a.a.O., S. 243. Auch unterscheidet Wendler wenig zwischen den verschiedenen 
Phasen von Sternheims Nietzsche-Verhaltnis, was ihn dazu verleitet im allgemeinen eine 
"zwiespaltige Haltung" gegeniiber Nietzsche bei Stemheim zu konstatieren, wobei dieser 
Nietzsche als Verkiinder des "Willens zur Macht" ablehnt. Diese SchluBfolgerung gilt nur 
fiir den Nachkriegs-Stemheim. 
10 Zurn Beispiel hatte Gottfried Keller sich schon zu dem Standpunkt einer gottlosen 
Naturordnung durchgerungen, als er im Jahre 1849 die Philosophie Ludwig Feuerbachs 
begeistert annahm. 
11 Winfried Georg Sebald, Carl Sternheim (Stuttgart, 1969), 146 S. Sebald findet 
Sternheim widerspriichlich, iiberschatzt und "weitgehend pathologisch" (S. 126). 
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dieser Arbeit darin, durch die Erorterung von Sternheims Beziehung zu 
Nietzsche zum besseren Verstandnis Sternheims beizutragen. 
In seinem Aufsatz iiber Sternheim schrieb Wolfgang Paulsen folgende 
Satze: 
Auch in spateren Jahren scheint Sternheim sich niemals ernstlich mit 
Nietzsche und dem Phanomen des europaischen Immoralismus beschaftigt 
zu haben. Wo immer er aufNietzsche zu sprechen kommt, hat er sich mit 
einigen hamischen und oft vollig verstandnislosen Bemerkungen begniigt, 
wie das beinahe allen groBen Namen der Weltgeschichte gegeniiber seine 
Art war, aus dem Bediirfnis einer inneren Verteidigung heraus.12 
Diese Aussage ist bisher noch unangefochten, und da wir ihr nicht 
ganz beipflichten, wollen wir zunachst Sternheims spatere, nach dem ersten 
Weltkrieg entstandene Schriften ins Auge fassen.13 
Der im Jahre 1920 veroffentlichte Aufsatz, Berlin oder Juste Milieu, ist 
der bekannteste und dazu wohl auch der bedeutendste Sternheims aus 
dieser Zeit. Er hat dann auch den Ton fast samtlicher kritischen Schriften in 
des Dichters Spatzeit bestimmt. Hier schildert Sternheim den geistigen 
Verfall Berlins in denJahren 1870--1914 aus seiner Sicht. Die absolutistische 
Ordnung der preuBischen Junker wurde durch die W eltanschauung 
Darwins abgelost. Das Gefiihl der personlichen Verantwortlichkeit muBte 
"Naturnotwendigkeiten" weichen. "Masse" wurde Schliisselwort. Dies 
fiihrte zum Umbruch, zur Industrialisierung und zum Einzug einer lntel-
ligenz aus dem Osten, die auf geistigem und schriftstellerischem Gebiet die 
Macht an sich riB. Statt aber nun eine neue und freie W eltanschauung zu 
bekunden, lieB diese Clique, die ihren eigenen Vorteil suchte und sich daher 
den fiihrenden kapitalistischen Schichten eng verband, die alten W erte 
wieder aufleben. 
Sternheim fand diese Entwicklung besonders tragisch, da der Um-
bruch die Moglichkeit eines geistigen und menschlichen Aufstiegs darge-
boten hatte. Man hatte aufNietzsche horen sollen: 
12 a.a.O., S. 282. 
13 Unseres Erachtens trifft Paulsens Vorwurf nur fiir Sternheims letzte groBere Schrift, 
Vorkriegseuropa im Gleichnis meines Lebens (Amsterdam, 1936), zu. In dieser Zeit des auf-
kommenden nationalsozialistischen Deutschlands lehnte Sternheim Nietzsche entschieden 
ab. Die zwei diesbeziiglichen AuBerungen in der Schrift Vorkriegseuropa lauten wie folgt: 
"Jeder war aus seiner praktischen Wirklichkeit der eigenen Gattung bewuBt; wobei mit 
seinem hysterischen Obermenschen der spitzfindige Nietzsche nachhinkte" (S. 36); "Die 
Menschheit erlitt dariiber hinaus Friedrich Nietzsches 'Willen zur Macht'; sein 'Jenseits von 
Gut und Bose.' Seines 'Obermenschen' Willkiir iibernahm die Fiihrung der Welt!" (S. 
122-23). 
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An sich hatte man sich denken konnen, die auf der Linie von Hegel und 
Haeckel gewachsene radikale Unverantwortlichkeit des Menschen vor 
Naturnotwendigkeiten sei bei dem Berliner und seinem urspriinglich 
unbekiimmerten und bewuBten Charakter in rechte Hande gekommen, er 
hatte, da er nichts mehr besorgen muBte, sich auf Grund der neuen Lehre 
wirklich grenzenloser Ausgelassenheit, jauchzender Lebenslust, etwa so 
prachtvoll und unvergleichlich hingegeben, wie ein einziger freier Deut-
scher, Nietzsche, es in diesem Augenblick zu fordern begann. 
Es ware denkbar gewesen, die in Deutschland am meisten verhatschelte 
Rasse der Berliner hatte sich solchen <lurch Philosophen riickversicherten 
Mut genommen, daB siejenseits von Gut und Bose aufGrund groBer Bank-
guthaben dionysische Laune, ein reines Lachen ausgetollt, ihre Landsleute, 
ganz Deutschland und. schlieBlich abendlandische Welt mit Lust angesteckt 
hatte. 
Alle Umstande waren vollendet da. Nietzsche gab geistiges Gelander. 
(VI, 125) 
1921 erschien die Schrift Tasso oder die Kunst des Juste Milieu, die im 
besonderen Goethe wegen seiner Verherrlichung von Pflicht und konven-
tioneller Sittlichkeit stark riigte. Nochmals wird Nietzsche als potentieller 
Retter hervorgehoben: 
Einen Augenblick schien es um des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts Ende, als 
konne das Goethesche "Leben und Leben-lassen" <lurch Friedrich Nietzsche 
bedroht, an des gemiitlichen Tasso Stelle in deutscher Sehnsucht der rauhere 
Zarathustra treten. Als konne aus seiner Lehre statt sich entwickelnder 
besinnungsloser Hingabe an alle Welt der Deutsche einen brutalen Egois-
m us in verntinftiger Schopfung entdecken, und ihn statt wie bisher 
verbrecherisch geradezu sittlich nennen. 
Aber die wesentliche Kraft, die nach Nietzsches schnellem geistigem 
Erloschen deutsches Geist- und Kunstleben in Ermangelung bedeutender 
deutscher Nachfolge am starksten beeinflussen sollte, Henrik Ibsen, muBte 
beim Versuch, das robuste Nietzschesche Gewissen in seinen Dramenhelden 
und -heldinnen durchzusetzen, alsbald einsehen, er habe sich in solchem 
Ziel iibernommen .... (VI, 199) 
Bemerkenswert ist, daB in beiden Aufsatzen, die im Abstand von einem 
Jahr erschienen sind, allein Nietzsche die rettende Kraft zugeschrieben wird. 
Obwohl Nietzsche in der Nachkriegszeit zum Modephilosophen wurde, 
ist die Bezugnahme nicht zufallig, wie im Laufe dieser Untersuchung noch 
zu zeigen ist. Nun fassen die Zitate den Kem der Nietzschelehre als "jauch-
32 
zende Lebenslust" und "brutalen Egoismus" auf, was von einem gewissen 
Standpunkt aus noch vertretbar ist. Die Zitate weisen aber auch andere 
Momente auf, die schwerlich von Nietzsche herstammen konnten. Wie 
laBt sich das alles erklaren? Am besten, wenn wir die ethische Auffas-
sung Sternheims selbst, seine Theorie der Denk- und Beziehungsinhalte 
kurz iiberblicken.14 Die ist sowohl im Berlinaufsatz wie in dem 1919 
erschienenen Roman Europa enthalten. 
Nach Sternheim gibt es eine absolute Gesetzmafligkeit der "Naturnot-
wendigkeiten," der der Mensch gehorchen muB.15 Er bekampfte aber mit 
allen Mitteln die, wie er behauptete, vom Juste Milieu vertretene Ansicht, 
der Mensch habe sich auch einem objektiven Sittengesetz zu unterwerfen. 
Auf dem Gebiet der Beziehungsinhalte, meinte Sternheim, miisse der 
Mensch seine personliche Freiheit, "seine eigene Nuance" bewahren: 
Dies.e zeitgenossische, momentane Welt aber besitzt der Mensch 
immer von neuem neu und unabhangig von Vernunft nur <lurch Kraft der 
Vision .... Und zwar nach seinen visionaren Fahigkeiten in abgestuften 
Graden jeder andere Mensch immer anders, so daB auf diesem Gebiet der 
Beziehungen jeder historische V ergleich sinnlos ist. Erst <lurch diese in-
dividuell gestufte Moglichkeit zum immer verschiedenen Besitz des 
"Beziehungsganzen" ist der neugeborene Mensch mit einem eigenen 
unvergleichlichen Schicksal frei, das heiBt ganz seine eigene Niiance ! (VI, 
170) 
Die Beziehung zur Ethik Nietzsches liegt auf der Hand. Abweichende 
Momente, wie in den oben zitierten Ausziigen, sind aber nicht zu verken-
nen. Diese waren 1. der Glaube an eine objektive Gesetzmafligkeit, 2. die 
Bezugnahme nicht nur auf die wenigen Genies, sondern auf die ganze 
Menschheit, wobei allerdings eine Abstufung durch die "Kraft der Vision" 
des Einzelnen noch anerkannt wird,16 3. das Ziel der personlichen Freiheit 
14 Die Anregung zu dieser etwas ungewohnlichen Begriffsbildung ging vermutlich 
von Heinrich Rickert aus, der in seinem Werk, Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen 
Begriffsbildung (Freiburg, 1902), Denk-und Relationsbegriffe unterscheidet. Zu bemerken 
ist, daB es bei Rickert hauptsachlich um Metaphysisches, bei Sternheim vorwiegend um 
Ethisches geht. 
15 Sternheim scheint nie an der objektiven Wirklichkeit der sinnlichen Welt gezweifelt 
zu haben. Daher ist wohl sein mangelndes Interesse fiir Metaphysik zu erklaren. 
16 "Kraft der Vision" ist eine durch den Krieg verursachte Abschwachung des 
friiheren Sternheimschen Kraftbegriffs. 
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und des inneren Triebes sei weder die groBe Tat noch die Machtbereiche-
rung, sondern der LebensgenuB.17 
Die abweichenden Momente sind also wesentlich dieselben wie in den 
Ausziigen und es ist nun klar, worum es sich handelt. Die Nietzsche 
zugeschriebene Ethik tragt wohl Ziige Nietzsches, ist aber im Grunde die 
Anschauung Sternheims. Das soll aber nicht gleich heiBen, daB sich Stern-
heim gar nicht um Nietzsche bemiiht oder sich nur eine oberfl.achliche 
Kenntnis von dessen Gedanken erworben hat. Wie noch zu zeigen ist, hat 
sich Sternheim Punkt fiir Punkt hinsichtlich dieser abweichenden Momente 
mit dem groBen Immoralisten auseinandergesetzt. Er wuBte also, daB das, 
was er hier Nietzsche unterschob, sein Eigenes war. Andererseits wuBte er 
ebenso gut, wie eng seine eigene Meinung noch mit den Kerngedanken der 
Moral Nietzsches verwandt gewesen war; sie war so eng damit verwandt, 
daB er ohne Bedenken den Namen Nietzsches fiir seine eigene Version des 
Immoralismus einsetzen konnte. 
Man muB es zugeben, in den Aufsatzen hat Sternheim die Moral 
Nietzsches zu eigenen Zwecken umgeformt. Es kann aber weder von 
"hamischen" noch von "verstandnislosen Bemerkungen," sondern nur von 
einem ziemlich positiven, wenn auch bewuBt distanzierten Verhaltnis zu 
Nietzsche und zu dessen Ethik die Rede sein. Diese Ansicht findet ihre volle 
Bestatigung in dem fast gleichzeitig veroffentlichten Roman Europa.18 
Ehe wir uns aber von den]uste-Milieu-Schriften abwenden, soll noch 
kurz daraufhingewiesen werden, wie sehr sie von Ausdriicken und Gedan-
ken des Zarathustra-Dichters Gebrauch machen. Einige Beispiele mogen 
geniigen. "Leben" wird mit dem "zum Gesetz Erstarrten" verglichen 
(VI, 189). "Hegelsche Verkiindigung" werde durch das]uste Milieu "vollig 
zu Pobelinstinkten und Pobelwerten" degradiert (VI, 194). Der "Mitleids-
befehl nicht nur Hegels aber auch Schopenhauers und Wagners" wird 
negativ bewertet (VI, 197). Vorwurfsvoll spricht man von "Aufzucht zum 
Herdenvolk" (VI, 133). Wie Nietzsche "Sklavenmoral" aus dem Res-
sentiment der Schwachen herleitet, so meint Sternheim vom "jiidischen 
Berliner": "in ihr (der Presse) konnte er anonym sein Ressentiment gegen 
alles Heilige und Hochstpersonliche austoben" (VI, 132). "Begriffe, die 
17 Wie Richard Dehmel, Frank Wedekind und der junge Heinrich Mann beschrankte 
Sternheim den "Lebenstrieb" vielfach auf den "Geschlechtstrieb." 
18 Carl Sternheim. Europa (Miinchen, 1919), 2 Bde. Weitere Hinweise auf diesen 
Roman beziehen sich auf diese Ausgabe und werden im Text angefiihrt. 
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einseitig nach sittlichem Dienst messen" findet Sternheim "lebensschwa-
chend" (VI, 140). Dem Biirger soll "Mut zu seiner menschlichen Urspriing-
lichkeit," "Mut zu seinen sogenannten Lastern" gemacht werden (VI, 140). 
"Allmachtig lebendige, brutale Lebensfrische" wird "verblasenen The-
orien" gegeniiber gestellt (VI, 140). "DaB Kraft sich nicht verliert, muB ... 
auf seinen frischen Einzelton der Mensch nur horen, unbesorgt darum, wie 
Biirgersinn seine manchmal brutale Nuance nennt" (VI, 139). 
Der Roman Europa (1919) behandelt dasselbe Phanomen des euro-
paischen Zusammenbruchs und kommt zu ahnlichen Ergebnissen. MaB-
geblicher Sprecher des Autors ist der Dichter Carl Wundt, der seine revolu-
tionare und heilbringende Botschaft-man spricht von "einem so riesigen, 
seit Jahrhunderten unvergleichlichen Geschenk an Deutsche" (I, 177)-in 
Form einer Erzahlung bekannt gibt. Der anpassungssiichtige W olfSchwar-
zenberg, unbekannter Herkunft, bisher von Ressentiment getrieben (I, 
141), verliebt sich in ein Madchen aus dem Rheinland. Seiner selbst nicht 
sicher, versucht er sich ganz der rheinlandischen Kultur zu bemachtigen und 
sich den rheinlandischen Menschen anzupassen. Diese Selbstverleugnung 
gelingt ihm in hohem MaBe. Fast wie ein Wunder nun erscheint eines Tages 
die HeiBgeliebte, von allen Vorurteilen befreit, und schenkt sich ihm. Von 
Gliick iiberwaltigt, kann sich Wolf aber nun nicht mehr von seiner neuan-
genommenen biirgerlichen Personlichkeit befreien. Er hat sich von seiner 
Urspriinglichkeit zu weit entfernt, um jetzt noch das Leben der biirger-
lichen Sicherheit vorzuziehen. Auf leisen Sohlen entfernt er sich von der 
schlafenden, lebensfrischen Eva, um zu der nicht vitalen, aber biirgerlich 
anerkannten Professorentochter zuriickzukehren. 
Es fallt natiirlich sofort auf, wie sehr Wundts Erzahlung die uns nun 
bekannte Ethik Sternheims verkorpert. Dazu wird Wundt mit seinem 
Schopfer geradezu identifiziert. Wie dieser hat auch er ein Don-Juan-Drama 
verfaBt (11, 69), das "in Berlin zu beispiellosem Theaterskandal gefiihrt" 
hat (I, 98). Wie Sternheim sich auch eben nicht unterschatzte, so wird 
Wundt von den beiden anderen Hauptpersonen im Roman, Eura und 
Rank, fiir den groBten deutschen Dichter der modernen Zeit gehalten 
(11, 69). 
Wie verhalt sich Wundt-Sternheim zu Nietzsche? Grundsatzlich 
bejahend. Als zum Beispiel Wolf seinen groBen Fehler der Selbstverleug-
nung begeht, deutet dies W undt symbolisch dadurch an, daB er Wolf die 
mannliche Lektiire von Nietzsche, Marx und Bakunin gegen die konven-
tionelleren Texte von Schiller und Kleist eintauschen laBt: 
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Nun ziigelte er und vergewaltigte in sich Gewalten, die er aufge-
peitscht hatte, verabscheute Musik, wie sie chaotisch in seinen Abgriinden 
brauste, floh vor Urwald und Dickicht in sich; erbleichte Marx und 
Nietzsche zu kennen, verwiinschte ihre finsteren Spriiche, schleuderte 
seinen Bakunin in die Ecke. Mochte Bier und Branntwein nicht mehr und 
verbrachte iiber Schillers und Kleists Lektiire in Konditoreien Freizeit. 
(I, 142) 
Wundt verhohnt Goethe als "piinktlichen Niederschlag mittelrheinischer 
Poeterei: hochstens angemessen versonnen, niemals entriickt," wahrend er 
Nietzsche indirekt lobt: "Hier hatte iiberstiirzte Aufklarung, kein Mysti-
zismus und nichts Damonisches Platz gehabt; hier war kein HuB und 
Nietzsche geboren. Hier diente man lebendigen lnteressen und verdient" 
(I, 150). Goethe als SpieBbiirger wird dem ins Damonische gesteigerten 
Nietzsche recht negativ gegeniibergestellt. 
Am Anfang des Romans betrachtet W undt die Welt mit einem Anflug 
des Nietzscheschen Nihilismus. Das grauenhafte Dasein, das Allzumensch-
liche, ertragt er nur, indem er es verabscheut: "Denn grauenhaftes Dasein 
trage er nur durch die Sprengkraft todlicher Abneigung gegen Allzu-
menschliches um ihn," (I, 40). Gegen Ende des Buches erreicht er den 
urteilslosen Amor fati Nietzsches, freilich mit leicht religiosem Anstrich. 
Seiner Freundin Eura teilt er mit, seine bejahende Haltung trotz der vielen 
Schlechtigkeiten in der Welt "sei kein W erturteil, sondern, wie er ihr schon 
oft bedeutet habe, Aufforderung zu freierem und heftigerem GenuB der 
Welt" (II, 126). Diese Ansicht entstamme der Haltung: "Neugier und 
dariiber hinaus beruhigte Unterwerfung unter von Gott gewollte kernige 
Wirklichkeit" (11, 126). Solche "kernige Wirklichkeit" bezieht sich in 
diesem Kontext auf das Harte, Brutale, also auf das Bose, oder besser 
gesagt, auf den Bereich jenseits von Gut und Bose. Freie Bejahung im 
Angesicht der rauhen Wirklichkeit entspricht dem Sinn des Amor fati. 
Wundt mag Nietzsche und denkt in vielem wie er. Nur vom "Willen zur 
Macht," den er nun streng vom Lebenstrieb unterscheidet, will W undt 
nichts horen. Er schlieBt seine Diskussion der Beziehungsinhalte mit dem 
Ruf, "Aufbruch vom Willen zur Macht zum Trieb reinen Lebens hin" 
(11, 214). Vom Begriff "Wille zur Macht" distanziert sich Wundt-Stern-
heim, da er nach dem Krieg die fatale Entwicklung Europas und besonders 
Deutschlands diesem Triebe zuschreibt: 
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Instinktiv wird Europa seitJahrhunderten, bewuBt seit iiber hundertJahren 
von diesem einzigen Drang nach Wirksamkeit, Tat, Fortschritt und seinem 
Ziel, Kapital vergewaltigt, und was letzte Jahrzehnte hinzubrachten, war 
nur dieses Willens zur Macht schnelleres Tempo .... Und gerade der 
Deutsche. Nie und nirgends, in keinem Wort, keiner Fiihrergeste fiel ihm 
ein, deutschen Machtwillens, Geschafts Methoden [sic] auf ihren geistigen 
Gehalt zu priifen, sondern von Anfang an hat er dieses Freibeutertum 
akzeptiert ... (II, 212-13) 
Dieser "Wille zur Macht," der zum Krieg fiihrte, zeige sich sch on wieder 
in der russischen "Diktatur des Proletariats" (I, 215). Deswegen wendet 
sich Wundt vom schnellen Tempo des "Willens zur Macht," zum ruhigen 
Beharren bei sich selbst: "Nicht W ettlauf zum Ziel, das keins ist, kein 
AuBerstes von Aktivitat, doch ein Verweilen, Beharren bei sich selbst und 
jeder Regung der Umwelt" (II, 213). Von Nietzsche beeinfluBte Termin-
ologie ist auch hier wieder reichlich vorhanden, doch wollen wir aus 
raumlichen Grunden von einer diesbezuglichen Erlauterung absehen und 
statt dessen kurz daraufhinweisen, wie sehr die Hauptgestalten Wundt und 
Eura als Obermenschen aufgefaBt werden. Eura ist "ein Artgipfel": "Wie 
Kohinor und GroBmogul sei sie fiir alle Zeit weiblicher Geltung Solitar, 
aus dem Schopf rotgoldener Flechten hochste Nuance, irgend ein Artgipfel, 
nach dem ein iiber die Welt versprengter Klungel von Mannern wallfahren, 
und vor dem er sich immer erniedrigen werde" (I, 18). Symbolisch gesehen 
stellt Eura den europaischen Sozialismus dar, als Frau vertritt sie den vitalen 
Lebenstrieb. In ihrer Verbindung von Kunstgefiihl, politischem Idealismus 
und ungehemmter Sinnlichkeit erinnert sie eher an Heinrich Manns 
Herzogin von Assy als an W edekinds Lulu oder Georg Kaisers Judith. Wie 
es fast immer der Fall bei Sternheim ist, wirdjedoch urgriindige Lebenskraft 
der Sinnlichkeit gleichgesetzt. Noch im blutigen Sterben will Eura die 
W ollust kulminieren: "W ollust ein letztes Mal zu kulminieren, greifr sie 
den Soldatenstiefel, der steil in ihren Unterleib fahrt, zieht ihn tief in 
zuckende Gedarme und entblattert ... " (II, 220). 
Wundt steht auf noch hoherer Ebene. Wie Eura besitzt er eine unge-
heuere Vitalitat, "eine Lebenskraft ... die sie (Eura) packte und wie mit 
Diiften der Dschungel berauschte" (I, 39). Von ihm allein ist dann auch die 
geistige Rettung Europas zu erwarten (II, 178). 
Wie Wundt schatzt auch Eura Nietzsche. Wenn sie ihn als Vorkampfer 
des S9zialismus bewundert, stimmt ihr Sternheim wohl zu: "In diesem 
weiteren Sinn, nicht als Selbstzweck schatzte sie Nietzsche, des Vor-
kampfers und seines Jungers Bergsons Philosophien ... " (II, 154).19 Als 
19 Rickert im Vorwort zur revidierten Ausgabe seines Buches (s. Anm. 14) bezieht 
sich hinsichtlich der neueren Philosophie gerade aufNietzsche und Bergson. Es mag sein, 
daB er dies dann auch in den Vorlesungen getan hat, die Sternheim besuchte. 
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verblendeter Sozialistin mangelt ihr aber Wundts Scharfsinn, so wird uns 
angedeutet, und mit Sternheim mussen wir vorwurfsvoll erkennen, wie 
sie im Gegensatz zu Wundt den "epochalen Trieb zur Expansion," wovon 
"Nietzsches Wille zur Macht" die letzte Phase sei, freudig begruBt (11, 30). 
Fassen wir zusammen: der Roman Europa bezeugt wieder die Nach-
kriegs-Distanzierung Sternheims von Nietzsche. Gleichzeitig ist nicht zu 
ubersehen, wie sehr der Roman in seiner Gesamtheit eine Auseinanderset-
zung mit Nietzsche darstellt, wobei Sternheim den Immoralisten hoch 
einschatzt und im wesentlichen bejaht. 
Die intensive Beschaftigung Sternheims mit Nietzsche in den Nach-
kriegsjahren mag zum Teil auf seine wahrend des Krieges begonnenen 
Freundschaft mit dem Dichter und damaligen Militararzt Gottfried Benn 
zuruckzufiihren sein, denn Benn war ein Nietzsche-Enthusiast, der sich 
noch nach dem zweiten W eltkrieg mutig zu Nietzsche bekannte. Stern-
heims Interesse mag auch vom Zeitgeist angeregt worden sein, so wie es bei 
Hermann Hesse der Fall war. Jedenfalls aber war dies nicht die erste Be-
gegnung mit Nietzsche. 
In ihrer Konzeption umfassen die Komodien Aus dem burgerlichen 
Heldenleben das zweite Jahrzehnt des 20. Jahrhunderts. Und wenn auch das 
erste Stuck nicht 1908, wie Stemheim angab, sondem erst 1909 geschrieben 
worden ist, und wenn die letzten Stucke zum Teil neue Themen aufweisen, 
so stimmt doch im wesentlichen seine Behauptung, daB die Stucke eine 
innere Einheit haben. Es laBt sich also dieser Zeitabschnitt in Sternheims 
Schaffen durch eine Analyse des ersten Stucks, Die Hose, das dann auch die 
gedankliche Grundlage der weiteren Stucke darstellt, gut ins Auge fassen. 
Die Handlung des Dramas scheint auf den ersten Blick wenig Ge-
meinsamkeiten mit Nietzsche zu zeigen. Eine junge Frau verliert unver-
sehens ihre Schlupfhose auf der StraBe. 1hr Mann, korperlich robust, aber 
im Beruf nur kleiner Beamter, ist entsetzt und fiirchtet dadurch seine Stelle 
zu verlieren. Z wei mannliche Zeugen des Ereignisses verlieben sich in die 
Frau und wollen den Mann zum Hahnrei machen. Wie er nun die Sache 
fiir sich zum Besten wendet, ist Kem der Handlung und des Humors. In 
dem Kampf des Gatten mit den zwei Verliebten geht es auBerlich um die 
Frau. Auf einer hoheren Ebene geht es um Nietzsche. 
Der eine Verliebte heiBt Scarron und ist Dichter. Er ist ein Verehrer 
Nietzsches. Im dritten Akt fragt er den Gatten, Theobald Maske, "1st Ihnen 
der Name Nietzsches zu Ohren gekommen?" (I, 87). Als Maske dann (fast 
wie Hesses Peter Camenzind) nur ein erstauntes "Wieso ?" hervorbringen 
kann, summiert Scarron die Ethik Nietzsches: "Er lehrt das Evangelium 
der Zeit. Durch das mit Energie begnadete Individuum, kommt Ziel in die 
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uniibersehbare Masse der Menschen. Kraft ist hochstes Gliick" (I, 87). In 
einer friiheren Fassung des Dramas auBerte sich Scarron weitlaufiger: 
Er lehrt das Evangelium des begnadeten lndividuums. Durch ihn erst 
kommt System in die uniibersehbare Masse der Menschen, in die er das 
Prinzip des aus sich selbst gearteteten Menschen, den Einser unter Nullen 
setzt ... Und diese Philosophie erdachte nicht etwa graue Theorie, sondern 
die Wirklichkeit hat sie gelehrt und lehrt sie allenthalbenjeden Tag. Wern 
ist das Gleichnis vom Maulwurfsweibchen unbekannt, das von der Schar 
der um sie streitenden Mannchen in die letzte unentrinnbare Ecke des 
letzten Ganges gedriickt wird und dort dem iibrigbleibenden zufallt. 1st es 
bei den Baren oder bei den Menschen anders? (VII, 854-55) 
In der friihen Fassung stimmt ihm Theobald nur bedingt zu: "Gliick ist bei 
den Weibern halt auch dabei" (VII, 855). WoraufScarron die klischeehafte 
Antwort gibt: "Aber was heiBt das? Kraft ist Gliick" (VII, 855). 
Damit ist der Dialog zwischen Maske und Scarron eingeleitet. In der 
endgiiltigen Fassung geht das weniger schnell. Zunachst willigt Theobald 
vorsichtig ein, "Kraft ist freilich Gliick. Das wuBte ich auf der Schule, hat-
ten die andern unter mir zu leiden" (I, 87). Worauf aber Scarron eine 
gewichtige Unterscheidung macht: "Natiirlich meine ich nicht brutale 
Korperkrafte. Vor allem geistige Energien" (I, 87). Einige Minuten spater 
greift Scarron den ausweichenden Theobald wieder an: "Horten Sie von 
diesen Theorien nie sprechen? Lesen Sie so wenig?" (I, 88). Scarron wirft 
ihm Bequemlichkeit vor, woraufTheobald, endlich ein wenig aufgebracht, 
reagiert: "1st bequem nicht recht? Mein Leben wahret siebenzigJahre. Auf 
dem Boden des mir angelernten BewuBtseins kann ich manches in diesem 
Zeitraum auf meine Weise genieBen" (I, 90). Das geniigt Scarron nicht. 
Nicht GenuB, sondem Mitarbeit an der geistigen Entwicklung des Men-
schengeschlechts sei das MaBgebende: "Ich beurteile den Mann einfach 
nach dem Grad seiner Mitarbeit an der geistigen Entwicklung des Men-
schengeschlechts. Heroen sind die groBen Denker, Dichter, Maler, 
Musiker. Der Laie so bedeutend, wie weit er sie kennt" (I, 90). Worauf der 
zweite Verliebte, der schwindsiichtige Friseur und W agner-Schwarmer 
Mandelstam, ihm begeistert zustimmt: "Und die groBen Erfinder" (I, 
90).20 
20 Wie sehr Mandelstam in geistiger Hinsicht zu Scarron halt, laBt sich aus seiner 
Verteidigung Scarrons gegeniiber Luise ersehen. Mit Theobald verglichen sei "Herr 
Scarron wie der liebe Gott." Scarron bewies "Vornehmheit der Gesinnung." Er hatte "ein 
groBes iiberstromendes Herz." Es war "riihrend, wie er noch am spaten Abend versuchen 
[wollte], Aufklarung in diesen Wasserkopf[Theobald] zu gieBen" (I, 99). 
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Nun bringt Theobald den Einwand hervor, der in der ersten Fassung 
viel friiher erscheint: "Und wo bleiben Sie mit dem Gemiit? ... Wie 
brauchen Sie das Herz dazu?" (I, 91). AufScarrons kaltbliitige Bemerkung, 
"Das Herz ist eine Muskel, Maske" (I, 91), erwidcrt Theobald, "Gut. Doch 
es hat eine Bewandtnis bei ihm. Bei den Weibern vor allem" (I, 91). 
Scarron und Mandelstam bemiihcn sich, ihm zu beweisen, daB groBe 
Geister-Shakespeare, Goethe, Schwarz, Newton-bei ihren Errungen-
schaften nicht an Frauen gedacht hatten (I, 91),jedoch Theobald wird nicht 
iiberzeugt: "Von Goethe zu schweigen, mcinetwegen von Schwarz-
immerhin-um mich so auszudriicken, die Weiher haben ihr Herz" (I, 91). 
Dies Gesprach wird einige Seiten weitergefiihrt, bis Theobald seine Mei-
nung etwas eindeutiger zu verstehen gibt: "Nun gibt es aber Wesen, fiir die 
ist ein Platz wie dcr andere, und vor allem mogen sie den, an dem sie stehen. 
Mit dem, was mir Geburt bcschieden, bin ich an meinem Platz in giinstiger 
Lage ... " (I, 96). Der verbliiffte Scarron kann nur erwidern, " ... Sklaven-
moral !" Theobald aber grinst und gibt seiner Weisheit letzten SchluB kund: 
"Meine Freiheit ist mir verloren, achtet die Welt auf mich in besonderer 
Weise. Meine Unscheinbarkeit ist die Tarnkappe, unter der ich meinen 
Meinungen, meiner innersten Natur fronen darf"' (I, 96). Da sind die 
Fronten gezogen. In der darauffolgenden Handlung siegt Theobald auf 
ganzer Linic. Die Verliebten mieten teure Zimmer bei ihm, ohne an die 
schone Luise zu gelangen, wahrend Theobald geniigend Kapital aus den 
liisternen Untermietern schlagt, um sich eine Matresse zulegen und eine 
Familie grtinden zu konnen. Scarron rettet sich zwar zur Nietzsche-Moral 
zuriick, entwickelt sich aber dabci zur Karikatur. Erst die Keuschheit 
einer StraBendirne laBt ihn wieder an die Relativitat der W erte glauben: 
... nie vorher im Umgang mit Kindern und der Madonna war Keuschheit 
mit solcher lnbrunst wie aus dieser Hure mir nah. Und alsbald merke ich: 
1hr [Theobalds] mit Emphase vorher ausgcsagtes Urteil von der Unveran-
derlichkeit aller W erte-das namlich ist der platte Sinn ihrer Lebensauffas-
sung ... ungiiltig wurde es vor diesem Weib ... (I, 126) 
Wir haben diese lange Auseinandersetzung Sternheims mit der Moral 
Nietzsches in allen Einzelheiten wiedergegeben, um einmal ihre auBeror-
dentliche Bedeutung fiir das Stuck hervorzuheben, sodann aber auch, weil 
sie nicht ohne weiteres verstandlich ist. Aber wie ist sie zu crklaren? 
Es fallt auf, daB beide Nietzsche-Verehrer Schwachlinge sind. Man-
delstam kann sich eigentlich nichts Hoheres denken, als abends allein mit 
Luise den Fliegenden Hollander zu lesen (I, 70). Scarron versteht sich zwar 
40 
als harten Obermenschen. Als Mandelstam ihm bei seiner W erbung um 
Luise im Wege zu stehen droht, schnauzt er, "Herrenmoral soll dem 
schlappen Hund gezeigt werden" (I, 90). Auf Luisens Frage, ob "kein 
Mitleid mehr sein soll," antwortet er barsch, "ist einfach nicht" (I, 90). Er 
findet "unvergleichliche W ohltat in dem Gedanken: das Schwache, 
Lebensunfahige, muB dem Starken, Gesunden weichen" (I, 86). Trotz aller 
atavistisch klingenden Nietzscheterminologie ist und bleibt Scarron ein 
groBmauliger Schwarmer mit schwachen Trieben. Dies zeigt sich dann 
auch eindeutig, als er stiirmisch um Luise wirbt. In dem Augenblick, wo sie 
sich endlich vollig bereitwillig zeigt, verlaBt er sie, lauft gliicklich in sein 
eigenes Zimmer und schlieBt ab, um das Erlebnis auf Papier zu verewigen. 21 
Scarron ist also ein GroBmaul und Schwachling. Warum hat ihn dann 
Sternheim zum Fiirsprecher Nietzsches gemacht? Offenbar, um sich schon 
zu diesem Zeitpunkt von Nietzsche zu distanzieren. In einem wichtigen 
Punkt aber unterscheidet sich diese Distanzierung ganz wesentlich von der 
spateren. Denn hier geht es nicht um eine Verneinung, sondern um eine 
Bejahung der Kraft. 
Es soll nochmals darauf hingewiesen werden, daB Theobald die 
urspriingliche Erlauterung der Moral Nietzsches als Sieg des Starken durch 
Scarron nicht ganz abgelehnt hat. Nur wollte er die Kraft nicht lediglich als 
geistige Energie aufgefaBt haben, die Starken nicht nur in den geistigen 
Menschen sehen. Er unterscheidet sich in diescr Hinsicht von Scarron nur 
insofern, als er die Kraft in den Bereich des Alltaglichen verlegt. Theobald 
zufolge hatjeder Mensch die Moglichkeit sowie das Recht, sichjenseits von 
Gut und Bose zu verhalten. Zwar komme es schon auf die Kraft jedes 
einzelnen an, auch gibt es keinen unbedingten Spielraum, innerhalb 
gewisser Grenzen aber konne sichjeder bemiihen, seine personliche Freiheit 
zu wahren, seinen inneren Trieben zu fronen. 
Obwohl Theobald es nicht ausdriicklich erwahnt, setzt er die Vitalitat 
fast ausschlieBlich der Geschlechtskraft gleich. Durch die wiederholte 
Betonung der eigenen starken Muskulatur will er die abgeschwachte 
Mannlichkeit Mandelstams hervorheben. Nicht "Mitarbeit an der geistigen 
Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts," sondern "GenuB" ist ihm Lebens-
ziel. Wie sehr er dieses Lebensziel erotisch auffaBt, ist beim Fallen des 
Vorhangs klar: er schatzt sich mehr als gliicklich, da er in zweifacher 
21 Scarrons iibersteigerter Wunsch, das Erlebnis auf Papier zu verewigen, soil ver-
mutlich eine Ironisierung Goethes sein. In seiner Tasso-Schrift wirft Sternheim denn 
Goethe auch vor, keine ergreifenden Verhaltnisse mit Frauen gehabt zu haben (VI, 191). 
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Hinsicht auf dem Gebiet des Sexuellen Fortschritte erzielt hat: er hat eine 
Matresse gewonnen, und, finanziell gesehen, kann er sich nun auch Kinder 
leisten. 22 
Theobalds auf dem Kraftbegriffbasierende Immoralitat wird dann zur 
Grundlage der weiteren Stucke Aus dem biirgerlichen Heldenleben. Mage die 
Bemerkung des alternden Theobald gegeniiber seinem Sohn Christian in 
dem 1913 geschriebenen Stiick, Der Snob, uns hier geniigen: "In dir ist alles 
Maskesche um ein paar Locher weitergeschnallt. Du hast mich vollig in 
dir ... Meine Beziehung zur Welt, der hohere Sinn von mir-bist du" (I, 
201). Fassen wir wieder zusammen: in der Komodie Die Hose, und somit 
indirekt auch in den damit verwandten Stiicken, distanziert sich Sternheim 
bewuBt von Nietzsche hinsichtlich seines Geniemenschen, seiner Zielset-
zung, seiner Geringschatzung der Frauen, auch hinsichtlich seines Kraft-
begriffs. Trotzdem steht er in der Bejahung einer auf Kraft gegriindeten 
Immoralitat Nietzsche naher als in der Nachkriegszeit, wo er ihn auch 
gelegentlich recht positiv bewertet hat. Obwohl Sternheim die Genie-
moral Nietzsches, wie sie Scarron zum Ausdruck brachte, abgelehnt hat, 
so ist nichtsdestoweniger die Kraftethik Theobald Maskes auf Nietzsche 
zuriickzufiihren. Das wollen wir nun zu zeigen versuchen, indem wir die 
vermutlich entscheidende Begegnung Sternheims mit Nietzsche wahrend 
der Konzeption des Don Juan erortern. 
Es besteht wenig Zweifel dariiber, daB Don Juan weltanschaulich fiir 
Sternheim von groBter Bedeutung gewesen war. Emrich meint, das Stiick 
sei von allen vor der Hose "das Gewichtigste" gewesen (VII, 850). Er 
behauptet sogar, "das Stiick wurde Sternheim mehr und mehr zu einer 
Summe seiner Existenz" (VII, 808). Sternheim selbst schrieb Mai 1906, 
"Am Don Juan, wie es recht ist und billig, erlebe ich mein ganzes Leben" 
(VII, 842). 
Das Drama besteht aus zwei Teilen. Der erste Teil wurde imJuni 1905 
22 Die Kritik irrt, wenn sie meint, Sternheim habe sich auch von Theobald Maske 
distanziert. Bei ihm ist keine Karikierung anzutreffen. W enn er auch am Anfang in seiner 
Angst Luise anschnauzt und sogar schlagt, so laBt Sternheim trotzdem durchschimmern, 
daB dieser Mann der einzige ist, der seine Frau wirklich versteht, der sie nicht wie Scarron 
falschlich idealisiert, sondern sie nimmt, wie sie ist, als das Kind der Schneidersleute. Es 
darf auch nicht iibersehen werden, daB Theobald eben derjenige ist, der Herz, Gemiit, und 
die Bedeutung des weiblichen Geschlechts in Schutz nimmt. Was man auch von ihm halten 
mag, Maske denkt und fiihlt in vielem wie sein Schi:ipfer. Sternheims Diener meinte dann 
auch in Theobald Sternheim selbst zu sehen. Manche gestrichenen, von Emrich wieder-
gegebenen Aussagen Theobalds lauten fast wie "ein Glaubensbekenntnis ... Sternheims" 
(I, 566). 
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geschrieben und im November desselbenJahres umgearbeitet. Erst bei der 
Umarbeitung kam Sternheim der Gedanke, noch einen zweiten Teil hin-
zuzufiigen, der dann Herbst 1906 angefangen wurde. 
Es ist nun auffallend, wie sehr die beiden Teile in der Konzeption des 
Helden voneinander abweichen. Nimmt man die Plane zum zweiten Teil 
hinzu, so wird der Unterschied noch erheblicher. 
Im ersten Teil hat man es mit einer Liebesgeschichte zu tun, wobei der 
egoistische und von Liebessehnsucht gequalte Held nicht ganz zufallig an 
Goethes Faust erinnert. Im zweiten Teil spielt die Liebe eine untergeordnete 
Rolle. Die Geliebte begeht bald Selbstmord, und die Handlung konzen-
triert sich darauf, Don Juan als groBen Kriegsfiihrer und Gegenspieler des 
Konigs darzustellen. 
Dieser Wandel vom Liebhaber zum selbstsicheren W eltmann laBt sich 
ja auch in Faust vorfinden. Es steht aber mehr auf dem Spiel. Das ergibt sich 
am deutlichsten aus den Briefen Sternheims an seine Freundin und spatere 
Frau, Thea Lowenstein-Bauer. Noch imJanuar 1906 bezieht sich Sternheim 
auf Schiller und versteht den Kampf zwischen Don Juan und Konig Philipp 
als den zwischen zwei fast ebenbiirtigen Gegnern (VII, 834). Dagegen zeigt 
ein im Februar desselben Jahres geschriebener Brief eine iiberraschende 
Neuerung. Sternheim beteuert, einen groBen Fehler begangen zu haben: 
Don Juan sei als die Kraft, als Machthaber des Lebens, anzusehen, wahrend 
Philipp als haBerfiillter, ohnmachtiger Schwachling zu betrachten sei: 
... Den gro.Ben Fehler habe ich am ... Januar gemacht, als mir der wahn-
sinnige VergleichJuan-Quichotte kam .... Es ist alles reiner Mist ... es 
ist ein Irrtum von uns anzunehmen, Juan sei die Sehnsucht. Er ist die 
Kraft . ... Er ist der 1Wachthaber des Lebens, der Machtige aus sich, der Sonnen-
gott. Der Konig! das Plus! Philipp, der Konig ist der ohnmiichtige, das Minus, 
die Schwache an sich. Der Unterthan. Der Abhangige . 
. . . Schwache. Kraft. 
Schatten. Sonne. 
Das ist der Konflikt. Darum ha.St Philipp . 
. . . Die ohnmachtige Macht Philipps, die versucht diese Sonne zu 
erloschen ... ist zu zeigen. Zu zeigen die Lebensfiille ... Bin Wunder des 
Lebens ist zu zeigen, der Lebenskraft. (VII, 838-39) 
Von Schiller zu Nietzsche! Der Konflikt wird plotzlich 1m Sinne von 
Nietzsches Herrenmoral aufgefaBt ! Der Starke handelt aus Lebensfiille und 
Kraft, der Schwache aus Ohnmacht und Ressentiment-"Philipp ver-
korpert eben diese Welt herrlich, der das wahrhaft groBe Starke verhaBt, 
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gefiirchtet ... ist" (VII, 840). Woher der Wandel? Was bestimmte diesen 
Umschwung? 
Ein zweiter BriefSternheims von Februar 1906, aus der Zeit des Um-
schwungs also, berichtet von einem neuen philosophischen Interesse: "Ich 
habe mich vorsichtig mit Windelbands vorziiglicher Geschichte der 
Philosophie auf diese eingelassen und habe unendliche Freude (obwohl es 
mir sehr schwer fallt) damit, kann es nicht mehr ertragen, die Philosophie als 
die Wissenschaft, die uns Erkenntnisse, d.i. Werturteile iiber die Fragen der 
Ethik und Aesthetik vor allem giebt, zu entbehren" (VI, 473). Ein dritter 
Brief des Monats verrat die fortgesetzte Beschaftigung mit dem Problem 
des ethischen Verhaltens. Sternheim ringt bewuBt darum, die personliche 
EntschluBkraft zu bewahren, sein ganzes Denken aber steht noch im 
traditionellen Geleise: "Ein ethischer Mensch thut, was ihm seine beste 
Einsicht, sein hochstes PflichtbewuBtsein vorschreibt, nicht wie unethische, 
was ihm eine landlaufige Moral, faule Prinzipien befehlen .... Der ethische 
Mensch ... untersucht in jedem Falle, was ist meine Pflicht. Und laBt sich 
dann ohne Riicksicht aef seine Neigung, einzig von seiner Pflicht leiten ... " 
(VI, 473-74). Sternheim unterscheidet scharf zwischen Pflicht und "land-
laufiger Moral," schlieBt aber ganz im Sinne Kants und des deutschen 
Idealismus: "Ich fiige noch einmal ausdriicklich hinzu. P.fticht, nicht 
Neigung. Einsicht!" (VI, 474). 
Ende Februar kehrte Sternheim aus Rom nach Freiburg zuriick, wo er 
bei dem Schiiler Windelbands, dem Universitatsprofessor Heinrich 
Rickert, Vorlesungen iiber Ethik horte. DaB er in manchem mit Rickert 
nicht iibereinstimmte, bezeugt ein an diesen gerichteter Brief vom 27. 
November 1906, in dem er Rickerts Auffassung vom groBen kiinstlerischen 
Menschen stark ablehnt (VI, 484). Im selben Monat schreibt er begeistert 
iiber Nietzsche und seine Ethik: "Eine Milde. Etwa mit Nietzsche zu sagen: 
Es ware entsetzlich, wenn wir noch an die Siinde glaubten, sondern, was 
wir auch tun werden-es ist unschuldig. Ich weiB wohl, daB der Don Juan 
Kraft ist vom Anfang bis zum Ende ... " (VII, 847). Daraufhin zitiert er 
Nietzsche (NachlaB, GA XII, Seite 75 ff. Ziffer 144-47, 168, I72, 186/187) 
und fiigt erklarend hinzu: 
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Mit anderen Worten: Er [Nietzsche] verwirft jede Ethik. Und will nur 
eine Aesthetik kennen. Der Mensch soll nicht gut, er soll nur ganz sein. 
Ganz er selbst. Dann ist er schon. 
Es leuchtet nebenbei aus seinem Werk als die Hauptsache heraus. DaB 
das Starke fiir ihn das Schonste ist. Es ist eine iiberraschende Entdeckung. Der 
Don Juan der ersten Szene des zweiten Teils ware Nietzsche als der schonste 
Mensch erschienen. 
All das ist sehr sympathisch und steht hoch iiber all dem ethischen 
Gefasel von Tausend und Abertausenden, Es ist jedenfalls sehr vie! schon-
heitstrunken zu sein wie er. Ohne MaaB. 
Denn er ist schonheitstrunken ohne MaaB. Das Hochste erscheint mir 
in diesem Augenblick. Ein SchonheitsmaaBbewuBtsein. Tasso, Iphigenie. 
Du siehst wieder den W ertunterschied. 
Fiir die Menschheit Nietzsche. 
Fiir den Menschen Goethe. 
Ganz 1m Sinne Nietzsches i.iberlegt er die ethische Vieldeutigkeit des 
Wortes: 
Wir konnen eine Ethik nicht haben-einfach weil etwas, durch ein Wort 
ausgedriickt, immer vieldeutig bleibt und ein ethisches System doch immer 
in W orten bestehen wird. Fiir jedes lndividuum andersdeutig. Z. B. sage 
ich: das war grausam so empfindet der schwache Mensch einen Schmerz, 
Ekel, der starke eine Lust, Freude. 
Das Wort "grausam" hat eben keinen feststehenden Wert fiir alle 
Menschen und alle Zeiten. Ebenso "selbstlos." Ein Starker nennt es 
"schlapp" usw. (VII, 848) 
Uns scheint diese eingehende Auslegung der Ethik Nietzsches auBeror-
dentlich wichtig. Zunachst belegt sie mit ziemlicher Sicherheit die Tatsache, 
die Paulsen und Wendler bestreiten, daB sich Stemheim zu irgendeiner 
Zeit einigermaBen intensiv mit Nietzsches Werk selbst beschaftigt hat. 
Eben hier bezieht sich Stemheim direkt auf das Werk ("es leuchtet nebenbei 
aus seinem Werk"), hier zitiert er aus dem Werk. Auch handelt es sich 
kaum um eine fli.ichtige Bekanntschaft, wobei Nietzsche etwa als Kuriosum 
oberflachlich durchblattert wird, denn diese Aussage Stemheims kommt 
zu einer Zeit, wo er sichja anhaltend mit Philosophie und Ethik beschaftigt 
hat, wie die Briefe bezeugen. Ferner ist die Aussage gewissermaBen 
Wiederholung und Bestatigung des zehn Monate fri.iher geschriebenen 
"Herrenmoral"-Briefes vom Februar 1906.23 
23 Wieder Nietzsche-Briefvom November 1906 und der "Herrenmoral"-Briefvom 
6. Februar 1906 zu einander stehen, ist schwer zu sagen. Man hatte eher die umgekehrte 
Reihenfolge der Briefe erwartet. Denn die allgemeinen Oberlegungen hatten doch der 
praktischen Obertragung vorangehen sollen. Dies mag denn auch der eigentliche Hergang 
gewesen sein. Die Beschaftigung mit Nietzsche konnte schon in Rom angefangen haben-
in einem anfangs 1905 aus Rom geschriebenen Brief bezieht sich Sternheim auf den Stil 
Nietzsches hinsichtlich des Stils in Don Juan: "O ihr Thoren, die ihr, wenn ihr knappe 
dramatische Verse lehrt, meint, der Autor konne nicht sprechen wie Nietzsche, Hof-
mannsthal. Im Gegenteil ... lch meine im Juan die dramatische Sprache Shakespeares oft 
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Die Intensitat und Aufrichtigkeit dieser ethischen Beschaftigung laBt 
sich besonders daran erkennen, daB er an dem Studium der Philosophie 
"unendliche Freude" empfindet, obwohl er eingestehen muB, daB es ihm 
schwer fallt. Auch daran, daB er in dieser Zeit nicht einfach rezeptiv die 
Meinungen anderer aufnahm, sondern selbst im Gegensatz zum Gehorten 
und Gelesenen nach einer ethischen Haltung suchte, die Pflicht mit person-
lichem EntschluB und Selbstwollen verband. Erst mit der frohlichen 
BegriiBung der Moral Nietzsches loste sich fiir ihn das Problem. 
Wie sehr sich Sternheim mit der Nietzsche-Lektiire im besonderen 
abgab, kann man daran erkennen, daB er die Begriffe verstandig und 
sachlich erfaBt. Hier distanziert sich Sternheim nicht, fiigt keine eigenen 
Meinungen hinzu. Seine Formulierung, "Der Mensch soll nicht gut, er 
soll nur ganz sein," trifft schon das Wesentliche. Auch iibersieht Sternheim 
das dionysische Moment nicht, auch nicht das Fehlen jeglichen auBeren 
MaBstabs ("ohne MaaB"). 24 
Und nun die positive Stellungnahme zu Nietzsche. Sternheim findet 
Nietzsches Vorliebe fiir das Starke "iiberraschend" und "sehr sympa-
thisch." Was der Immoralist behauptet "steht hoch iiber all dem ethischen 
Gefasel von Tausend und Abertausenden." Eine fast unbewuBt bejahende 
Annahme der Nietzscheschen Denkart ist in den Bemerkungen iiber die 
ethische Vieldeutigkeit des W ortes zu erkennen. 
W enn man nun zu all dem noch die zeitliche Obereinstimmung der 
Entdeckung des Kraftbegriffs bei Nietzsche durch Sternheim und das 
plotzliche Auftauchen dieses Begriffs als Kerngedanke des Don Juan nimmt, 
so kann man nicht umhin, den SchluB zu ziehen: aus dieser Zeit des ethi-
schen Ringens und besonders aus der intensiven Beschaftigung mit der 
Moral Nietzsches erhielt Sternheim eine entscheidende Anregung, Be-
statigung, Klarung seiner eigenen Gedanken. Wir wissen, eben zu diesem 
Zeitpunkt festigte sich seine ethische Einstellung. Bis dahin unsicher und 
erreicht zu haben" (VI, 472). In diesem Fall hatte Stemheim friiher Durchdachtes, etwa 
aus einem Tagebuch, seinem spateren, im November geschriebenen Brief eingefiigt. Auch 
so ist aber von Bedeutung, daB er noch zu der friiheren Aussage steht. 
24 Damit soil nicht gesagt werden, daB er die Metaphysik Nietzsches begriff. Dafiir 
hatte der in dieser Hinsicht wissenschaftlich orientierte Stemheim wenig Verstandnis. An 
seiner Intelligenz darf aber nicht gezweifelt werden. Obwohl er wie Georg Kaiser, um 
Sensation zu erregen, nicht ungem groBe W orte um Dinge machte, die er nicht verstand, 
so hat Kasimir Edschmid, der ihn gut kannte und sich gelegentlich von Stemheims Meinun-
gen distanzierte, wohl recht in seiner Feststellung: "Er war ein Kindskopf, aber vielleicht 
der intelligenteste, den ich kannte" (Lebendiger Expressionismus [Wien, 1961], S. 129). 
konfus, lagert sie sich nun eindeutig um den Kraftbegriff, der lange Jahre 
die zentrale Stelle einnimmt. 25 Also in dieser Zeit des belegten Nietzsche-
Studiums und des belegten weltanschaulichen Umschwungs findet wohl 
die entscheidende Begegnung mit Nietzsche, die Zeit der Nietzsche-
"Beeinflussung" statt. 
Obrigens liegt bei Sternheims Begriff der Kraft, der zu dieser Zeit noch 
recht undifferenziert ist, das Hauptgewicht auf der Starke, der Vitalitat. 
Don Juan ist in seiner jugendlichen Lebensfiille dem Konig iiberlegen. 
Wenn auch die Kluft Adel-Biirger, Romantik-Biedermeier, die beiden 
trennt, so stehen in ihrer Verkorperung der Kraft Don Juan und Theobald 
Maske einander nahe. W enn einige J ahre spater Sternheim Scarrons Genie-
moral verwirft, so ist das wohl so zu verstehen, daB Sternheim im Gegensatz 
zu der immer gangiger werdenden Deutung der Ethik Nietzsches als 
Geniemoral, an seiner einmal gefaBten Anschauung festhalten wollte. 
W elche Ironie, daB Sternheim dann nach dem Krieg seinen Kraftbegriff in 
ein "Beharren bei sich selbst," also doch noch in eine geistige Macht um-
wandelte ! 
1905 war Sternheim 27 Jahre alt. Schon vor der Jahrhundertwende 
studierte er Literaturgeschichte und Philosophie an drei deutschen Uni-
versitaten. Da Nietzsche gerade in diesenJahren Beriihmtheit erlangte, ist 
anzunehmen, daB Sternheim auch vor 1905 mit Nietzsches Ideen bekannt 
gewesen sein muB. 
In den dem Don Juan unmittelbar vorangehenden W erken ist jedoch 
nichts von Nietzsche zu verspiiren. Das Hauptwerk des Jahres 1904, Ulrich 
und Brigitte (erst 1907 veroffentlicht), stellt eine romantische Geschwister-
Tragodie dar. In den drei Lustspielen des Abenteuerers, etwa um dieselbe 
Zeit konzipiert, ist Casanova zwar der Held, wird aber nur als witziger 
Liistling und Till Eulenspiegel aufgefaBt. 
Bei den allerfriihesten Versuchen (1895-1900) findet man dann wieder 
eine V orliebe zum vorurteilslosen, star ken Helden. So siegt Barry in dem 
etwa 1895 entstandenen Stiick Im Hafen iiber den intrigierenden Marquis, 
da er, obwohl ein leichtlebiger Galan, sich jedoch mutig zu sich selbst 
bekennt: 
25 Die Bedeutung dieses Wandels ist auch Wilhelm Emrich nicht entgangen: "In der 
Abli:isung des Zentralbegriffs der 'Sehnsucht' durch den der 'Kraft,' so undeutlich sie auch 
noch ist, kiindigt sich auch die Konzeption an, die den Komi:idien zugrunde liegt" (VII, 
850--51). 
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Ich thue, was mir mein Gefiihl 
Vorschreibt, und halte das fiir gut und recht. 
Der strengen Sitte hiindisch feiger Knecht 
Mag der sein, der in sich die Kraft nicht fiihlt, 
Eigenen W eg zu gehen, ich spiir' den Mut 
In mir. (VIII, 17) 
In dem Prosafragment Geschichte eines bedeutenden Mannes (1898) tragt der 
Held deutliche Ziige des Herrenmenschen: 
Auch war schon der Augenblick da ich ihn kennen lernte sehr verschieden 
von dem ersten Begegnen mit andern Menschen ... W oher hatte er auch 
all diese auBern Attribute einer star ken Herrschaft? (IX, 590. Gestrichene 
Stellen). Wie sch on war dieser Glaube, der tief von sich iiberzeugt war 
(IX, 325). Wie er frei und groB ging und stand, hierhin und dorthin 
plauderte und liberal! gehort wurde .... (IX, 326) 
Die Problematik des starken mitleidslosen Menschen wird in dem 
Einakter Glaube (etwa 1895) angeriihrt. Ofter taucht auch im Friihwerk die 
Gestalt des Kiinstlers auf, dem innerer Drang den eigenen W eg zu gehen 
vorschreibt. 
Ein Gedicht des Jahres 1897 beginnt mit den Zeilen "Originell, um 
jeden Preis, sei die Losung" (IX, 24). Bald aber entpuppt sich der Sprecher 
als Dandy, dem es nur darum geht: "Im Sein und im Handeln anders als 
andere." "Freiheit der Meinung" wird "Respektlosigkeit" gleichgesetzt. 
In der von Stefan George stilistisch stark beeinfluBten Gedichtsamm-
lung Fanale (1901) finden sich Hinweise auf den genialen, stark erlebenden 
Kiinstler. Im Vorwort heiBt es: "Mag einem, dem Natur das Talent in die 
Wiege gab, auch die Moglichkeit nicht genommen sein, in starkem 
Erleben die angestammte Herrlichkeit zu genialer 9r0Be zu vervollkomm-
nen" (VII, 8). Und in dem Gedicht "Strahlendes Erkennen": 
W enn kleines Menschentum ich um mich merke ... 
Man muB ganz strahlend aus sich selber leuchten. (VII, 17) 
Die meisten Gedichte dieser Sammlung sind jedoch mit jugendlicher 
Erotik so sehr befrachtet, daB man unwillkiirlich an Sternheims wohl 
ironisch gemeinte Zeilen von I 897 denken muB: 
W enn ich nur nicht immer schriebe 
Meine schliipfrig seichten Verse 
Meine hochst perverse Lyrik. (IX, 28) 
Nietzsche wird auch in einem Gedicht aus dieser Zeit erwahnt (1901): 
Ich glaube Nietzsche auch, trotz Jesu Christ, 
Ich glaube auch, daB Irren menschlich ist, 
Ich glaub' an Raffael und Mozart, Goethen, 
Und trotzdem ist ein Glaube mir von nothen. (IX, 86) 
Es handelt sich hier offensichtlich um die Ethik Nietzsches, die mit den 
christlichen Glaubensgeboten verglichen wird. Der leichte Ton verrat aber, 
wie wenig ernst es Sternheim dabei war, wie wenig er sich noch um ethische 
Dinge kiimmerte. 
Aus den veroffentlichten W er ken der Friihzeit laBt sich also keine 
tiefere Beschaftigung Sternheims mit Nietzsche feststellen. Es mag viel-
leicht in den unveroff entlichten Heften des in Marbach befindlichen 
Sternheim-Archivs noch dieser oder jener friihe Bezug zu Nietzsche zu 
entdecken sein. Es ist aber kaum anzunehmen, daB sie den Tatbestand 
wesentlich andern wiirden. 
* * * 
Fassen wir zusammen: Schon das Friihwerk Sternheims weist selbst-
sichere, vorurteilslose Menschen auf, und die Frage nach der ethischen 
Sonderstellung des starken Menschen und des Kiinstlers wird gelegentlich 
angeriihrt. 1901 legt Sternheim ein leichtfertiges Glaubensbekenntnis zu 
Nietzsche ab. Es ist aus all dem anzunehmen, daB er in diesen friihenJahren 
in der Schule iiber Nietzsche gehort, vielleicht den Zarathustra gelesen, und 
von an Nietzsche orientierten Schriftstellern wie Stefan George diesbeziig-
liche Eindriicke erhalten hat. Von einem naheren Verhaltnis zu Nietzsche 
kann aber noch nicht die Rede sein. 
Bei der 1905 in Angriff genommenen Arbeit an Don Juan kommen 
Sternheim Bedenken hinsichtlich der ethischen Erfassung seines Helden. 
Da das Stiick ihm besonders nahe geht, wird die eigene W eltanschauung 
miteinbezogen. Am Anfang des Jahres 1906 vertieft er sich plotzlich in 
ethische Studien, die er im Zusammenhang mit Vorlesungsbesuchen in 
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Freiburg im Laufe desJahres fortsetzt. Gegen die hergebrachte Schulphilo-
sophie versucht er seine eigene Meinung zu formulieren, kommt aber 
zunachst nicht recht vom Fleck. Erst bei der jubelnden Besprechung der 
Ethik Nietzsches, die als vom Begriff der Starke ausgehend aufgefaBt wird, 
losen sich die ethischen Schwierigkeiten. Wie sehr Sternheim dieser subjek-
tiven Ethik der Starke verfallen ist, wird an dem drastischen Umschwung in 
der Gestaltung des Don Juan deutlich. Seine neue Haltung wird auch in dem 
Stiick Die Hose und den damit verwandten Komodien ersichtlich. 
In der Komodie Die Hose, durch die Sternheim beriihmt wurde, ist die 
Auseinandersetzung mit Nietzsche der wesentliche gedankliche Inhalt. 
Sternheim distanziert sich hier zwar vom geistigen Geniemenschen, halt 
aber im Grunde an dem von Nietzsche iibernommenen, bzw. angeregten 
Kraftbegriff fest. Nach dem ersten W eltkrieg setzt sich Sternheim in dem 
Roman Europa wiederum eingehend mit Nietzsche auseinander. "Wille 
zur Macht" als Ursache brutaler Kriege und kultureller Selbstvernichtung 
wird nun abgelehnt. Der Kraftbegriff wird aber als der "Trieb reinen 
Lebens" beibehalten. In dem Berlin-Aufsatz spricht Sternheim dann auch 
von der maBgeblichen Bedeutung der "Kraft der Vision." Von her-
kommlicher Ethik will er aber noch nichts wissen. Wie immer soll der 
Mensch lebensbejahend auf sich selbst horen und nach wie vor bleibt die 
Starke des inneren Erlebens das entscheidende Kriterium. Wiederholt wird 
in sehr positivem Sinne auf Nietzsche gewiesen. In den ]uste-Milieu-
Schriften dieser Jahre wird er sogar als der einzige, der Europa hatte retten 
konnen, dargestellt, wenn ihm auch Sternheim seine eigene Adaption der 
Nietzschelehre unterschiebt. Erst in den allerletzten Jahren seiner literari-
schen Tatigkeit (1936), zu einer Zeit also, da man den Namen Nietzsches 
vielfach in Verbindung mit dem Nationalsozialismus brachte, lehnte 
Sternheim Nietzsche samt seiner Lehre ab, wie es auch viele andere deutsche 
Schriftsteller, die in einem engeren V erhaltnis zu Nietzsche standen, wie 
z. B. Thomas Mann, Hermann Hesse, Robert Musil, taten. 
Was man auch von Sternheims bizarrer W eltanschauung halten mag-
seine brutale Ironie und iibertriebene Erotik erregen heute noch heftigen 
AnstoB-, er war ein urspriinglicher und konsequent denkender Mann. 
Mit Recht kann aber gesagt werden, daB er sich fast zwei J ahrzehnte immer 
wieder, und mehr als mit irgendeinem anderen, mit Nietzsche auseinander-
gesetzt hat. Ohne die immer wiederkehrende Bezugnahme auf die Moral 
Nietzsches hatte das Hauptwerk Sternheims wohl ein ganz anderes Gesicht 
erhalten. 
Nietzsche and Georg Kaiser 
The history of research dealing with the impact of Nietzsche on Georg 
Kaiser spans over three decades and is a record of erratic progress toward a 
goal that has not yet been reached. In 1926, when the dramatist was still at 
the height ofhis fame and little was known about his personal life and views, 
Max Freyhan discussed briefly Nietzschean aspects in two ofKaiser's plays, 
Der gerettete Alkibiades and Gats1 ; two years later Hugo F. Koenigsgarten 
boldly declared that Kaiser was a disciple of Nietzsche by virtue of his 
strong and recurrent plea for the vitalistic regeneration of man. 2 Koenigs-
garten stated his view summarily without documentation but with such 
clarity and force that scholars must certainly have cocked their ears and 
considered the possibility of a detailed investigation of the relationship. 
However, after the pacifistic playwright was blacklisted by the Nazis in 
1933, critical writing on him virtually ceased until the end ofhostilities and 
Kaiser's death in 1945. In the late forties and early fifties a number of doc-
toral candidates3 had the opportunity to peruse various portions of the 
literary remains, now housed for the most part in the Kaiser archive in the 
Akademie der Kiinste in Berlin, and although they were not primarily 
interested in the subject under consideration,jointly accumulated evidence 
indicating that Kaiser had indeed concerned himself with Nietzsche. The 
main facts can be listed briefly. 
The dramatist first became acquainted with the ideas of Nietzsche in a 
lecture by Kurt Hildebrandt, later to become a renowned Nietzsche 
scholar, held in the literary club, Sappho (co-founded by Kaiser and Hans 
Hildebrandt around 1895). Also sprach Zarathustra was the first work to 
1 Max Freyhan, Georg Kaisers Werk (Berlin, 1926), pp. 337, 364. 
2 Hugo F. Koenigsgarten, Georg Kaiser (Potsdam, 1928), pp. 68, 70. 
3 Most important are Viktor Fiirdauer, Georg Kaisers dramatisches Gesamtwerk (Diss. 
Vienna, 1949); Wolfgang Fix, Die Ironie im Drama Georg Kaisers (Diss. Heidelberg, 1951); 
Hanns H. Fritze, Uber das Problem der Zivilisation im Schaffen Georg Kaisers (Diss. Freiburg, 
1953). 
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awaken Kaiser's strong enthusiasm. While in Argentina, he read avidly in 
the works of Dostoevsky, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche; and upon his 
return to Germany he held long conversations on the philosopher with an 
old Sappho-friend, Wilhelm Andreae. In 1904, Kaiser conceived plans for a 
drama dealing with the superman and jotted down notes and extracts from 
Nietzsche's writings. The following year he entered for a short time into 
relations with Kurt Hildebrandt and other members of the Nietzsche-
oriented George circle. In 1919, he wrote a drama which he said contained 
all of Nietzsche and Plato, and in 1938 outlined a Nietzsche play that was 
to be entitled Ariadne.4 
One would think that, as this information became known, it would 
have occasioned a new effort to ascertain Kaiser's exact debt to Nietzsche, 
but scholars were evidently unwilling to perform the task. Several reasons 
for this lack of interest can, of course, easily be deduced. For one thing, the 
notion was widely held that Plato had exerted a stronger influence on 
Kaiser than Nietzsche. Then, after the war, many German scholars vigor-
ously rejected what they considered to be the dangerous subjectivism of 
Nietzsche's doctrine. Lastly, this was only one problem in the vast backlog 
of problems in the field of German literature that had accumulated during 
the war. 
In any case, little was done. Hanns H. Fritze,5 Hansres Jacobi6 and 
others touched on the subject ofNietzsche's influence, but that was all. B.J. 
Kenworthy, in his comprehensive English study (1958), contented himself 
with a few references and the comment that Kaiser owed to Plato, Nietzsche 
and Christ "a particular debt ... which is apparent in so much ofhis work."7 
Wolfgang Paulsen deliberated on the matter at some length in his 
Kaiser monograph (1960), but then came to the conclusion that Nietzsche 
had not significantly shaped Kaiser's outlook.8 
Paulsen was willing to admit that all of Kaiser's thought rested in the 
shadow of the early and decisive Nietzsche experience: 
4 Ariadne, as the beloved of Dionysus, had especial significance for Nietzsche. 
5 Fritze, p. 83. 
6 Hansres Jacobi, Amphitryon in Frankreich und Deutsch land (Zurich, 1952), p. 11 r. 
7 B.J. Kenworthy, Georg Kaiser (Oxford, 1957), p. 42. 
8 Wolfgang Paulsen, Georg Kaiser: Die Perspektiven seines Werkes (Tiibingen, 1960). 
Plays by Kaiser mentioned in this study are dated in accordance with Paulsen's biblio-
graphy. 
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Unser Bild ware ohne den erneuten Hinweis aufNietzsche nicht vollstan-
dig, nicht einmal richtig, denn was Kaiser sich auch im V erlauf seines Lebens 
geistig angeeignet hat, es wurde immer wieder durch dieses friihe und 
bestimmende Erlebnis gefiltert und gewandelt. 9 
However, this critic was reluctant to believe that the encounter with 
Nietzsche had been more than an emotional experience for Kaiser10 ; not 
ideas but the "Eindruck der groBen pathetischen Geste" was what Kaiser 
had gained from his nineteenth-century predecessor.11 In Paulsen's opinion 
the dramatist had never read Nietzsche with care, excluding the latter's 
criticism of Socrates, and like many of his contemporaries had absorbed 
Nietzschean ideas from the Zeitgeist by a kind of osmosis.12 Nor did 
Kaiser's early plays get very close to the heart of Nietzsche's ideology, 
according to Paulsen, since the "blond beast" was conspicuously absent in 
a milieu where he might have committed all kinds of mischief,13 and so 
Paulsen concluded: "es kann doch auch keine Frage dariiber bestehen, daB 
fiir Kaiser dies alles zunachst eine recht literarische Angelegenheit blieb."14 
From the foregoing two things should now be clear: that there is no 
agreement as yet in the critical literature on the subject of Nietzsche's 
influence on Kaiser, and that no comprehensive discussion of the problem 
has been undertaken. Although the limits of this paper do not permit an 
exhaustive analysis, it will endeavor to present an objective evaluation of 
the extent and manner of Nietzsche's influence on Georg Kaiser. 
As a point of departure for our inquiry, Der gerettete Alkibiades seems 
particularly well suited, since it was over a decade in the making,15 and 
since it was with respect to this comedy that the playwright had once 
written that it contained all of Plato and all of Nietzsche, and that it 
9 Ibid., p. 103. Paulsen also says that the Nietzsche influence "gilt auch for die grie-
chischen Dramen" (p. 105). 
10 Ibid., p. 104. 
11 Ibid., p. n3. The pathos in Kaiser's plays (pp. 103-104) as well as the arrogant and 
prophetic tone of his essays and final aphorisms (p. 106) also reflected Nietzsche's influence. 
12 Ibid., p. 104. 
13 Ibid., p. 17. 
14 Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
15 It will be shown that Kaiser had the motif in mind since 1904. See also Bernhard 
Diebold, Der Denkspieler GeorJ? Kaiser (Frankfurt am Main, 1924), p. 20: "Nur am Gerette-
ten Alkibiades soil er zehnJahre Jang gefeilt haben." 
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destroyed the classic conception of antiquity (implying to a large degree 
acceptance of Nietzsche's dionysiac doctrine): 
Der ganze Platon [ist] darin-der ganze Nietzsche-und alles aufgelost in 
szenischer blutvollster Gestaltung. Ich habe Griechenland neu geschaffen-
und das des Goethe, Winckelmann umgesti.irzt. Die Menschheit muB mir 
danken-oder es gibt sie nicht. : .. 16 
Nietzsche's influence is first apparent in the manner in which the 
Athenians in the play view Socrates, regarding him as the embodiment of 
mind maliciously opposed to life. For them he is not Plato's gadfly stinging 
the great steed of Athens into wakeful vitality, but rather a cunning dialec-
tical thinker opposed to instinct-the Socrates portrayed by Nietzsche in 
Geburt der Tragodie and other writings. 
This Athenian concept of Socrates is repeatedly highlighted through-
out the play. It was because of his idealistic teachings that the youth of 
Athens determined to renounce life, as symbolized in their rejection of 
gymnastics and sports. As a result of his dialectical harangues, he completely 
confused the natural, instinctive actions of the litter-bearers and fish-
mongers. Only because Alcibiades was convinced that Socrates posed a 
mortal danger to life, did the young general topple the great hermae on the 
market square. 
Obviously such parallelism was not the product of mere chance. That 
Kaiser had, indeed, the Nietzschean conception of Socrates clearly in mind 
when he wrote the play is evident from a jotting attached to the manuscript 
in the Nachlaj3: 
SOKRA TES (RICHARD III) 
Mit seinem Tode, weil er das Leben miBachtet(?) feiert er den groBten 
Triumph.-FaBte man Christus nicht ebenso auf: der Machtlose, der nach 
der Macht begehrt? Sokrates aus Ti.icke-Christus aus Mitleid? ... -
Instinktiv wird Sokrates von den Athenern verurteilt-quod juventutem 
corrumpsit!-Bin ich gewillt ein Bosewicht zu werden: das absichtsvolle 
Steigern seines Verlustes. Saure Trauben! Aus der Not die Tugend.17 
As early as 1904, when he had written down extracts from Nietzsche's 
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16 Alfred Beierle, "Begegnung mit Georg Kaiser," Aufoau, 2 (Berlin, 1948), 990. 
17 Fix, p. 168. 
"Problem des Sokrates," in which the sage is viewed as a deceptive clown, 18 
the playwright had envisioned a drama comparing the death of the Ober-
mensch with that of the Vernunftmensch and wrote several comments in this 
connection. The last of these reads: "Ich komme auf Nietzsche-Wahrheit 
und Macht. " 19 One may fairly presume that as the antithesis of the super-
man he had Socrates in mind, conceived as a sophistic dialectician striving 
for power. 
What now of the Socrates whom the audience sees? He is just the 
opposite of what the Athenians think he is, since not one of his dramatically 
heroic acts is motivated either by conventional idealism or malice. He 
invents the myth of idealism out of sympathy for Alcibiades, regrets the 
unfortunate tum of events caused by this invention, exhorts Xantippe to 
defend life, and dies because he apparently cannot bear to witness the 
coming trumph of idealism. For the audience, Socrates is a clear-cut 
exponent of vitalism. In his final moments, Socrates himself mourned the 
fact that his idealism had dealt vitalism a mortal blow-in the manner 
conceived by Nietzsche: 
... einmal miissen sich die andern auflehnen und einen Himmel iiber den 
Himmel tiirmen, aus dem die Sonne so furchtbar brennt, wie sie es 
schwachlich nicht ertragen!-mich schmerzte der Wandel-und es verur-
teilte mich zur Standhaftigkeit! (I, ro8) 20 
Since vitalism is a Nietzschean tenet which in modem times has helped 
to topple classical idealism in Germany, and since Socrates has been shown 
to contain within himself the usual Kaiser dichotomy of Geist versus Leben, 
which satisfies the structural requirements of the drama, this might appear 
the proper point to conclude the interpretation. However, one basic 
question remains unanswered: why does Socrates renounce for himself the 
joys oflife when he is an exponent oflife? One thinks immediately of the 
thorn. But it is precisely because of the thorn, as will be shown below, that 
he should have wanted to partake of life. We suggest that a dialectical 
18 Ibid., pp. 40-41. 
19 Ibid., pp. 40-41. 
20 Although this Nietzsche-Kaiser article first appeared before the publication of 
Georg Kaiser's complete works, all references are to this edition: Werke, ed. Walther 
Huder, 6 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Propylaen Verlag, 1970-1972). Volume and page 
number will be given in the body of the text. 
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confrontation of optimistic vitalism with pessimistic vitalism may have 
been Kaiser's deepest layer of meaning. 
The nucleus of this hypothesis is the all-important thorn. Freyhan was 
wrong in believing the thorn to be merely the incipient of the action, since 
it is also the symbol of the play's ultimate meaning. Kaiser said as much 
when he wrote: "Machtig schafft Mythos im Sinnbild-und im kleinsten 
Ding des Splitters eines Dorns-beweist er seine schopferische Macht."21 
All of Kaiser's activating objects have symbolic value as well. To give only 
a few examples: Nehrkorn's mousetrap stands for his vain attempt to 
ensnare life, the billionaire's coral represents the security of an island retreat, 
the gas of the latter's progeny depicts the destructive force of mechanized 
civilization, and Krehler's papiermache globe symbolizes his futile yearning 
for life. 
What is the thorn? It is the sharp prod of instinct. In two other plays, 
Diejiidische Witwe (1904-1908; I, 167) and Gilles und]eanne (1922),22 the 
one written before and the other after the completion of Der gerettete 
Alkibiades, a thorn also represents instinct. In these other plays, however, 
the thorn pricks a virile representative of life and symbolizes frustrated 
sexual longing. In the case of Socrates the situation is different, as the thorn 
is brought into contact with mind and causes a unique pain that induces him 
to renounce life.23 Such pain can only result from the confrontation of 
instinct with mind; if instinct alone were the cause, what would be the 
logic of having the pain induce Socrates to resist the lure of the attractive 
concubine and shun fame? Why would it make him, even before the trial, 
see in death a welcome release from "Lob-Leiden-Leben?" Or, to put 
the problem differently, would not Alcibiades, who was hailed into court 
by his wife for adultery, suffer far more than Socrates? In this play only 
Socrates has a thorn; it has virtually become a part of him. Thus it is clear 
that the true symbol of the drama is the limping Socrates-which is the 
picture that the play-goer carries away with him. 
21 Koenigsgarten, p. 9. 
22 Gilles und]eanne (V, 782). After Jeanne's death the alchemist says to Gilles: "Jetzt 
hist du-frei. Der Stachel ist aus dem Fleisch gebrannt" (V, 773). 
23 The thorn is employed as a symbol of life's troubles in Adrienne Ambrossat: "Wir 
sind in diesem Dornstrauch verfangen und finden keinen Ausweg" (III, 332). And in Gas II 
the hero says, "Front dem Fremden ... verleugnet den Stachel, der an euch blutet :-seid 
das Reich" (II, 86). In Die Koralle broken pieces of coral have the same function: "Losge-
brochene Stucke vom dammernden Korallenbaum-mit einer Wunde vom ersten Tag 
an. Die schlieBt sich nicht-die brennt uns-unser fiirchterlicher Schmerz hetzt uns die 
Laufbahn !" (I, 71 r). 
What does the limping Socrates represent? In a word, the depressing 
corollary which the new revelation of the primacy of instinct brings to his 
keen mind: the knowledge that man is earthbound, a creature of the flesh, 
and that all ideals are illusory. Such an attitude explains fully Socrates' 
renunciation oflife. He welcomes death not to enter a spirit world-there 
is none; not to deceive Plato into believing he is an idealist; but as a vitalist 
aware of the pain oflife, the fraudulency of idealism, the chaos of existence. 
He dies a nihilist. 
But his nihilism is not complete and does not rule out love oflife in the 
sense oflove for one's fellow men. In his last words to Xantippe, Socrates 
had described love as "das ungewiB gewisseste von allen Wundem" (I, 808), 
a miracle that chance kept alive in an otherwise chaotic and meaningless 
world. Love for his fellows had induced the aged thinker to hide the secret 
of nihilism from them, and to give his life rather than reveal the horrible 
secret-"es kostet ein Leben das zu ersticken" (I, 812). 
Socrates overcame dionysiac reality by synthesizing idealism and 
nihilism, by detecting the possibility of a new idealism within the frame-
work of nihilism, but his optimism is of the order of Thomas Mann's wan 
hope in the final pages of Dr. Faustus that a miracle may come to pass; 
Socrates affirms and overcomes nihilism in the tragic sense of amor Jati. 
Some years ago it was fashionable to consider Kaiser as a Denkspieler 
whose heart was never in his work. Scholars now know that the dramatist 
was personally and deeply involved in his art, and that many of his heroes 
spoke for him. Socrates was one of his favorites with whom he identified 
himself most closely. Not only do we know that he concerned himself with 
the sage since 1904, but in 1929 when he planned to write a book castigating 
the follies of the times, he made Socrates his spokesman. Achtung des 
Kriegers, the one extant chapter of Sokrates wandelnd heute, makes the 
identification abundantly clear. Again, years later while in exile, Kaiser 
identified himself in bitter jest with Socrates, commenting in a letter to a 
friend that he, too, was fattening the fowl with which to welcome death: 
"Ich bin langst dem Tode naher als dem Leben. Und schon maste ich den 
Hahn, den ich nach sokratischer Art opfem werde, wenn ich das hinter mir 
habe, was sich Leben nennt. " 24 It is evident that a nihilistic Socrates would 
have most accurately represented Kaiser's deep sense of disillusionment in 
the post-war years, as expressed in the Gas trilogy and in the bitter com-
ments he made during his trial in 1921. 
24 T. Risti [Robert Pirk], "Georg Kaisers dramatische Sendung," Schweizer Annalen, 
2 (1945), 544. 
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Further support for this interpretation of Socrates may be seen in the 
fact that Kaiser incorporated elements into the play borrowed from a 
Nietzschean aphorism in which Socrates is clearly conceived as a nihilist. 
There is an unmistakable verbal parallelism between Kaiser's death scene 
and that in aphorism 340 in Die frohliche Wissenschaft, in which Nietzsche 
had imbued Socrates with his own pessimism and had interpreted the 
latter's words, "Oh Kriton, ich bin dem Asklepios einen Hahn schuldig," to 
mean that life was tragic and death beneficial. To cite Nietzsche's words: 
"Dieses lacherliche und furchtbare 'letzte Wort' heiBt fiir Den [sic], der 
Ohren hat! 'Oh Kriton, das Leben ist eine Krankheit!' "It has already been 
shown that the young Plato in Kaiser's play interpreted Socrates' last words 
similarly, using the same key-word, Krankheit: "So schied Socrates vom 
Leben, wie von einer langen Krankheit-und dankte dem Tode wie einem 
Arzt, der ihn von schwerem Leiden erlost!" (I, 813). Nietzsche had con-
tinued: 
1st es moglich! Ein Mann wie er, der heiter und vor aller Augen wie ein 
Soldat gelebt hat-war Pessimist! Er hatte eben nur eine gute Miene zum 
Leben gemacht und zeitlebens sein letztes Urtheil, sein innerstes Gefiihl 
versteckt ! Sokrates, Sokrates hat am Leben gelitten ! 
In Nietzsche's eyes, Socrates had been a pessimist throughout his life. 
Of course, it may be argued that Kaiser may well have used the words 
without necessarily retaining the meaning of the aphorism. This possibility 
seems unlikely, however, when one recalls that the aging Kaiser used the 
identical figure of speech to express his intense dissatisfaction with life. 
Still another factor lends weight to the hypothesis of nihilism: the 
extent to which Kaiser's drama parallels Also sprach Zarathustra. In the one 
as in the other, a sage comes upon a dreadful secret concerning the nature of 
being which is so terrible that he feels compelled to hide it from his fellow 
men. In each case the secret has to do with the nihilistically conceived 
universe that lies under the fac;:ade of idealism. In each case the hero seeks to 
isolate himself. In each case, at the moment of death, by reference to a 
miraculous event, life is reaffirmed within the framework of nihilism; 
Zarathustra grasped at the notion of the eternal recurrence whereas 
Socrates hoped for a miracle after the manner oflove. To be sure, Nietz-
sche's sage lives on and Socrates seeks death, but the difference is slight; 
actually Socrates has a glimmer of hope, whereas Zarathustra despite his 
affirmation continues to view life as infinitely tragic. 
The dose identification of Kaiser's Socrates with Zarathustra fails only 
with respect to the new ideal they extoll. It is dear that Socrates personified 
love and that his outlook included elements of Platonic or Christian idealism 
as well as the Nietzschean doctrine of a soulless universe. However, it will 
be shown that this paradoxical union did not disturb the roots of Kaiser's 
Nietzschean premises. 
There is clearly much to speak for the third interpretation of Socrates 
as a tragic vitalist, but whether one prefer the second or the third interpre-
tation, whether one prefer the conventional superman or Zarathustra, 
optimistic or pessimistic vitalism, both derive from Nietzsche and his 
contribution to the play is evident. 
Now, to see whether Kaiser merely used Nietzschean concepts as a 
chance occurrence, or whether they reflected an attitude of long-standing, 
we may now proceed to the early plays and have chosen as the one best 
suited for our purposes, Rektor Kleist (1905), rather than the thematically 
similar Der Schuler Vegesack (1901-02),25 as the former brings certain 
Nietzschean aspects into clearer focus. Granted, no trace of a "blond beast" 
can be found, but neither was there a ruthless superman in the Nietzschean 
play just discussed. Conversely, one discovers in Rektor Kleist a very similar 
set of antagonists. A gymnastics instructor named Kommiiller has, like 
Alcibiades, all the attributes of the biological superman. Kommiiller 
enjoys excellent health and his virility is attested to by his strong and healthy 
children. He prides himself on his "gesunden Instinkte," and is "heilfroh, 
daB es in mir noch zu brausen vermag" (V, 236). But Kommiiller, again 
like the Greek general, has only average intelligence and holds determinedly 
and at times rather blindly to conventional notions of morality and truth-
the earthy name Kommiiller has also a petty-bourgeois ring. 
His opponent is Rektor Kleist, a sickly little hunchback approaching 
middle age. A light beard hints at impotence; foppish dress at a desire to be 
accepted: "Er ist ein kleiner, schmachtiger Mann ... geckenhaft gekleidet. 
Wenig iiber fiinfzig Jahre alt. Die rechte Schulter ist hoch verwachsen. 
Diinnes, rotliches mit Grau vermischtes Haar, geringer Backenbart, Brille 
mit Goldrand" (V, 225). Despite his weakness, or because of it, he craves 
life strongly, inordinately: "Was locken uns die Traumbilder des Ruhms 
am meisten? Was machen sie uns schlaflos und vor der Zeit begierig? 
Weib-Kind-Ruhm, was gilt der Geist vor der Tat?" (V, 271). Courageous-
25 Der Schuler Vegesack pits a beardless rector against a healthy young student, with 
the former getting involved in an incident by going to the student's room. 
59 
ly, if foolishly, he prefers to suffer the unspeakable torment of painful 
hemorrhoids rather than permit their removal-which would entail 
revealing the nature of his ailment and thereby make him the laughing 
stock of the community. 
Kleist' s sickness and thwarted desire make him bitter and resentful 
toward his more fortunate fellows, the strong and healthy, and occasionally 
lead him to commit an injustice, as when he refused young Strauss leave to 
go home. This weakness in turn makes him disgusted with himself: "Ich 
bin mir selbst zum Ekel" (V, 239). But Kleist is by no means a mere villain 
or weak coward. He has sensitivity and feeling and in his heart wishes the 
boys no harm. When he returns from the conference at which young 
Strauss was found guilty, he is despondent at the injustice committed. When 
the news comes that little Fehse has killed himself, Kleist is beside himself 
with grief and torment. Nor is he unkind to his attractive and sensible 
young wife, Frau Sophie, although frequently irascible because of his 
extremely painful ailment. It must also be remembered that Kleist was to a 
large degree justified in trying to keep the ink-throwing episode a secret, 
as he was fully aware that his future and the future of the school were at 
stake. All his purported evil acts were attempts to forestall the dangerous 
revelation which the bumbling self-righteous Kornmiiller forced to the 
fore. He remained silent at the council meeting because of his excessive sen-
sitivity to ridicule and because he realized that if the affair became known, he 
would never live it down, whereas he was convinced that the minor 
punishment to be inflicted on the boys would be quickly forgotten by all 
concerned. 
Admittedly, one must proceed with caution in the analysis. Kleist does 
reach a low point when he hurls the epithet "Kanaille" at the sensitive 
little hunchback, Fehse, and when he cannot bring himself to confess his 
guilt before the council. But he has done virtually everything that is for him 
humanly possible. When it seemed that Fehse would not co-operate, Kleist 
did confess to Kornmiiller and his confession was sincere. One need only to 
consider the tone of his words which are not smoothly hypocritical, but 
which are impulsive and intense. Bitterly he says to Kornmiiller, "Ihrem 
Wahrheitsfanatismus ist das Opfer gebracht: ich binder Tater." (V, 262). 
When Kornmiiller refuses to believe him, Kleist blurts out, "Ich bekenne 
mich dazu !" (V, 263). And, in increasing agony of soul, "Herr Kornmiiller, 
so horen Sie doch auf mich!" (V, 263). In frustration, he repeats his assertion 
and asks whether he must spell it out in black and white: "Ich-ich-ich bin 
der Urheber-ich, 1hr Rektor Richard Kleist! Soll ich es Ihnen nieder-
schreiben, daB Sie dann glauben?" (V, 263). If necessary, he says, he will 
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even explain how the drawing by Strauss entered into the matter, although 
he pleads in inner torment, "aber ersparen Sie mir die Demiitigung" (V, 
263). 
In a later scene, when Kommiiller claims to know the culprit and 
suddenly clasps Kleist's arm, the rector is not taken aback, but says with a 
note of tragedy in his voice, "W arum erhorten Sie mich nicht, als ich Ihnen 
am Vormittag die Wahrheit preisgab?" (V, 269). 
Inasmuch as Kaiser uses a dialectical procedure even in this early play, 
it may be argued that Kleist spoke, despite the apparent sincerity of his 
tone, with tongue in cheek, hoping to throw Komm tiller off the track. The 
only means that is then left to prove this contention in error, is to seek an 
objective clue outside the speeches of the two men. Such a clue is to be 
found in the attitude and conviction of Kleist's wife, who like Xantippe 
and all the sympathetically drawn female characters in Kaiser's dramas, has 
an unerring sense of right and wrong far beyond all conventional standards 
of morality. Frau Sophie-healthy, sensible, alert, fond of Komm tiller and 
his children, a symbol of life and instinct-after carefully evaluating the 
situation and at first doubting her husband, ultimately places the entire 
blame on Kommiiller: "Ja, Sie sind es einzig und allein, der an meinem 
Mann dies Verbrechen veriibt hat!" (V, 273). Kommiiller had been too 
stupid to recognize that her husband's confession of guilt had been sincere: 
"Der sie (die Wahrheit) verhohnte, als sie Ihnen von ihm geboten wurde" 
(V, 273). Through Frau Sophie the author informs us that the rector had 
done everything in his power to avert the catastrophe, and is not to be held 
responsible. In a limited sense Kleist is a tragic hero; one feels that he has the 
sympathy of Kaiser, the morbid-and at the time still sickly-intellectual. 
Of particular significance to our investigation is the fact that Kleist is as 
free of conventional notions as is the later Socrates. The foregoing discus-
sion makes it quite clear that Kleist is voicing his sincere conviction when he 
argues, in line with Nietzsche's views, that truth can be a dangerously 
destructive force: 
Was ist W ahrheit ?-Die W ahrheit am Ende vernichtet uns alle ! Sie ist 
nicht das rosenrote Gebilde, das Sie sich vorzaubern-oder das Schwert, das 
ein guter Schild noch auffangt. Die Wahrheit-trachten Sie der nach, Herr 
Kollege, trachten Sie der blindlings nach; so gelangen Sie mit zerschmet-
tertem Schadel auf dem Grunde an. Gott schiitze uns Menschen vor der 
Wahrheit in jeglichem Dinge ! (V, 262) 
Kleist stresses the illusory nature of conventional justice and conventional 
mores: 
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Irrtum-Irrtum-Irrtum, wir sind Kinder des Irrtums, aus Irrtum gezeugt 
-wuchernd im lrrtum-Sie wollen Fackeltrager heiBen und schwenken 
mit wilden Gebarden nur eine riesenhafte schwarze Fahne, mit der Sie das 
Licht erst recht verdunkeln .... Suchen Sie keinen Feuersaulenruhm,-die 
Menge rennt den Irrlichtern nach ... Aus Priestern werdet 1hr zu Henkern 
-Menschenopfer einem unbekannten Gott!-Das MaB eurer Gerechtig-
keit sei euch das Leiden beider Parteien ! (V, 2 70) 
The ailing rector bears a resemblance to Kaiser's Socrates, and it is interest-
ing to note that Socrates was in the author's mind when he created Kleist. 
Arguing against Kornmiiller's contention that the Greeks had developed 
the body as much as the mind, Kleist cries: "Der gr6Bte Grieche war 
Sokrates ! 1hr Rektor ist auch kein Riese!" (V, 23 7). Like Socrates, Kleist 
is a hero of the intellect, engaged in a bout with brutish life. 
The moral relativism and nihilism apparent in the theme of this drama 
link it with Der gerettete Alkibiades and with Nietzsche. The best indication 
that the play reveals a close familiarity on the part of the author with 
Nietzschean concepts lies, however, neither in the theme nor in the empha-
sis on Kornmiiller's gesunde Instinkte, but in the character of Kleist himself. 
Many critics have rightly noted the influence ofWedekind's Friihlings 
Erwachen on Rektor Kleist, but it is obvious that Kaiser's characters do not 
derive from that drama. And a moment's reflection will make it equally 
obvious that neither Kleist nor Kornmiiller is typical of Wedekind' s male 
heroes. It is well known that Wedekind stood strongly under Nietzschean 
influence and that his male heroes are usually strong, brutal, highly sexed, 
cunning, amoral individuals-Gerardo and the Marquis von Keith, to men-
tion only two-who combine rather than separate the elements of Leben 
and Geist. Oddly and perhaps significantly, though to our knowledge 
nowhere mentioned by critics, there is one play and only one by Wedekind 
which might conceivably have influenced Kaiser's characterisation. Hidalla 
(1904) is an atypical Wedekind drama, heavy with disillusionment and 
irony, which in a crucial scene pits a muscular dullard against a keen and 
embittered hunchback. Mocking the idealism he had expounded in Mine-
Haha, Wedekind portrayed the greasily handsome Morosini, President of 
the Society for the Ziichtung von Rassenmenschen [ !] with such ironical 
derision that he might well have served as a partial model for Kornmiiller, 
particularly since Hetmann, the hunchback, with his physical ugliness, his 
fanatical drive, his bitter resentfulness, and his keen intellect might have 
served as a prototype for Kleist. On closer inspection, however, it becomes 
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apparent that there is an intrinsic difference between the two hunchbacks. 
Hetmann is neither weak nor sickly, and there is no indication that his 
intellectuality or deformity in any way affect his virility. Had he not 
insisted on remaining a bachelor in conformity with his fanatical ideal of 
fostering physical beauty, it seems a foregone conclusion that he would 
have made a model husband. Thus, Hetmann can only have served at best 
as a partial prototype for Kleist as he, like other Wedekind heroes, represents 
Leben as well as Geist. 
In these same years, another writer who ~dmitted deriving his concept 
of Leben from Nietzsche, Thomas Mann, wrote several stories that incor-
porate the dualism of Leben versus Geist. In Tristan (1902) for example, the 
decadent artist, Spinell, clearly embodies intellectuality whereas the mer-
chant Kloterjahn, stands for insensitive vitality. The hero in Tonio Kroger 
(1903) feels himself straddling two worlds as he has some of the sentimen-
tality and conventionalism of the healthy burgher as well as the icy intel-
lectuality of the enervated artist, and the two worlds have their explicit 
representatives in Inge, Hans Hansen, and the Hamburg merchant on the 
one hand and the sickly but artistic Magdalena Vermehren on the other. 
But here again, whereas the representatives of Leben, particularly Kloterjahn 
and the Hamburg merchant, resemble Kornmiiller and might have influ-
enced his creation, Mann's heroes of the intellect are artists and Kleist is no 
artist. 
Whom now does Kleist resemble? Who was his prototype? To some 
degree Hetmann and Spinell are possibilities, but even more their direct 
forebear, Socrates, as customarily conceived by Nietzsche! It will be 
recalled once again, that for Nietzsche a variant of his favorite dichotomy: 
strength versus weakness, was instinct versus reason, and that he made a 
sharp distinction between "instinctive" intelligence and dialectical reason-
ing, detesting the latter as a sign of decadence and weakness. Thus Nietzsche 
wrote, "Der Pobel kam mit der Dialektik zum Sieg,"26 and "Dialektik 
kann nur eine Notwehr sein." Again, "Die Ironie des Dialektikers ist eine 
Form der Pobelrache." The symbol par excellence of the decadent dialecti-
cian for Nietzsche had been, from the beginning, Socrates, whom he 
bitterly attacked not only in his first major work, Geburt der Tragodie, but-
with a few notable exceptions-throughout his writings. Here are refer-
ences to Socrates from the posthumous volume, Wille zur Macht: 
26 The following quotations from Nietzsche occur in the Musarion Edition of his 
works (XVIII, 306---308). 
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die Reaktion des Sokrates, welcher die Dialektik als W eg zur Tugend 
anempfahl ... bedeutet exakt die Auflosung der griechischen Instinkte. 
Verhiij]lichung: Die Selbstverhohnung, die dialektische Diirre, die Klugheit 
als Tyrann gegen den "Tyrannen" (den Instinkt). Es ist alles iibertrieben 
[Kaiser uses "geckenhaft"] excentrisch, Caricatur an Sokrates, ein buffo 
mit den Instinkten V oltaires im Leibe ... er vertritt nichts als die hochste 
Klugheit ... 
Die Wildheit und Anarchie der Instinkte bei Sokrates ist ein decadence-
Symptom. 
Do not these quotations describe Rector Kleist as well? An eccentric, 
rather ridiculous little hunchback whose bearing, dress, etc. are excessive, 
whose instincts are in rebellion (for Nietzsche a sign of physical weakness), 
who detests himself and who possesses dialectical skill and die hochste 
Klugheit? As shown above, Kaiser himself linked Kleist with Socrates, 
obviously having in mind not Nietzsche's aphorism 340 but the Socrates 
Nietzsche more generally portrayed and despised as the embodiment of 
ressentiment. Kaiser views Kleist with more sympathy and understanding 
than Nietzsche does Socrates, but in most respects the two characters are as 
alike as two peas in a pod. 
If we pause now to correlate the two plays discussed this far, their 
great similarity will readily be observed. Not only do they both embody 
the Geist-Leben motiv, and have corresponding sets of adversaries, but the 
ostensible platonic dichotomy is in both cases oriented along the lines of 
Nietzsche's polarity: healthy instinct versus dialectical rationality. This 
finding is significant for the entire period which these plays span (1903-
1919), as many of the intervening plays likewise deal with the Geist-Leben 
motiv in the same Nietzschean sense and, in addition, are in some way 
directly indebted to Nietzsche himself. Thus, Die jiidische Witwe (1904), 
whose heroine knows no law but that of instinct and is a worthy offspring 
ofW edekind' s Lulu and her kin, has as its motto the famous lines from Also 
sprach Zarathustra, "O meine Briider, zerbrecht, zerbrecht mir die alten 
Tafeln!" In the play itself, the witty King Nebuchadnezzar ostensibly 
quotes his contemporary Zoroaster, but acutally parodies the style and tone 
of Nietzsche's popular work: "Siehe mit deiner Sternenseele den Mond an, 
wenn der blasse ins blaue Tuch der Nacht gezeichnet steht-also spricht 
Zarathustra" (I, 167). Judith's husband, Manasse, has much in common 
with Rector Kleist as he likewise embodies impotent intellectuality strongly 
desiring life, although Manasse is drawn more unsympathetically since he is 
not a victim but a perpetrator of bourgeois injustice. The antithesis is here 
further heightened by contrasting youth with old age. 
Several years later Kaiser created a blood-brother to Manasse, although 
a bit more vindictive and neurotic, King Mark in Konig Hahnrei (19rn); 
the young lovers, Tristan and Isolde, are the usual uneloquent and healthy 
representatives of virulent instinct. 
Der Geist der Antike (1904) presents the customary dichotomy in terms 
of a professor of archeology who strives vainly to change his allegiance from 
scholarship to life. It is more than likely that Professor Nehrkorn was meant 
to be a humorous jibe at Nietzsche himself, as Nehrkorn, like Nietzsche, is 
a professor of classical antiquity who claims that prevailing views on antiq-
uity need to be basically rectified in favor of a dionysiac interpretation. 
Nehrkorn says to his son, "Dein Vater schafft die Welt zum zweiten Mal" 
(V, 418), which Leo correctly interprets to mean, "Unsere Auffassung der 
Antike bedarf durchgreifender Korrektur?" (V, 418). Darkly, the professor 
exclaims, "Ich grub die Mumie der Welt aus" (V, 426). He is convinced that 
Leo has gained from the turbulent ocean the same insight into life that he 
has carried away from his studies in Greece: 
Leo, was sich dir im brausenden Orkan der Meere erschlossen hat-du wirst 
diesen Strom des heiBen, jungen, ewig gegenwartigen Lebens auch in 
Deinem Vaterhause nicht mehr entbehren. Ich trug ihn als beste Beute aus 
Hellas hier herein!- (V, 417) 
Nehrkorn has other Nietzschean attitudes, disdaining the masses 
whom he terms "Schafskopfe" dominated by illusions, "Blendwerk des 
Irrtums." He rejects scholarship and historical causality in the same manner 
that Nietzsche did in Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie fur das Leben. 
Nehrkom says with regard to scholarship: "Leuchte der Wissenschaft-was 
ist denn das fiir ein Licht? Stemenlicht, wenn die Sonne erlosch-keine 
Hand warmt sich daran. Nachtzeit! Nachtzeit!" (V, 426). He refuses to 
consider himself a part of the chain of events. Indignantly he snorts, "Ich 
schustre den Kalender nicht" (V, 425). And when Eck insists, "Wir alle 
hampeln an der eisernen Kette von gestern und heute," Nehrkorn retorts, 
"Als Hampelmann tun Sie das" (V, 425), meaning that only an unenlight-
ened person could hold to such a naive view. His ideal is "das starke, mutige, 
fruchtbringende Leben" (V, 415). The title Geist der Antike is itself an ironic 
word-play on that theme, since the Geist in question is not Geist at all but 
dionysiac Leben. 
Both Leben and Geist are mocked in the strongly anti-bourgeois 
comedy Der Zentaur (1906) in which the hero's pedantic devotion both to 
duty and to life is ridiculed as "iibermenschlich": "Mir recken Sie sich 
hinten und vome . . . iibermenschlich ! iibermenschlich ! Der Mythos 
wolkt sich um Sie, Zentaur! Zentaur!" (I, 294). Die Versuchung (19rn) and 
Von morgens bis mitternachts (1912) are tragedies which deal with the quest 
for Leben. A clear victory is won by instinct over effete culture in the 
comedy, Europa (1914); the heroine-another Judith-prefers the mascu-
line soldiers to the light-footed dancers. 
Three dramas of the 192o's still utilize the Leben-Geist theme but the 
spirit of these plays is quite different from those of the earlier period. In 
Kanzlist Krehler (1921), the protagonist is another Kleist in conflict with a 
full-bosomed wife. However, the latter's bond with life is less instinct than 
a bourgeois desire for material possessions which has forced her husband to 
keep his nose to the grindstone-and miss out on life. In Cats (1924), the 
motif crops out at the end of the play; the secretary when faced with the 
choice between humanitarian birth control and having children, decides in 
favor of instinct and turns her idealistic lover-who has made her sterile-
over to the police. Lederkopfe (1927) employs the conception of a treacher-
ous soldier who deforms his head and covers it with a leather hood (made 
of animal skin!) as a brutal example of body without head, Leben without 
Geist. 
It is no easy matter to describe in a few words Kaiser's gradual shift 
towards idealism. His popular expressionistic dramas of the second decade 
of the century furnish an accurate testimonial of his views concerning the 
destructive force of automation, capitalism and war on human personality, 
but in the main these dramas were sociological rather than philosophical, 
and their criticism was essentially a refinement of the social criticism found 
in his earlier plays. In the third decade, however, a new idealism became 
apparent (foreshadowed in Konig Hahnrei, 19rn). Kaiser's protagonists 
now frequently rejected the ugly world of phenomena in favor of a mental 
world which conformed to their wishes. At times the flight was involuntary 
(Zweimal Oliver), at times belief proved stronger than the outwardly real 
world (Oktobertag). 
This new idealism has frequently been associated with Kaiser's 
heightened interest in Plato, but such a view is only partly correct. Whereas 
Plato may have been an important factor in stimulating the new outlook, 
still Platonic idealism is essentially quite different from the subjectivism of 
Kaiser's characters. It would seem that Kaiser sought through Plato to 
overcome Nietzsche's nihilism without ever quite succeeding. 
The essays written by Kaiser in the decade 1918-1929, although 
concerned primarily with the problem of his art, were filled with Nietz-
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schean concepts. 27 To list a few such ideas : the world is chaotic and ruled 
by blind chance. Life is the sole meaning of existence. Man is the highest 
form of energy; he must assert himself against external forces and develop 
his potentialities to the full. "Der Mensch der Hochstleistung ist der Typ 
der Zeit, die morgen anfangt" (IV, 5 80). The goal of existence is "die 
Erneuerung des Menschen" (IV, 549).28 
Since space is restricted and the material voluminous, our discussion 
will be confined to the key concept in Kaiser's new idealism: spiritualized 
love. Although such love was in itself obviously not Nietzschean, the 
attempt will be made to show that the world outlook on which it was 
posited was still largely derived from Nietzsche. 
For Kaiser and his later protagonists, spiritualized love meant pure 
feeling not unlike the ideal of religious and yet erotic feeling to be found in 
the hymns of Novalis. This pure feeling, awakened by attraction to a 
member of the opposite sex, was esteemed both as immediate experience 
and as the feeling which the memory of the experience occasioned. Or, one 
might say that the feeling, although born of physical attraction, was there-
after able to survive on its own momentum-even, perhaps, into eternity. 29 
Such pure feeling was the highest possession of man to be cherished and 
protected at all costs. 
A good illustration ofhow spiritualized love combined the real and the 
ideal may be seen in the drama, Die Flucht nach Venedig (1922) wherein the 
physical desire of the heroine was spiritualized when she abandoned herself 
to it completely. Kaiser presented the thesis with his customary ironic 
distortion: George Sand was true to her lover for the first time when she 
betrayed him since, in sleeping with the Italian doctor, she had for the first 
time been true to Musset's ideal. This ideal-also Kaiser's-had been that 
love must entail complete self-abandonment; hitherto Sand had been 
accustomed to exploit her sexual experiences as a source of material for 
her novels. But now in the arms of another, she could preserve "die ewige 
Keuschheit des Empfindens" and later say to Musset, "Ich lebte fiir dich, 
27 Cf. particularly, "Dichtung und Energie" (1922), "Der Mensch im Tunnel" (1924), 
and "Die Sinnlichkeit des Gedankens" (1924). 
28 Cf. also Fix, pp. 33-40. 
29 At the close of Bellerophon, Apollo says, "Denn nur dies bedeutet die gewahrte 
Erdenfrist: dir die Gefahrtin zu erlesen fiir den einsamen Verein der Ewigkeit" ( Griechische 
Dramen, Zurich, 1948), p. 376. 
als ich diese Nacht erlebte" (II, 70). Not bourgeois conventions ofloyalty, 
but intensity and purity of feeling were what mattered. 
Virtually all of Kaiser's idealistic lovers derive their love from an 
initial physical attraction which is then sublimated into the realm of the 
spiritual-Juana, the wife of Claudius, Friedrich, the Countess Lavalette, 
Gilles, Vera, Elise, Adrienne, Franc;ois, Agnete, Marie, Noelle, Rosamunde, 
among others. Even in Oktobertag, where the mind experiences its greatest 
victory and Catherine wills her dream into reality, there was an initial 
physical encounter that lit the flame oflove. Sylvette in Brand im Opernhaus 
(1922) might seem to possess a truly spiritual love since it was awakened by 
the realization of the loftiness of her husband's feeling rather than by 
physical attraction. But a moment's reflection reveals that the husband's 
love, born of desire, was spiritualized passion and that Sylvette's love was a 
mirror of this passion. Awakened, she desired to be his wife in every sense 
of the word, and only when he refused to consider her as alive, did she 
commit suicide to preserve his dream. Her love is predicated on the fact 
of their marriage and physical bond. 
The term spiritualized and not spiritual has been chosen to characterize 
Kaiser's new conception of love, since this feeling did not originate in a 
serene and inviolable realm of the absolute, and was not a pure love of God 
or virtue, but rather remained, as before, love between man and woman, 
born of the flesh, and only then rising into the world of spirit. The impetus 
for the new love still comes from the world of dionysiac reality and has its 
roots in Leben. 
Because spiritualized love did not derive from an ideal world, but 
issued forth initially from the ugly reality of carnal desire, there existed an 
ever-present struggle between the ideal and the real, with the result that 
spiritual love is integrally related to and often characterized by suffering. 
No hard and fast line can be drawn as to the why and when of the suffering, 
but it is always correlated to the interplay of the two worlds. To speak with 
Schiller, the characters have little opportunity for Anmut and much for 
Wiirde. When they appear stonily serene like Rosamunde Floris and der 
Herr von :. , they usually inflict suffering on others. For that matter, 
Rosamunde's serenity is indeed only a mask, as we shall see presently, and 
none of the other heroes possesses what might properly be termed serenity 
of spirit. In Alain und Elise (1938), Kaiser insisted that suffering was essential 
to the preservation of spiritualized love. Elise inflicted pain both on herself 
and her lover, Alain, having him unjustly incarcerated for life, to fan the 
precious flame of love. A love such as hers, she told Frocquenard, could 
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thrive only in the deep shafts of suffering. In Pygmalion (1944), "gottlich 
Leiden" became the artist's "reichster Schatz" (VI, 597). We need not con-
sider further the many protagonists who suffer in suppressing their own 
desire and sacrifice themselves at the altar of their love-they are almost 
legion-, and one notes again how closely Kaiser's new ideal is associated 
with the reality of dionysiac being. 
When one considers the strong dionysiac undertones of Kaiser's 
idealism, coupled with the deeply pessimistic utterances of his most auto-
biographical protagonists, one wonders as to the strength of his idealistic 
convictions. Pygmalion was even more dejected than the dying Socrates as 
conceived by Kaiser, who at least had an ideal that might, perhaps, be 
realized. Pygmalion was forced to the grim conclusion that the ideal could 
never be brought to life. Napoleon in Pferdewechsel (1938) had little faith in 
his mission and only continued his tragic and lonely course in order not to 
betray the naive faith of a young widow. Kaiser, himself, at his trial for 
theft in 1921, stated that he had gone to such lengths to avoid the utter 
meanness of the world. 30 It would appear that Kaiser's idealism represented 
rather a flight from the engulfing reality of nihilism than a triumphant 
defeat of chaos, that Kaiser affirmed life less with the serene faith of Plato 
than in the tragic sense of Nietzsche's amor fati. 
The insecurity implicit in Kaiser's idealism was also reflected in the 
radical manner in which the ideal was to be cherished and preserved. There 
is precious little of Platonic temperance in Kaiser's ethic; rather he em-
ployed with even greater extremism the Nietzschean master morality, the 
doctrine of "beyond good and evil," which he had utilized in his earlier 
plays. It will be remembered that Kleist and Socrates had limited their 
infractions of bourgeois morality to misleading dialectic and some outright 
lies while defending their cause. Judith had, to be sure, felt justified in 
murdering Manasse and Holofernes, but Kaiser presented her with a certain 
humorous irony which was missing in his later dramas. The later protag-
onists shy from no crimes when it is necessary to preserve their ideal. 
Of the numerous examples at hand, one will suffice to illustrate the 
point. In Rosamunde Floris (1936), which Kaiser termed his "kiihnste und 
vollkommenste Dichtung," the heroine is a girl with a voice that is "glok-
kenrein in der Seele" and resounds "aus Herzenstiefen." She has "die 
weiBen Augen" found only in people "die nichts zu verbergen haben" (III, 
379). Yet this pure girl commits every conceivable crime-slander, decep-
30 New York Times (16 February 1921), p. 15. 
tion, perjury, adultery, homicide, infanticide-in order to preserve her 
inner spark of love free from taint. Once she has achieved this end for all 
time, she confesses to a crime that she has not committed, so that may atone 
for the wrong she has done. 
Rosamunde is no monster. She was fully aware of what is normally 
considered right and wrong and respected these values; she paid for her 
violation of traditional mores with her life. But she had seen through the 
veil of Maj a and was aware of what was significant in life, the preservation 
of the ideal; she sacrificed everything to this end. The grotesque and ironic 
perspective of the drama is merely another manifestation of Kaiser's 
profound pessimism. 
This ethical relativism can be all the more closely related with the 
immoralism of the superman, as Kaiser espoused the superman ideal itself 
ever since the end of World War I, identifying the superman with the 
tragic artist and so with himself. 
At his trial Kaiser viewed himself as a superman, insisting that he was 
"the greatest living German poet" and "that his condemnation would 
mean a catastrophe for civilization." Kaiser contended that he was not 
"everybody," and consequently not "bound by ordinary laws."31 If one 
is inclined to doubt the sincerity of these extreme utterances, one need only 
to recall the words of Athena in Pygmalion, assuring the artist that he is the 
misunderstood genius of mankind: "So seid Ihr Kiinstler Fremdlinge im 
Volk,/ Das lieber steinigt, als den Genius sieht" (VI, 522). Were it not for 
him, Athena told Pygmalion, Zeus would long since have destroyed man-
kind. It was the artist's lot to pursue a path ofloneliness and suffering so that 
mankind might be redeemed-"in der Erlosertat fiir alle Menschen." The 
latter words might seem more suited to Christ than to Zarathustra, but it 
must be noted that Pygmalion, unlike Christ, had only contempt for the 
common herd of men. 
Or one may refer to a typical artist like Abel Parr in Vinzent verkauft 
ein Bild (1937) who does not shy from fraud and deception, in the firm 
conviction that he belongs to the select few who stand above good and 
evil, and whose job it is "die Schopfung zu vollenden. Denn das ist Kunst" 
(VI, 198). 
The figure of Napoleon furnishes another clue to Kaiser's veneration 
of the superman. As Paulsen rightly says, the pacifist Kaiser's admiration 
for Napoleon even through the Hitler era is only comprehensible 
31 New York Times (16 February 1921), p. 15. 
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wenn man erkennt, daB Kaiser in Napoleon nicht in erster Linie den 
General und iiberhaupt nicht einen gewissenlosen Machtpolitiker sah, 
sondern das in der Geschichte einmal sichtbar gewordene schopferische 
Prinzip, den Obermenschen aus Fleisch und Blut.32 
As early as Das Frauenopfer (1915) and again in Das Los des Ossian Balvesen 
(1934), a noble Napoleon appears in the background. To be sure the 
comedy, Napoleon in New Orleans (1937-1938) condemns the imperator 
principle, but the earnest and autobiographical Pferdewechsel ( 193 8) presents 
Napoleon in all his grandeur and dignity as a courageous martyr, a tragic 
hero, who has tread a hard and lonely path in a futile effort to demonstrate 
to herd-humanity what greatness really is. In this play Napoleon, the 
superman and Kaiser himself are closely linked. Paulsen's assumption seems 
well taken that the Napoleon plays of 1938 are related to the plans Kaiser 
made the following year for a Nietzsche play to be entitled Ariadne.33 
As for the protagonists of the "idealistic" plays, it is not too much to 
claim that every one of them was, in his immoralism and dedication to an 
ideal, a superman seen through the distorting prism ofKaiser's irony. Even 
the early heroes of the pacifist dramas are supermen. The first of these, 
Eustache de Saint-Pierre, for example, is an unconventional hero who defies 
bourgeois notions of honor but is willing to lay down his life for his ideal. 
Thus our final discussion has shown that Kaiser's ideal of spiritualized 
love rested on four Nietzschean concepts: 1) dionysiac reality 2) heroic 
suffering 3) ethical relativism 4) the superman ideal. 
Let us recapitulate briefly before concluding. We have sought to show 
that during the period, 1903-1919, Kaiser's outlook lay rooted in the Nietz-
schean notion of dionysiac being, with many of the plays of the period 
dealing with the motiv, Geist-Leben, in the Nietzschean sense of healthy 
instinct versus dialectical rationality, and having other Nietzschean features 
as well. In the later period, Kaiser eulogized spiritualized love, but even this 
concept was predicated on the continued existence of the world of instinct. 
32 Paulsen, p. 107. 
33 A hint as to the possible content of Ariadne may be gained from Kaiser's contempo-
raneous play Klawitter (1938). In the latter play, Tibis cites Nietzsche and a short time after 
this, Hoff addresses his wife as Ariadne-a few moments before he learns that she has 
betrayed him. An unfaithful Ariadne in connection with the name of Nietzsche brings 
to mind Cosima Wagner. Hence it is likely that Ariadne was to deal with Nietzsche's 
relations to Cosima, perhaps during the "Triebchen" period, perhaps later when Nietzsche 
was on the verge of insanity and called her Ariadne. 
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Throughout the later period, Kaiser's idealism often seemed insecure, 
floating like a cockle-shell on an ocean of nihilism. After World War I 
Kaiser liked to conceive of himself as a tragic superman, waging single-
handed the battle for humanity and practicing the master morality. All of 
his later protagonists are dedicated and ruthless supermen. It does not come 
as a surprise that Kaiser evinced strong interest in Nietzsche in the years 
1938-1939. 
Whether Kaiser is to be considered a Nietzschean is a matter of 
definition. Certainly Nietzsche in no way detracted from his originality. On 
the other hand, Nietzsche very definitely influenced his thinking, choice of 
motifs, characterization, and perhaps even the tone of his dramas and 
essays. 34 
Kaiser's relationship to Nietzsche is strikingly similar to that of other 
eminent German writers at the tum of the century who found themselves 
in a terrifying world deprived of absolute standards and ideals by means of 
which they might chart a meaningful course through life. Like Thomas 
Mann, Hermann Hesse, Franz Kafka and a host of others who felt them-
selves decadent artists unable to cope with brutal life-and were strength-
ened in their conviction by a familiarity with Nietzsche's doctrine-, 
Kaiser sought constantly within the framework of his artistic creation to 
come to terms with life-with his own life. The basic dichotomy, Geist 
versus Leben, which in essence concerned him from first to last, may freely 
be rendered as the idealist Georg Kaiser striving to cope with Nietzschean 
nihilism. 
34 For further discussion of Nietzschean influence on Kaiser, see Raymond English, 
"Ethics in the Works of Georg Kaiser: The Conflict between Individualism and Altruism" 
(Diss. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, expected completion date, fall 1975). 
The first half of the dissertation deals with Kaiser's individualistic ethic, including the extent 
to which it is derived from Nietzschean concepts such as vitality, the will to power, sub-
limation of Eros, the Genie, and the Geniemoral. 
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Nietzschean Influence in Musil' s Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften 
Any attempt to determine Nietzschean influence in Der Mann ohne 
Eigenschaften1 should begin with a consideration of the central character, 
Ulrich, since the huge though fragmentary novel is ultimately concerned 
with his search for a purpose in life. The profound moral and eschatological 
implications of this quest may best be indicated by giving a brief synopsis 
of the story. 
Prior to the time of the narrative, Ulrich had given up a promising 
career as an officer when he came to identify military life with romantic 
idealism. Subsequently, he had given up an equally promising career as a 
mathematician when he decided that science and technology were de-
stroying "Seele" and dehumanizing western culture. However, despite 
this rejection of reason and order, his trained intellect remained suspicious 
of tempting ventures into the irrational, with the result that he became an 
uncertain, passive and cynical observer. This is the Ulrich the reader first 
encounters. Ulrich's indecision and confusion ultimately lead him to set 
aside one year in which to determine whether life can be meaningful. In 
the course of this experiment, which is the actual concern of the novel, he 
investigates several widely divergent, utopian possibilities. 
1 Robert Musil, Gesammelte Werke, I (Hamburg, 1952), 1672 ff. This edition of the 
novel contains the fragment published earlier by Musil as well as a number of hitherto 
unpublished fragments. Henceforth, in this study, page references to the novel will be 
given in parentheses, usually in the text of the paper, without further bibliographical data. 
For the sake of simplicity we have assigned volume numbers to the other volumes in the 
Gesammelte Werke based on the order of their publication: II = Tagebiicher, Aphorismen, 
Essays und Reden; III = Prosa, Dr amen und spate Briefe. References to these volumes will 
include the volume number. For additional information concerning the unpublished 
manuscripts, we have relied on Robert Musil: Eine Einfiihrung in das Werk by Ernst Kaiser 
and Eithne Wilkins (Stuttgart, 1962), henceforth referred to as KW. Occasional references 
to KW does not mean that we are in full agreement with all of its conclusions. We do not 
comment on the other critical Musil literature (Allesch, Bachmann, Boehlich, Braun, 
Grenzmann, Pike, Rasch, Sokel, Zak, etc.) as it has limited itself either to a laconic affirma-
tion ofNietzschean influence or to a brief reference to Clarisse as a superficial Nietzschean. 
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The first of these utopias is correlated with an attitude of dionysiac 
abandon. Although important to Achilles and Anders, as the hero was 
variously called in early versions of the novel, the dionysiac solution to life's 
problems appeals to Ulrich only on rare occasions and he usually considers 
it a dangerous seduction leading to insanity. 
He gives more serious consideration to the second possibility, termed 
the "Utopie des Essayismus," which is a rational attempt based on Nietz-
schean relativism to straddle and bracket ever more closely the unattainable 
truth. However, when no positive results seem forthcoming, Ulrich turns 
again to irrationalism and, together with his twin sister Agathe, seeks to 
attain a mystical serenity in the "Utopie des andern Lebens," based on an 
attempt to blend platonic and erotic love. During the course of his involve-
ment with this obviously antisocial utopia, treated in the novel in a section 
entitled "Die Verbrecher" and rooted in Nietzschean immoralism, Ulrich 
becomes disillusioned with subjective ethics and terms them a passing fad. 
According to later fragments, the paradisiacal existence a deux turns out 
unsatisfactorily, and a third utopia, termed the "induktive Gesinnung," 
is envisioned which once again is socially directed and takes into account 
the daily problems of existence and the need for getting along with one's 
fellow men. Nevertheless, even in this final utopia, certain basic Nietzschean 
elements are in evidence, such as the dual morality which distinguishes 
between the masses and the inspired few. 
Whereas none of these utopias directly reflect Nietzsche's Weltan-
schauung, all are presented in a Nietzschean framework. This study will 
concern itself with an examination of the Nietzschean elements in Musil's 
novel. 
To begin with Ulrich then, he has been endowed with many traits of 
the Nietzschean superman. In his youth he strove to be "so etwas wie ein 
Fiirst oder Herr des Geistes" (156), and kept his body as strong and supple 
as a panther's (47). The thirty-two-year old Ulrich presented in the novel 
has retained most of these features, mitigated only by a strong dash of 
nihilistic irony: 
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Mit der seelischen Beweglichkeit . . . verbindet sich bei ihm noch eine 
gewisse Angriffslust. Er ist ein mannlicher Kopf. Er ist nicht emp.findsam fur 
andere Menschen und hat sich selten in sie hineinversetzt, auBer um sie fiir 
seine Zwecke kennen zu lernen. Er achtet Rechte nicht, wenn er nicht den 
achtet, der sie besitzt, und das geschieht selten. Denn es hat sich mit der Zeit 
eine gewisse Bereitschaft zur Verneinung in ihm entwickelt, eine biegsame 
Dialektik des Gefiihls, die ihn leicht dazu verleitet, in etwas, das gut geheif]en 
wird, einen Schaden zu entdecken, dagegen etwas Verbotenes zu verteidigen 
und Pflichten mit dem Unwillen abzulehnen, der aus dem Willen zur 
Schaffung eigener Pfiichten hervorgeht. Trotz dieses Willens iiberlaBt er aber 
seine moralische Fiihrung mit gewissen Ausnahmen, die er sich gestattet, 
einfachjenem ritterlichen Anstand, der in der biirgerlichen Gesellschaft so 
ziemlich alle Manner leitet, solange sie in geordneten V erhaltnissen leben 
und fiihrt auf diese Weise mit dem Hochmut, der Rucksichtslosigkeit und 
Nachldssigkeit eines Menschen, der zu seiner Tat berufen ist, das Leben eines 
anderen Menschen, der von seinen Neigungen und Fahigkeiten einen mehr 
oder weniger gewohnlichen und sozialen Gebrauch macht. (155 [my 
italics]) 
From this passage it is evident that Ulrich possesses the Nietzschean char-
acteristics of masculinity and aggressiveness, disdain for pity, egotistical 
self-esteem, respect only for equals and not for traditions; that he is en-
dowed with a nihilistic propensity, a distrust of the good and an attraction 
to the forbidden, a dislike for social duties and a will to create his own duties; 
that he is imbued with arrogance, ruthlessness, indifference, and a strong 
sense of mission. Ulrich's two prototypes in early versions of the novel 
mentioned above, Achilles and Anders, consider themselves to be a kind of 
"little Napoleon," who under other circumstances might have become a 
Mongolian general (KW, 137). Despite their cynicism, however, all three 
protagonists are filled with an intense desire to improve mankind. Thus, one 
early fragment significantly bore the title, Der Erloser, and while still a 
young man Ulrich had viewed the world as a great laboratory, "wo die 
besten Arten, Mensch zu sein, durchgeprobt und neue entdeckt werden 
miiBten" (156). It will be shown presently that a new morality becomes 
Ulrich's main concern. 
As the title of the novel suggests, Ulrich is a complete relativist who 
distrusts all such concepts as Geist, Seele and Leben, analyzing them endlessly 
without ever reaching satisfactory conclusions. What he says in the abstract 
of Geist holds for his own intellectual outlook: "Er halt kein Ding for fest, 
kein Ich, keine Ordnung; weil unsre Kenntnisse sich mit jedem Tag andern 
konnen, glaubt er an keine Bindung, und alles besitzt den Wert, den es hat, 
nur bis zum nachsten Akt der Schopfung, wie ein Gesicht, zu dem man 
spricht, wahrend es sich mit den Worten verandert" (158). He even con-
siders the possibility that the dissolution of the ego may be imminent (144). 
Such relativism is closely related to nihilism, and so it is not surprising 
to find that Ulrich holds the world to be devoid of goal or meaning. In his 
reflections concerning the world as a great laboratory, he had continued: 
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"DaB das Gesamtlaboratorium etwas planlos arbeitete, und daB die Leiter 
und die Theoretiker des Ganzen fehlten, gehorte auf ein anderes Blatt" 
(r 56). Ulrich is of the opinion that mankind is in a transitional state that may 
endure till the last days of our planet. To comfort his friend Walter, he 
expresses the conviction that mankind is rapidly approaching a utopia, but 
admits to himself that "dieser Jugendtraum langst hohl geworden war, den 
er Walter vorhielt" (222). Walter senses Ulrich's true attitude. "Und wir 
sollen auf jeden Sinn des Lebens verzichten ?" he asks. Ulrich can only 
counter with the equivocating query, "wozu er eigentlich einen Sinn 
brauche ?" (222). 
After his pessimistic meditations on Geist, Ulrich had asked himself 
why he had not become a pilgrim, commenting, "Wer das Leben nicht 
bejahen will, sollte wenigstens das Nein des Heiligen sagen" (r57). 
Ulrich's nihilism encompasses an awareness of Nietzsche's concept of 
the eternal recurrence. At the death of his father, which occurs significantly 
between two utopian adventures, Ulrich is plunged into a darkly pessimistic 
mood. Looking at his dead father's face, he senses the possibility that every-
thing is only an eternal repetition and circular movement of the mind: 
"Vielleicht war alles darin, die Rasse, die Gebundenheit, das Nichtperson-
liche, der Strom des Erbgangs, in dem man nur eine Krauselung ist, die 
Einschrankung, Entmutigung, das ewige Wiederholen und im Kreis Gehen 
des Geistes, das er im tiefsten Lebenswillen haBte !" (708). 2 
When Ulrich is toying with the notion of suicide, he detects in the 
recurrence of a Lieblingsbild-experienced in the same dreamlike state in 
which Nietzsche had his vision of the eternal recurrence-"eine seltsame 
Ubereinstimmung und ein sonderbares Zusammentreffen" (678), and then 
sees himself as a series of puppets with broken springs ( 679). Kaiser and 
Wilkins relate this vision to young Musil's comment written after the fail-
ure of his first novel: "Gewisse Erinnerungen treten plotzlich in das 
Gedachtnis und man ahnt einen eisernen Zusammenhang" (KW, r92). In a 
fragment entitled" Atemziige eines Sommertages," Ulrich holds to the idea 
of the eternal recurrence in association with other Nietzschean viewpoints: 
2 KW comments as follows on this passage: "Und wenn plus ra change, plus c'est la 
meme chose wirklich alles ist, was sein kann, und der letzte geistige Gewinn aus all den 
Jahren, in welchen 'Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften' entstand, nur eine 'Welt ohne feste 
Form' ist, eingeschlossen in den Reifen der ewigen Wiederkehr in jenen [sic] wieder-
kehrenden Alptraum, den Nietzsche, der bewunderte Lehrmeister des Logikers Anders, 
traumte, warum sollte dann Ulrich widerstehen?" (p. 203). In a fragment dated by Frise 
around 1934, Ulrich terms Nietzsche "sein eigener Lehrer" (1379). 
"Dem appetitartigen Teil der Gefiihle verdankt die Welt alle Werke und 
alle Schonheit, allen Fortschritt aber auch alle Unruhe, und zuletzt all 
ihren sinnlosen Kreislauf' (II74 f my italicsl). 
The tragic realization oflife's futility imbues Ulrich and his predeces-
sors with a deep sense of isolation. Monsieur le vivisecteur,3 the first 
prototype, feels that he is frozen deep under polar ice (KW, 49), a close 
parallel to Nietzsche's icy high noon of revelation or the icy wastes referred 
to in his poem "Vereinsamt."4 Ulrich is more communicative than the 
others, but he is still a lone wolf, unmarried and unemployed, who contem-
plates life with passive irony. 
Paradoxically enough, but like his forerunners and like Nietzsche, 
Ulrich remains deeply concerned with the need for a complete revaluation 
of moral values. 5 He rejects conventional morality as "die Altersform eines 
Kraftesystems" (258) and feels the necessity, "eine Moral, die seit zwei-
tausend Jahren immer nur im kleinen dem wechselnden Geschmack 
angepaBt worden ist, in den Grundlagen zu verandern" (259). His radical 
proposal entails the elimination of moral codes entirely, as he is of the 
opinion that codification leads to rigidity and loss of moral essence (258, 
779). In an established society, virtues soon become as unbearable as vices 
(258). Ulrich cannot help but feel that there is nothing more useless than a 
person good on principle alone (764, 780). Anders had expressed the same 
idea more vigorously, insisting that "Fortschritt kommt nur <lurch das 
Bose."6 In the aforementioned fragment, Ulrich observes that human 
action is largely determined by instincts which are ambivalent in their 
relation to good and evil (1175), and in a related fragment discusses mascu-
line, anti-Christian egotism as the source of all moral values : 
3 Nietzsche referred in Genealogie der Moral to "Vivisektoren des Geistes" (Werke in 
4 Biinden, ed. Karl Schlechta [Munich, 1954 ff.), II, 842). 
4 Hermann Hesse referred to this poem in his novel Steppenwol.f (1927) to illustrate the 
isolation of the genius. 
5 Nietzsche used the concept of nihilism variously, at times to mean a completely 
negative position that viewed the world as devoid of meaning, more frequently to refer to 
a complete dissolution and relativizing of values which served him as a starting point for 
establishing a new set of values. Both Musil and Nietzsche vacillated between these two 
attitudes. 
6 KW, 137. Concerning Antler's philosophy, KW adds in parentheses, "von deres in 
Notizen heiBt, daB sie auf Nietzsche beruht." Commenting on the unpublished Erliiser 
manuscript, KW states, "Sein [Ulrich's) Vorlaufer Anders versuchte seine Vorliebe fiir 
Moosbrugger philosophisch auf Gedanken Nietzsches, des 'bewunderten Lehrmeisters,' 
zu begriinden" (p. 169). 
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. . . wer sich nicht selbst liebe, konne nicht gut sein, eine Botschaft, die 
ziemlich das Gegenteil vom Christen tum ist ! Denn nicht, wer gegen andre 
gut ist, gilt als gut; sondern wer gut an sich selbst ist, ist es notwendig gegen 
andre. Das ist also eine schopferische Art Selbsrliebe ohne Schwache und 
Unmannlichkeit, eine kriegerische Obereinstimmung von Gliick und 
Tugend, eine Tugend in stolzem Sinn. (u92) 
Just as Zarathustra detests the notion of the smugly virtuous "letzte 
Mensch" who steers a careful middle course to avoid exertion, Ulrich 
disdains the modern tendency to regard strong feeling as psychopathic 
(259). He dreads to think what it would mean for "das gesunde Leben" 
were morality to consist of an anxious "mittleren Zustand zwischen zwei 
Obertreibungen ... wenn sein [ des Lebens] Ideal wirklich nichts anders als 
die Leugnung der Obertreibung seiner Ideale ware" (259). 
True morality must take into account the flux of reality, the "Beweg-
lichkeit der Tatsachen" (2 59). It has to recognize that reason cannot pre be 
the depths of" das wahre Leben." According to Ulrich, morality lies not in 
conduct according to rules but in carrying out one's acts "mit ganzer Seele." 
Any act is morally valid if committed "aus dem ganzen Wesen heraus." 
Morality is "ein ganz Begreifen" that transcended intellect and feeling 
(262). 
These views held by Ulrich at the beginning of the experimental year 
are still quite strong in him months later during the first period of his life 
with Agathe, when he sums up his views in the following manner: 
Ich glaube, da.B alle Vorschriften unserer Moral Zugestandnisse an eine 
Gesellschaft von Wilden sind. Ich glaube, da.B keine richtig sind .... Ich 
glaube, man kann mir tausendmal aus den geltenden Grunden beweisen, 
etwas sei gut oder schon, es wird mir gleichgiiltig bleiben, und ich werde 
mich einzig und allein nach dem Zeichen richten, ob mich seine Nahe 
steigen oder sinken macht. Ob ich davon zum Leben geweckt werde oder 
nicht. (786-87) 
Although he then hesitates for a moment, admitting that he is unable to 
prove anything and that such an ambiguous position could lead to danger-
ous confusion, he goes on to say: "Ich glaube aber vor allem nicht an die 
Bindung von Bos <lurch Gut, die unser Kulturgemisch darstellt: das ist mir 
widerwartig ! Ich glaube also und glaube nicht !" (787) 
To emphasize the invalidity of conventional mores, Ulrich frequently 
discusses murder, which in bourgeois eyes is conceived as the extreme 
crime. For him the fifth commandment does not represent "eine Wahrheit" 
and is not to be taken as an inviolable law (261). Not only are there valid 
exceptions to this law but in less clearly defined cases the reactions of the 
average newspaper reader are often in part sympathetic, vacillating between 
"Abscheu und Verlockung" (261). The act itself is not what matters, since a 
murder may be either a crime or a heroic deed (257). The decisive factor is 
whether one acted from inner necessity or not, since a truly moral person 
could never let himself be guided by an external law: "Er konnte gliicklich 
sein, weil er nicht totet, oder gliicklich sein, weil er totet, aber er konnte 
niemals der gleichgiiltige Eintreiber einer an ihn gestellten Forderung 
sein" (262; cf. 749). 
Imbued with this attitude, Ulrich is able to contemplate murdering his 
arch-opponent, the pseudo-idealist Arnheim. Later, with Agathe, Ulrich 
adopts a somewhat more conservative attitude, but when she asks what he 
might do after committing murder, he is at first tempted to answer in good 
Nietzschean fashion: "Ich konnte ja vielleicht dadurch befahigt werden, 
ein Gedicht zu schreiben, das Tausenden das innere Leben gibt, oder auch 
eine groBe Erfindung zu machen" (751). When speaking of egotism, Ulrich 
had commented, "Ein guter Mann kann auch toten" (1196). 
The morality of murder is embodied most clearly in the case of the 
sex-murderer Moosbrugger, which constitutes an earlier and more signi-
ficant motif than the much discussed Collateral Campaign; the latter was, 
by the author's own admission, only a development of the Moosbrugger 
motif permitting the introduction of additional characters (KW, 141). 7 
When the strong, benign-looking carpenter Moosbrugger committed 
murder, he acted in harmony with his innermost need. An abnormal up-
bringing had made him extremely shy in the presence of women and this 
shyness later developed into an insane fear, inducing him to react in a 
frenzied and sadistic manner when approached by a prostitute. He came to 
believe that he was being persecuted by female spirits and ultimately sought 
refuge in insanity. The law court, with its psychiatric staff, sentences Moos-
7 The Collateral Campaign has as its function to organize a celebration, to be held in 
1918, of the seventieth anniversary ofFranzJosefs accession to the throne. The purpose was 
to outdo the Prussians who were preparing to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of 
William II in the same year. The long and futile search by the organizers of the Collateral 
Campaign for something worthy of celebrating is correlated with Ulrich's search for a 
meaning in life. 
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brugger to death for slaying a prostitute, but Ulrich is convinced that "im-
moralists" such as Luther and Meister Eckhart would have judged the case 
in a more profound manner and set the carpenter free (124-25). 
Moosbrugger has both a passive and an active function in the novel. 
He not only serves to point up criticism of existing society and mores, but 
on the symbolical plane he also offers a solution to man's dilemma. Indeed, 
grotesque as it may seem, he represents the first irrational utopia Ulrich 
considers, a release from the stultifying bonds of reason and moral responsi-
bility into frenzied dionysiac abandon, so well described by Nietzsche in 
Die Geburt der Tragodie. Clarisse and, to a lesser extent, Ulrich and Bonadea, 
see in Moosbrugger an answer to the problem of decadent civilization. 8 
Clarisse links Moosbrugger with the ecstatic mood of dionysiac music 
which Musil, like Nietzsche, distrusted for its enervating effect on the will 
to live. 9 Clarisse, it will be remembered, is a vigorous young pianist who 
thrills unduly to rapturous music and whose greatest wish is to continue to 
play endlessly (149). When Ulrich gives her a set of Nietzsche's works, she 
becomes a confirmed if superficial Nietzschean, advocating will and genius 
(50,623). Now, more than ever, she exults in frenzied dreams of perfection, 
so that her husband fears for her sanity and hates Ulrich for encouraging her 
to yield to this heady seduction (69). 
It is only when Clarisse becomes convinced that Moosbrugger is 
musical that she becomes intensely interested in him and seeks his release 
(3 IO, 445, 727). She now endeavors to enlist Ulrich's support in freeing the 
murderer, commenting, "du wiirdest verwandelt werden" (223). In 
addition, she writes a letter to Count Leinsdorf suggesting that the Col-
lateral Action be celebrated as a Nietzsche year and closes her letter with an 
appeal that something be done for Moosbrugger (233; cf. 303, 361, 453). 
The point is obvious. Freeing the i~sane murderer is for her equivalent 
to freeing the dionysiac forces within herself. Like Ulrich, a nihilist who 
does not balk at murder,1° Clarisse sees in such self-abandonment an escape 
8 Musil does not refer in the published version to Moosbrugger's code of action as a 
utopia, presumably because he had by this time come to reject such a radical cure for the 
world's ills. It will be seen, however, that even Ulrich regards Moosbrugger at times as a 
utopian possibility. 
9 Musil wrote in 1902, after attending a concert by Paderewski: "Wenn manJemanden 
hatte, der einem fort und fort solcherweise die Seele umspinnen wiirde oder selbst so ware. 
-Ich empfand, daB ich mich ganz vom Leben abwenden und ganz diesem zuwenden 
wiirde,-weil das Leben nicht im Stancle ist, mir etwas Gleichwertiges zu bieten" (KW, 
70-71). 
1° Clarisse says to Ulrich, " ... ist das Leben, das wir fiihren, nicht furchtbar traurig? 
80 
from the emptiness of modern civilized life and a revitalizing force for an 
enervated culture. 
To stress this point, the author lets Clarisse experience a strange day-
dream while playing the piano with Walter in their usual violent style. 
Depressed by thoughts of her past life, she abandons herself to the music 
and imagines that Moosbrugger's prison opens up before her like a refuge. 
She enters, filled with trepidation but encouraging herself-as she had done 
on an earlier occasion-with the thought, "Man muB bis zum Ende Musik 
machen!" Whereupon the cell becomes suffused with her being (Ich) 
which is likened to a delicious sense of intoxication : ". . . ein so mildes 
Gefiihl wie eine Wundersalbe, aber als sie es fiir immer festhalten wollte, 
fing es an, sich zu offnen und auseinanderzuschieben wie ein Marchen oder 
ein Traum." She now sees Moosbrugger sitting before her and sets about 
removing his fetters. "Wahrend sich ihre Finger bewegten, kam Kraft, 
Mut, Giite, Schonheit, Reich tum in die Zelle ... "The murderer is magical-
ly transformed into "ein schoner Jungling" and she into "eine wunderbar 
schone Frau" (150). 
Freeing Moosbrugger symbolizes the release of the demonic and 
irrational forces in man, both as a protest against insipid bourgeois culture 
and as a revitalizing process. Musil's doubts as to the feasibility of such an 
irrational code of action are, of course, evident at many points in the novel 
and particularly in the fact that his savior is a wildly insane murderer and 
the savior's prophet a frenetic young woman (whom the author at times 
caricatures in brutal fashion). On the other hand, it cannot be overlooked 
that even in the published fragment Ulrich was on occasion sorely tempted 
by Moosbrugger's drastic solution. To cite the most telling example, one 
evening, despondent over the problems besetting him, Ulrich feels a sudden 
urge to leave his brightly illuminated house (i.e., the security of his rational 
self) to take a walk in the garden. Outside, the darkness ominously suggests 
to him the gigantic shape of Moosbrugger and the trees seem imbued with 
a strange plasticity. Although they appear wet and ugly as worms-an 
obvious symbolism for the underlying instincts-he can scarcely resist the 
desire to kneel down and embrace them, tears streaming over his face (264). 
In the present context Ulrich's behavior implies more than nihilistic 
surrender. It will be remembered that his predecessors saw in Moosbrugger 
a symbol of positive action. Anders considered Moosbrugger to be the 
Es kommt weder Gott noch Teufel. So gehe ich schon jahrelang herum" (674). She had 
calmly suggested to Walter that he murder Ulrich (364,455; cf. also 627-28). 
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mirror of certain traits within himself while Achilles felt that the murderer 
was his complete mirror image (KW, 139). Ulrich cannot be completely 
detached from these earlier protagonists, since even he senses a close bond 
with Moosbrugger. When the carpenter is sentenced, Ulrich has the feeling 
that the murderer's fate means more to him than his own life (124). Earlier 
the idea occurred to Ulrich that if mankind as a whole could synthesize its 
dreams it would produce Moosbrugger, which is just another way of 
saying that Ulrich also views the condemned man as a savior (78). Nor 
should it be forgotten that Ulrich shares the insane carpenter's aversion to 
sexual relations and can readily understand that a man might seek to stifle 
a woman's shrieks by stuffing clods of dirt in her mouth (72).11 
Another important character related to Moosbrugger is the nympho-
maniac Bonadea, who personifies the sexual element in the dionysiac mood. 
She wants Ulrich to help free Moosbrugger, i.e., to identify himself with 
the latter, as she would like Ulrich to assume the murderer's innocence and 
sense of irresponsibility (590). Like Moosbrugger, Bonadea violates con-
ventional morality without remorse and from a consuming desire. She 
seeks to convert Ulrich to her own sensuality and wants him to follow his 
instincts (594). Ulrich is enticed by the possibility she offers and "fiihlte 
groBe Sehnsucht nach diesem Schliipfrig-Schleirigen, nach Nachgeben und 
Vergessen" (595), but manages to resist. The orgiastic element is linked to 
Moosbrugger in an earlier fragment by having Clarisse incite Anders 
through her demoniacal piano-playing to seduce her, after which he feels 
committed to help free the murderer.12 
The Moosbrugger motif, perhaps all-important in the earliest versions 
of the novel, recedes into the background of the later versions when con-
fronted with the more serene utopia embodied in Ulrich's sister, Agathe, 
whose garden is light and friendly, and whose escape into a mystical 
"anderen Zustand" offers bliss comparable to platonic love (923). This 
rather erotic spiritual union bears a striking resemblance to the ideal oflove 
11 Musil vacillates in a confusing manner, generally regarding Moosbrugger's solution 
as that of an insane mind, but then again identifying the murderer to a degree with Ulrich 
himself. Without a knowledge of the earlier versions, one would be inclined to conclude 
that Moosbrugger represents a dangerous nihilistic seduction rather than a utopian possi-
bility. 
12 (KW, 171-72). Unpublished manuscript of 1905. In an even earlier fragment, 
music, eroticism, and dionysiac ecstasy were linked by having an errant wife dressed in a 
neglige receive the hero in a room containing a huge grand piano and a dionysiac mask 
(KW, 56). 
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found in some of Georg Kaiser's later plays.13 However, our attention will 
here be directed to Agathe's Nietzschean characteristics. 
Ulrich's charming sister also possesses the "eine Tugend" praised by 
Zarathustra, that complete harmony between act and intent which Musil 
termed "ein ganz Begreifen." Like Moosbrugger, she embodies an ideal 
of the irrational and the instinctive, and has a fair share ofBonadea's earthy 
sensuality, being only more passive and serene. She has had an unhappy 
second marriage and shares Ulrich's nihilistic views and his desire to 
escape the misery of daily existence (747). The two spend countless hours 
discussing questions of morality, during which time Agathe comes to 
accept Ulrich's relativistic Lebensmoral, largely because it articulates what 
she already believes.14 
Without a twinge of conscience, Agathe commits what normally 
would be considered a serious crime; she forges her father's last will and 
testament. She does so to prevent her husband from sharing in her inheri-
tance and possibly interfering with her present way oflife. From her point 
of view her act is entirely justified, but the theorist Ulrich is horrified, 
chiding her that even Nietzsche had adjured his "freie Geister" to adhere to 
certain outer laws so that they might maintain their inner freedom (812). 
But when Agathe remains unmoved Ulrich decides to let destiny take its 
course, in the hope that the morality "des Steigens und Sinkens" would 
prove as applicable as "die einfache der Ehrlichkeit" (845). He was, as usual, 
torn between the compulsions of the law-making intellect and the law-
breaking soul. On the one hand, he reasons that he is only a theoretical 
defender of evil who in practice leads a law-abiding existence and who has, 
so to speak, merely protected the idea of evil from the actual evildoers (843). 
At the moment he feels strongly drawn to the course of good (842). On the 
other hand, he has to admit to himself that he is better disposed after com-
mitting a conventionally wrong act, and that evil leads to a fuller develop-
ment of one's faculties than does routine observance of good (839). In a 
decadent civilization such as he feels presently to exist (843), evil acts could 
on occasion not only be "urspriinglicher und kraftvoller . . . sondern 
geradezu moralischer" (841). In fact, in such a civilization good and bad 
become almost meaningless concepts when applied to an act committed 
"aus einer reinen, tiefen und urspriinglichen Handlungsweise" (841). Al-
though Agathe's act violates moral law, it presents •eine betorende 
13 Cf. my essay, "Nietzsche and Georg Kaiser" in this volume, pp. 51-72. 
14 (764-88); cf. also 758, 762. Agathe says, "!ch mochte Hagauer umbringen." 
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Verlockung ... , sobald man es mittraumte, denn dann entschwand alles 
Strittige und Geteilte, und es bildete sich der Eindruck einer leidenschaft-
lichen, bejahenden, zum Handeln drangenden Giite .... " (842). He cannot 
bring himself to condemn Agathe since her act represents a sincere and 
wholehearted attempt to achieve a "Zustand ... , worin es eine Moral ohne 
Unterbrechung gibt" (845). 
In an earlier version, the forgery had been only the first of a series of 
crimes perpetrated by Agathe and Anders as a kind ofNietzschean experi-
ment in immoralism which ended in a short-lived incestuous paradise on a 
Mediterranean island (1443-67). In the published version of 1932, the 
episode is virtually terminated when Agathe's husband, Hagauer, in his 
letter accuses his wife of being "das strikteste Gegenteil einer ins Leben 
gerichteten und seiner kundigen Menschenart" (972). The latter, who had 
committed her misdeed in "einem einbildungsreichen Rauschzustand," 
now experiences "eine unbeschreibliche Niichternheit" (974), and soon 
thereafter attempts suicide. Ulrich also has a change of heart and is now 
definitely convinced that she has been in the wrong. Even though morality 
in the present-day world is either in dissolution or in "Krampfen," he 
insists that one should keep pure for the sake of a world yet to come (978). 
He abhors evil, he discovers, and views his earlier enthusiams for nihilism 
and immoralism as part of a passing fad: 
Ich selbst babe auch urspriinglich gedacht, daB man zu allem Nein sagen 
miisse; alle haben so gedacht, die heute zwischen fiinfundzwanzig und 
fiinfundvierzig sind; aber das war natiirlich nur eine Art Mode: ich konnte 
mir vorstellen, daB jetzt bald der Umschwung und mit ihm eine Jugend 
kommt, die sich statt der Unmoral wieder die Moral ins Knopfloch stecken 
wird. (979) 
Nietzsche's ideas are apparently rejected in both versions of the attempted 
flight into the mystical tausendjiihrige Reich, but even here Nietzschean 
nihilism and immoralism remain the central theme. Agathe embodies these 
concepts just as all the other characters mentioned, excluding at times the 
vacillating Ulrich. 
Concerning Musil' s rejection of certain aspects ofNietzsche and Nietz-
scheanism, it would appear that the mystical Austrian wanted to dissociate 
his interest in Nietzsche completely from the customary will to power 
interpretation of the latter. To this end he introduced into the story the 
Nietzschean writer Meingast, presumably a caricature of Ludwig Klages, 
who comes down from "Zarathustras Bergen" to spend several weeks with 
Walter and Clarisse. In his advocacy of an irrational hierarchy based solely 
on power, Meingast is presented as a pompous, superficial and lascivious 
person whom Ulrich disdains as a "Schwatzer" (857). 
An even more comprehensive rejection of Nietzsche seems implicit in 
the disillusionment experienced by Ulrich and Clarisse in the insane asylum, 
where the orgiastic exhibitionism of the insane brutally ridicules the 
romantic idea of dionysiac ecstasy. One inmate is actually an ironic por-
trayal of the insane Nietzsche. He is described as a man in his late fifties, 
obviously from the upper class, with bushy hair and a spiritualized face. His 
sickness is depressive dementia paralytica; the psychiatrist Siegmund whispers 
to Clarisse, "Ein alter Syphilitiker. Versiindigungs- und nihilistische 
Wahnideen" (1004). The ironically drawn representative of Austrian 
militarism, General Stumm von Bordwehr, is deeply impressed by the 
serenity of the old man's face and feels compelled to remark, "die leibhaftige 
Geistesschonheit," but the accompanying physician throws cold water on 
this notion, explaining that the spiritualized expression resulted from a 
pathological relaxing of the facial muscles (1004). 
To judge from the novel as published by the author, it would appear 
that Musil had gone the way of many other writers of his generation, such 
as Thomas Mann, Hermann Hesse, Stefan George and Georg Kaiser, who 
were at first captivated by the possibilities inherent in the new immoralism 
but who gradually became suspicious of an anarchistic morality. If one also 
takes the early fragments into consideration, the hero may be seen to have 
evolved from a Cesare Borgia type of ruthless superman to a mystical 
immoralist who ultimately rejects Nietzscheanism as a passing fad. 
The published portion and early fragments comprise, however, only a 
part of Musil's work on the novel; there are also the later fragments on 
which he continued to work until his death in 1942. One cannot disregard 
these fragments on the ground that they were not final copy or that they 
were not published by the author himself, since Musil had wanted to 
publish more of the novel and was thwarted by lack of funds, the Nazi ban 
on his writings, and the difficulties of emigre existence. 
In these later fragments there are indications that Musil contemplated 
having his hero explore the possibilities of a third utopia. We cannot 
attempt here to deal with the difficult and much disputed problem of 
whether the third utopia of the inductive attitude (induktive Gesinnung) 
was a continuation of the first or second utopia, or indeed of both. The 
scholars who have studied the manuscripts most intently, Frise, Bausinger 
and the Kaiser-Wilkins team, at least agree that the fragments dealing with 
85 
the third utopia are late fragments and that this utopia was to be the final 
utopian possibility to be considered. Now, whatever these fragmentary 
outlines and preliminary studies may fail to show, they do reveal a con-
tinued or renewed preoccupation with Nietzschean concepts; if these 
fragments are to be taken at all seriously, they indicate that Ulrich's 
rejection of Nietzsche either had little duration or reflected in essence a 
transition to a more mature approach to Nietzsche. 
According to one late fragment, the utopia of the inductive attitude 
was to make a clear distinction between the morality for the many and the 
morality for the few (1621). The distinctly Nietzschean flavor of such a dual 
morality is further enhanced by the fact that the elite few were to utilize 
Ulrich's Geniemoral (1621). Even the morality for the many has Nietzschean 
overtones, as the following precepts demonstrate: 
Zusatz 3: Zur Moral fiir die vielen gehort auch: das Mehrseinmiissen, als 
man ist. 
Z usatz 4: Die wirkliche Welt braucht am meisten die Erfindung und 
Darlegung des "guten Bosen." (1623) 
It may be noted in passing, that a fragment of 1932 dealing with the struc-
ture of the second book expands the second of these precepts to form the 
main motif of the novel: "Im Ganzen muB der Roman wohl das 'gute Bose' 
erfinden und darlegen, da es die Welt mehr braucht, als die utopische 'gute 
Glite'" (1633 [author's italics]). 
The morality for the many is discussed in such Nietzschean terms as 
Dekadenz, Ressentiment, Macht, and das Bose (1622-26). Nietzsche is himself 
frequently referred to, in one instance three times on one page (1625). In 
commenting on the positive attributes of a use of force, Musil had Nietzsche 
very much in mind: 
Die Produktion von Machtmenschen, die alles ihren Zwecken beugen, ist 
der Trick der Menschheit, ihre Zwecke zu erfiillen. So Nietzsche .... 
Positiv wirken die hauptsachlich von Nietzsche beschriebenen Tugenden 
der Macht: Stolz, Harte, Ausdauer, Mut, Geltenlassen, Neidfreiheit, 
GroBziigigkeit, Gelassenheit, und so weiter. [Note the striking parallel to 
the earlier description of Ulrich!] Meist sind das auch Tugenden des Geistes. 
Siehe die Entwicklung des europaischen Geistes aus dem Kriegergeist .... 
Diesem wurde (nach Nietzsche) das fremde, vergiftende Element des 
Christentums zugesetzt. (1625) 
To be sure, Nietzsche is considered only as one alternative and Musil then 
raises the question whether evil is unavoidable and to be esteemed (1625-
86 
26). Significantly, however, he leaves the question open. 
Late references in Musil's diary also indicate a continued interest in 
Nietzsche. Presumably in 1937, Musil asked himself the question, "Habe 
ich in meiner Jugend auch nur ein Drittel von ihm aufgenommen?" and 
answered amazed, "Und <loch entscheidenden EinfluB" (11, 401). In the 
margin adjoining an early comment reading, "Nietzsche an sich hat keinen 
groBen Wert," he later jotted, "jugendliche AnmaBung" (11, 43). 
Until the many questions concerning Musil's Nachlaj3 are clearly 
resolved one cannot, of course, make definitive statements about his later 
attitude. But it seems reasonably certain that Nietzschean ideas would have 
formed a cornerstone of the entire work, had the novel been completed. 
In conclusion two ancillary points may briefly be touched upon. There 
is little doubt that the novel expresses Musil's own basic viewpoints. This 
is apparent both in the autobiographical nature of the hero and in the fact 
that the novel, including early versions and late fragments, was a life's work 
covering the period 1898 to 1942. It appears equally evident that Nietzsche, 
and not similarly oriented thinkers in whom Musil was simultaneously 
absorbed, was the principal inspiration for the ideas discussed above. Ad-
mittedly, Musil had read Emerson and been impressed by him. On occasion 
he linked the names of Emerson and Nietzsche. In one diary reference, for 
example, he acknowledges his debt to the two men: "Es gibt Augenblicke 
groBer W ahrhaftigkeit, wo ich mir eingestehe, alles, was ich sage, habe viel 
besser schon Emerson oder Nietzsche gesagt. Ich werde nicht nur davon 
i.iberwaltigt, wenn ich solche Stellen wieder sehe, sondern ich muB auch 
annehmen, daB ein tatsachlicher EinfluB im Spiel ist" (III, 706). Musil 
juxtaposed the names of the two men again in a commentary to a diagram 
stressing the importance of the "andern Zustand": "Unserer Zeit das 
Problem von Emerson vermacht, schlieBlich auch <lurch Nietzsche. Sie hat 
es nicht gelost, sondern gespalten in Rationalismus und Religion" (KW, 
299). 
When one reflects, however, on the areas in which Emerson and 
Nietzsche held similar views, it becomes obvious that a rather clear line of 
demarcation can be drawn between them, as Emerson remained at all times 
a transcendental idealist.1 5 Thus, the inner voice which guided Emerson's 
heroic genius was no will to power but ein frommes Empfangen. And whereas 
his superman was no weakling and not easily swayed, still he was not 
permitted to disregard his neighbor's rights completely. 
15 Stanley Hubbard, Nietzsche und Emerson (Basel, 1958), p. 196. Musil, himself, 
believed the similarity between Nietzsche and Emerson to be superficial: "Denn diese 
beiden sind trotz mancher Verwandtschaft zu unahnlich" (III, 706). 
The Impact of Nietzsche on Hermann Hesse 
In his short autobiographical novel, Nuremberg Journey (Die Nurnberger 
Reise) written in 1927, Hesse mentions an evening stroll in the old part of 
Tuttlingen, a town in Swabia. The romantic atmosphere awakened 
memories of his youthful enthusiasm for Holderlin's poem "Die Nacht" 
and of his equally strong enthusiasm in later years for Thus Spake Zara-
thustra: 
Never again, although I had read much and enthusiastically in my youth, 
did the words of a poet fascinate me as completely as did these words the 
young boy. And later, when at twenty I read in Zarathustra for the first time 
and was similarly fascinated, the Holderlin poem in the reader and that 
first astonishment of my boyish soul in the presence of art came to mind 
once again.1 
Nietzsche must indeed have been an overpowering experience for the 
twenty-year old Hesse. The short essay "On Moving into a New House" 
("Beim Einzug in ein neues Haus," 1931) reveals that at twenty Hesse, 
although in dire financial straits, had purchased two expensive portraits of 
the philosopher. Especially the picture of Nietzsche taken during his 
illness "with completely sunken and distant gaze" made a strong impression 
on him (IV, 615). 
In the same essay, still ruminating on his youth, Hesse alludes to his 
"intoxicated, even frenzied absorption first with Goethe and then with 
Nietzsche," and to the dominant role played by Nietzsche during his 
[Hesse's] stay in Basel: 
The small circle of friends in Basel that took me in and helped educate me 
was completely under the influence of Jacob Burckhardt, who had died 
1 Hermann Hesse, Gesqmmelte Schriften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1958) 
IV, 148. All further references to Hesse's work will be to this edition; volume and page 
number will be given in the body of the text. The English translations in this essay have 
been made by the present writer. 
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only recently and who, in the second half of my life, came gradually to fill 
the place that had previously belonged to Nietzsche. (IV, 616) 
Goethe dominated the early years and Burckhardt the later ones, but in the 
interim Hesse had been especially attracted to Nietzsche. The lines quoted 
would indicate that Nietzsche was the strongest influence during this 
"interim," which on closer examination may be seen to encompass the 
major portion of his creative existence (1899--1930). 2 Memoirs Hesse 
penned in 1951 describing his arrival in Basel confirm this opinion; he 
confides how "enthusiastic for Nietzsche" he was at the time and adds that 
although he cherished Basel "above all (as) the city of Nietzsche, Jacob 
Burckhardt and Bocklin," Nietzsche had at first completely overshadowed 
Burckhardt: 
Even then I had been reading him [Burckhardt). I had read his Culture of the 
Renaissance in Tiibingen and his Constantine in Basel, but I was still too 
enthralled with Nietzsche to be fully receptive to his [Burckhardt's) ideas.3 
Another significant revelation as to the importance of Nietzsche for 
Hesse's life and work is to be found in Hesse's masterpiece and final dictum 
of 1943, Magister Ludi (Glasperlenspiel). It will be shown subsequently that 
Pater Jakobus and the brilliant but unreliable glassbead-player Tegularius 
are transparent disguises for Burckhardt and Nietzsche. The fictional 
narrator says of the autobiographical hero, Josef Knecht: 
It is our opinion that Tegularius was as necessary and important in shaping 
Knecht's life as were Designori and the Pater in Marienfels, and indeed in 
the same manner as they, as an inspirational force, as an open window to 
new viewpoints. (VI, 367) 
Inasmuch as the character Designori was a practical man of the world who 
merely reinforced the historical and institutional views ofBurckhardt, it is 
evident that here again Burckhardt and Nietzsche are pitted against one 
another as the two most significant inspirational forces which helped to 
form Hesse's outlook. 
2 It may appear strange that Hesse would consider the period beginning only a year 
or so before the time of writing as the "second half' of his life, when he was already 54 
years of age. It must not be forgotten, however, that Hesse's marriage to Ninon Auslander 
brought him such happiness that he viewed life from then on as a new beginning. The 
terminating date of Hesse's Nietzsche-period will be considered in detail below. 
3 "Ein paar Basler Erinnerungen," Die Weltwoche (Zurich, 22 March 1951), p. 17. 
These statements are admissions by Hesse of his debt to Nietzsche. 
They carry particular weight when one recalls that Hesse never tried to 
create a legend about himself and was in all such matters scrupulously 
honest and painfully self-analytical. And these admissions can be reinforced 
by additional comments which reveal Hesse's continued interest in and 
admiration for Nietzsche. 
In 1918, for example, Hesse praised certain writings by Freud, Jung, 
Stekel and other psychologists, in part because these writings affirmed and 
improved Nietzsche's findings (VII, 138). The following year he expressed 
astonishment that Dostoevski should attract German youth more than 
Goethe "or even Nietzsche" (VII, 162), and he recommended that a cor-
respondent take another look at the last pages of the second Thought out of 
Season (Unzeitgemafie Betrachtung), so that he might recognize the difficult 
task facing "youth destined to strangle a moribund pseudo-culture and 
then to begin anew" (VII, 234). At about the same time Hesse came to the 
conclusion in "Sampling of Books" ("Biicherprobe") that Nietzsche was 
"essential, including the correspondence" (VII, 187). In 1921 Hesse ex-
pressed admiration for the prose music of Zarathustra (VII, 252) and six 
years later for the style of Ecce Homo which he felt was a desperate attempt 
to achieve the reconciliation between art and truth demanded by his 
generation (IV, 157). "The Magic of Life" ("Magie des Lebens," 1930) 
terms Nietzsche the long misunderstood genius who prepared the way for 
at least "several dozen thinkers" (VII, 349-50). An essay on Goethe written 
in 1932 stresses by indirection the importance of the Nietzsche experience: 
" ... no other writer except Nietzsche ever engrossed, attracted, tormented 
me to the same degree, forced me to reflect to the same degree" (VII, 376). 
A few pages further on Hesse refers both to the duration and depth of this 
experience: "Many a year I plagued myself with Goethe and let him 
become the disturbing element in my spiritual life, him and Nietzsche" 
(VII, 378). "A Night at Work" ("Eine Arbeitsnacht," 1928), views the 
dreams and hopes of the poet-philosopher Nietzsche as an important 
contribution to both German and European culture (VII, 305), and a letter 
written in 1934 includes him in the community of great suffering and 
creative spirits (VII, 565). The eulogy for Christian Schrempf (1944) 
"defends ... the pathologic personality" as such and in particular "Nietz-
sche, who was at that time revered by me," against the moralistic attacks 
of the eccentric theologian (IV, 770-77). Similarly, the essay, "Concerning 
Good and Bad Critics" written over a decade earlier (1930), discussed how 
difficult it was for intelligent and gifted people to live in our times. Once 
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people recognized this difficulty, "Holderlin and Nietzsche would be 
converted back from psychopaths to geniuses" (VII, 369). In his last pub-
lished reference to Nietzsche (1953), Hesse relates how excited it still made 
him to view the house in Sils Maria where Nietzsche had lived. Clinging 
defiantly to the rugged mountain-side, it "awakened respect and pity and 
served as an urgent reminder of the noble human ideal which the hermit 
even in his erroneous teachings had posed" (VII, 849-50). 
* * * 
Before considering Hesse's principal works in chronological order, it 
will be well to enumerate briefly the main themes in Hesse's writing that 
reveal a spiritual affinity to Nietzsche: 
1. The present-day bourgeois world is decadent and must be revitalized. 
2. Such revitalization can only be brought about through the deeds of the 
really great individuals, of the geniuses. 
3. The genius is a person with a strong sense of mission. The purpose of his 
life is to understand his inner voice and to obey it. 
4. Whatever the inner voice commands should be done in a courageous 
and joyous manner. (Nietzsche's amor Jati is here merged with the 
pietistic Unio mystica). 
5. It is normal and justified for a sensitive (inspired) person to react patho-
logically to present-day decadence. (Hesse himself attests to the frequen-
cy of this theme in his works [IV, 5 8]). 
6. A rather weak, pathologic individual with traits of the genius is con-
fronted by a strong, intelligent, merciless, artistic superman. Sometimes 
the two are different sides of the same person, sometimes the superman 
is initially an independent entity and yet is ultimately identified as an 
aspect of the protagonist, and then again he is occasionally portrayed as 
an entirely independent personality. 
7. The world-structure vacillates between chaos and divine order. In the 
course of each novel, chaos is overcome. Hesse's heroes ultimately come 
to believe in a divine essence located in the heart of man. This insight is 
reached, however, in every case only after a long and bitter battle with 
nihilism. 
The early poems, Romantic Songs (Romantische Lieder, 1897) and the 
nine prose studies, An Hour beyond Midnight (Eine Stunde hinter Mitternacht) 
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reveal essentially an attitude of romantic pessimism. Hence our investiga-
tion will begin by considering the first of Hesse's many autobiographical 
novels, The Posthumous Writings and Poems of Hermann Lauscher (Die 
hinterlassenen Schriften und Gedichte von Hermann Lauscher, 1901), which was 
conceived in part while Hesse was still in Tiibingen. In this novel the main 
link to Nietzsche is found in the character of the hero and his disdain for 
bourgeois life. Although Lauscher in some ways resembles an enamored 
Werther, he is more the strong, moody, outsider-artist, who refuses to 
create because he believes the world bereft of meaning. 
Lauscher views the world from a dionysion-apollonian perspective. 
To his way of thinking the drives of the subconscious resemble a subter-
ranean world which, when suddenly released, surge upward to mock and 
crush "his white temples and favorite illusions." He leaves unanswered the 
question as to whether he believes in Christ. Instead he directs his entire 
attention to an aesthetic religion that measures all spiritual and material 
things in terms of their relationship to beauty. In this regard one thinks of 
Novalis whom Hesse revered. But one thinks also ofNietzsche who saw the 
worldjustified only as a work of art. Hesse's friend and biographer, Hugo 
Ball, thought he detected Nietzschean influence in the frequent shifts in 
mood on the part of the hero from romantic intoxication to cynical 
sobriety. 
Hesse's first successful novel Peter Camenzind (1904) evaluates the 
Nietzschean ethic but then rejects it; the altruism of St. Francis of Assisi 
triumphs over the immoralism of Zarathustra. After many educational 
experiences including a sojourn in Assisi, Camenzind concludes that his 
adherence to the master-morality had not been justified: 
Formerly, without ever actually having prayed to Zarathustra, I had been 
a master-type (Herrenmensch) and had neglected neither my self-veneration 
nor my disdain for simpler people. Now I saw with increasing clarity that 
there were no firm boundaries, and that for the little people, the oppressed 
and the poor, life was not only just as complex, but usually warmer, truer 
and more exemplary than for the favored and illustrious. (I, 325) 
Despite this rejection of the master-morality-by no means final as Hesse's 
contempt for mediocrity caused his love of humanity to waver time and 
again-, Nietzsche's impact on the novel is note-worthy. Camenzind is 
another Lauscher, a strong yet sensitive artist-type whose doctor urges him 
to give up his inner isolation if he does not want "to lose his mental equi-
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librium." His abhorrence of bourgeois culture induces him to sacrifice a 
promising career as a writer. Like Lauscher, he oscillates between romantic 
moods and a cynical intellectualism. When he is stimulated by his beloved 
red wine, he turns into a ruthless critic who attacks the decadence of the 
times with Nietzschean severity. 
At the university only the ideas of Nietzsche and St. Francis impress 
the young Camenzind. Nietzsche's importance for the novel and its hero is 
highlighted in the scene in which the youth first learns of the philosopher. 
When he admits ignorance to his friend Richard, the latter cries out in 
amazement, "Nietzsche. Why, great heavens, you mean you don't know 
about him?" and was thoroughly delighted at Camenzind's naivete (I, 2 59). 
The novel Under the Wheel (Unterm Rad, 1905) tells the tragic story of a 
gifted student who is overtaxed and ultimately destroyed by his pedantic 
teachers. The young protagonist Hans Giebenrath, when first introduced 
to the reader, is viewed as a product of decadence in a Nietzschean frame 
of reference: 
Recalling the weakness of the mother and the considerable age of the 
family, a sensitive observer schooled in the modern manner might have 
spoken of hypertrophy of the intelligence as a symptom of incipient 
decadence. (I, 376) 
The link with Nietzsche is especially clear from the next lines: 
But the city was fortunate in not having any people of this sort ... one 
could still live there and be cultured without being familiar with the 
speeches of Zarathustra. (I, 376-77) 
With fine irony Hesse lets it be understood that in this smug little town, 
which neither knew nor cared to know anything about Nietzsche's modem 
ideas, there was little likelihood of encountering sympathy or understand-
ing for the problem of decadence. 
Another Nietzschean aspect of the novel is its fundamental concern 
with the exceptional person, the artistic superman, the genius. To be sure, 
only Giebenrath's friend, Hermann Heilner, is portrayed as a real genius. 
But it is said of young Hans that"the mysterious spark from above [of 
inspiration] had indeed fallen for once into the old hamlet" (I, 376). Spark, 
fire, mission, these are all designations by means of which Hesse refers to 
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the inspiration of genius. Thus, Hans, too, is an incipient genius. The inner 
congruence of the two lads is emphasized by their close friendship. 4 
Heilner represents an ideal rather than reality and is clearly Nietz-
schean, though it is interesting to note that in some respects he bears more 
resemblance to an idealized Nietzsche than to the artistic superman. 
Robust, "at times wild and almost cruel" (I, 437) and a loner, Heilner 
abhors both the petty diligence of his fellow students and the pedantry of 
his teachers. He is artistic-like Camenzind and Lauscher he is a gifted 
writer with a satiric bent. Like them he is inclined to melancholy (I, 443) 
and (like Nietzsche!) exposed to attacks of moodiness when the weather 
was bad (I, 450). As with all true geniuses, however, "this pathologic 
melancholia was only the freeing of superfluous and unhealthy impulses" 
(I, 451). 
Giebenrath does not fit the pattern of the superman as well; although 
he possesses the spark of genius, he does not have the strength to withstand 
the destructive impact of the boarding school. His divergence from the 
pattern results from the fact that he represents the real, the author himself, 
to a degree modern man in his helplessness, and the tortuous road which 
Giebenrath must follow through all the phases of neurosis to his ultimate 
destruction is one Hesse was to describe many times more as the road he 
believed modern man, too, had to go. 
The nihilistic undercurrent in the novel is only partially vitiated by a 
vague amor fati. It is said of Heilner that "after many further genial pranks 
and aberrations he mastered the suffering of life." 
Nihilism continued to remain an important factor in Hesse's thinking, 
as may be seen in the sad tale, The Marble Saw (Die Marmorsage, 1908). Here 
the romantic hero is confronted by the learned and skeptical farm-superin-
tendent, Gustav Becker, who destroys his optimistic principles: 
Frequently without the use of any words and merely by a horribly expres-
sive grin, he made me doubt my own statements about life and mankind, 
and sometimes he even ventured to say that every kind of worldly wisdom 
was ridiculous. (I, 558) 
Becker's nihilistic view is confirmed not only by the tragic outcome of the 
narrative but also by the early realization of the hero that his optimism 
4 The contrast of ideal and real, ego and anima, which in the case of Lauscher and 
Camenzind was still encompassed in one person, will henceforth frequently be projected 
by Hesse in two distinct individuals. 
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resembled "the happiness of the fairy prince" which he knew "never lasts 
very long" (I, 552). 
Nihilism is a motif in Walter Kompff, another story by Hesse, also 
written in 1908. Driven to desperation, Kompff goes mad and concludes 
with Nietzsche: "This dear God you speak of. He is nowhere, he doesn't 
exist" (11,258). The author makes it clear that he is not to be identified with 
the insane protagonist, yet he ends the story with these revealing words: 
"And few people ~ave any thought to the matter of how close we all live to 
the darkness, in the shades of which Walter Kompff went astray" (11, 259). 
But nihilism was never more than a component in Hesse's thought and 
his feelings continued to waver between nihilism and amor Jati, just as 
Nietzsche's had done. In some of the other stories of this period, amor fati, 
the idea of a life-affirming compulsion, takes thematic precedence over 
nihilism, although frequently the inner drive has aspects of a Christian 
conscience. The theme in Emil Kolb is the protagonist's inability "to hear 
the call of nature within himself' (II, 395). This lack of inner consistency 
leaves him exposed to the vicissitudes of fortune; a "passing mood" (11, 
412) leads him to petty theft and ultimate ruin (11, 429). Ladidel's "purity 
of heart" (11, 262) smacks more of Luther than Nietzsche, as it implies a 
meek Christian acceptance of destiny; when Ladidel realizes that he does 
not have the makings of a notary, he willingly-and with the author's full 
approval-accepts the modest career of a barber (11, 304). 
In the story Hay-Moon (Heumond), however, amor Jati has a more 
Nietzschean ring. The pedantic tutor Hamburger lacks, like Kolb, "a 
commanding and inviolable essence" (I, 68 5). He is consequently portrayed 
as a shallow idealist who reads his heroes Nietzsche and Ruskin only in 
watered-down popularizations as he would be unable to grasp their 
significance in the original (I, 68 5); that is to say, he lacks the inner drive 
and hence cannot understand Nietzsche's message of amor Jati. Hom-
burger's words ring hollow when he pompously asserts that only geniuses 
can alter the course of history (I, 694). Young Peter Abderegg on the other 
hand represents the ideal as he has inner strength and the courage of his 
convictions. 
The conflict of nihilism and amor Jati is the principal theme in the 
novel Gertrud, written in 19m. Here the main characters, the crippled 
composer Kuhn and the strong and handsome singer Muoth, are both 
beset by the problems of nihilism. In contrast to Under the Wheel, however, 
the strong artist succumbs, whereas the weak composer Kuhn manages 
through his art to come to limited terms with life. 
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The predominantly nihilistic tone of the novel is symbolized by its 
leitmotif, Nietzsche's lament, "God is dead." This outcry occurs in a poem 
Kuhn had set to music. The last strophe reads: 
Does he not see me hovering 
In mortal anguish and suffering? 
Alas, God is dead! 
-And I should continue to live? (11, 40) 
It was this poem that led to Kuhn's friendship with Muoth; the latter 
immediately sensed that even ifKuhn had not written the words, he "must 
have experienced them" (11, 40). Nihilism was the common bond. 
Muoth's nihilistic conviction is reinforced by an unhappy marriage 
and he commits suicide. To the bitter end he holds to the belief: "I believe 
as did Buddha that life has no value" (II, 188). 
Kuhn also finds "everything false and stupid" (11, 127) and even at the 
end of the novel he still views the world as cruel and meaningless: "Destiny 
was not good. Life was fickle and cruel. There was to be found in nature 
neither goodness nor reason" (11, 191). In the period ofhis greatest tribula-
tion, Kuhn is informed by his former teacher, Lotze, that he is a pathologic 
case: 
You suffer from a malady which unfortunately is fashionable and which 
one encounters daily in intelligent individuals. Doctors naturally know 
nothing about it. This ailment is related to moral insanity and can also be 
termed individualism or imagined loneliness ... It happens that at times 
such sick people become arrogant and condemn other people, who are 
healthy and can still understand and love one another, as the common herd 
(Herdenvieh). Were this sickness to become universal, humanity would die 
out. But it occurs only in Central Europe and there only in the upper 
classes. (II, 128) 
It is apparent that the "moral insanity" 5 of which Lotze speaks is closely 
related to Nietzsche's immoralism. Consequently, when Lotze suggests 
that Kuhn's cure can only be effected ifhe were to concern himself more 
with helping other people, it is clear that the basic duality, St. Francis 
contra Nietzsche, is again in evidence. However, for a time Kuhn rejects 
the doctrine of unselfish love taught by St. Francis, as he finds that even 
with the best of intentions he cannot really help his aged mother or alter 
her situation. 
5 Hesse wrote "moral insanity" in English. 
Ultimately Kuhn struggles through to amor Jati, to a life-view that 
affirms life despite its pain. He reaches the conclusion that if one affirms 
pain, in time one can scarcely differentiate it from happiness (II, 34). He 
comes to believe that goodness and reason exist in man, although nature 
and destiny remain cruel and coincidental (II, 191). Through art Kuhn 
reestablishes his faith in God; in rare creative moments "when the dark 
depths are silent" he feels "the divine within himself' (II, 191). The ultimate 
Unio mystica reached by Kuhn is of course quite un-Nietzschean. But Kuhn's 
stress on nihilism and pain prior to the achievement ofhis transitory affirma-
tion, reveals the extent to which Nietzsche's concept of amor Jati lay im-
bedded in Hesse's thinking. 
In its manifold use of archetypal symbolism, dream analysis and 
introspection, Demian (1917) is structurally indebted to the psychoanalytic 
theories of Carl Jung; the ethical ideas expressed in the novel, however, are 
a reformulation of Nietzsche's views. 
Once again the leitmotif has been unmistakably selected in the spirit 
of the great immoralist; it is the sign of Cain. With Nietzschean irony and 
emphasis on the "bad," Hesse chose the first murderer, the first villain in 
world history to serve as his model of a truly great man. In a letter dated 
1930 Hesse writes: 
And so it seems to me that Cain, the outlawed criminal, the first murderer, 
may very easily be interpreted as a defamed Prometheus, as a representative 
of the intellect and of freedom, who was punished with banishment for his 
curiosity and daring. (VII, 488) 
In the novel the hero is permitted to express a similar opinion. The 
stalwart Demian tells his weaker friend Sinclair the story of Cain from the 
Nietzschean viewpoint. As Demian6 sees it, the conventional version was 
in all likelihood a crass lie invented by the weak to slander this strong and 
dreaded outsider (III, 125-26). 
Thus Cain is viewed as a promethean individual, an outsider, a super-
man, and his sign thus becomes the symbol of the chosen few. The impor-
tance of the Cain leitmotif in the novel may be seen from the fact that it 
reappears at every significant moment in Sinclair's life: during the religious 
instruction prior to his confirmation (III, 148), during his initiation into 
the dark world of the senses (III, 165), and at the moment of self-realization 
6 In numerous ways, Hesse makes it clear that Demian is to be understood as the 
artistic projection of Sinclair's anima or ideal. 
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when, on meeting Frau Eva, he is aware that he bears the sign on his own 
forehead (III, 236). In Sinclair's last vision the God-Mother appears, 
resembling Frau Eva, a giantess, stars in her hair, with the sign of Cain 
upon her brow (III, 255). Thus the sign of Cain accompanies the hero from 
his first uncertain steps into life to his final comprehensive vision. 
As is evident from his use of the Cain leitmotif, Hesse was concerned 
in the novel with proclaiming a new morality beyond conventional good 
and evil. Seeking to encourage the dispirited soldiers of the defeated 
German army, he implied that the new morality was for "everyone," but 
actually his interest, as always, was directed toward the strong individuals 
imbued with a sense of mission. He conceived these strong individuals in 
the manner of Nietzschean supermen, as a closer inspection of Demian 
shows. 
The mysterious Demian is without flaw; he is reserved, courageous, 
strong, intelligent, filled with a sense of destiny. He divides mankind into 
leaders and the "herd" (III, 228). As shown above, he attributes customary 
morality to the resentment of the weak, who seek through cunning to 
force their slave morality upon the strong. With Nietzsche, he prefers the 
pale thief who when crucified with Christ refused to repent (III, I 55). 
Although not a drinker, Demian recognized the dionysiac power of alcohol 
to awaken heightened states of mind, which he refers to approvingly as 
"intoxicated" and "bacchic" (III, I 80). He prefers the life of an intoxicated 
individual to that of the "virtuous citizen" because the former is "presum-
ably more vital" (111, 180). He loathes modern European culture with its 
"country fair of technology and science" (III, 229), and in consonance with 
Nietzsche's conception of cultural decadence, he predicts the passing of 
western civilization (III, 228). He is convinced that the salvation of mankind 
lies in the hands of the select few who bear the sign of Cain and who are 
predestined to shake the philistines from their heavy slumber. Demian 
reveres the principle of amor fati more strongly even than Kuhn, although 
he knows that the path leads without fail to the tragic loneliness and 
desperation of Jesus in the Garden of Gethsemane (III, 222). The strength 
of his conviction is attributed to his belief that man's destiny lies completely 
within himself. Demian's inner voice resembles the "bow oflonging" and 
the "will to power" of Nietzsche's creative superman, to the extent that 
neither Hesse nor Nietzsche was concerned with outer destiny or superficial 
gratification of the ego. But whereas Nietzsche virtually identified the 
inner command with the self, Hesse stressed once again that the inner voice 
was the manifestation of a higher power. Young Sinclair makes this clear 
when he recognizes the meaning of destiny for the first time: 
And here suddenly the knowledge burned me like a searing flame:-there 
was an "office" for each individual, but not one that he might select, delimit 
and administer at will ... the true mission for each individual was simply 
this: to find himself. He might end up as a poet or as a demented individual, 
as a prophet or as a criminal-that was not his concern, indeed in the final 
analysis that was unimportant. It was his business to find his own destiny, 
not just any destiny, and to live this destiny to the full, completely and 
unbroken .... I was a toss of nature, a toss into the unknown, perhaps 
towards something new, perhaps towards nothing, and to permit this toss 
to fulfill itself, to feel its will in me and make it completely a part of me, 
that alone was my destiny. (III, 220-21) 
Demian's belief that the inner voice is a reflection of Nature induces him to 
subordinate his activist tendency to reform the world in favor of a kind of 
religious passivity. Despite his violent opposition to the philistines with 
their "will to endure," (III, 238), he insists that he and his compatriots 
will take no initiative but will await the inner command of destiny. The 
robust Demian and the cripple Kuhn are in terms of outlook not so far 
apart as it might seem. But whereas for Kuhn amor fati was a step to the 
achievement of the pietistic unio mystica, Demian and his friend Sinclair 
fuse the two concepts. 
The mystical affirmation in Demian might lead one to believe that 
there was little room in the novel for the ugly specter of nihilism. One must 
not forget, however, that at the time of writing the author was experiencing 
the most difficult years of his life. Branded a traitor to his country, his wife 
mentally ill, Hesse was so close to despair that he put himselfin the care of a 
psychiatrist. Indeed, if one disregards for a brief moment the dazzling goal 
of the hero, it becomes readily apparent that as with Hesse's previous 
novels, many pages in Demian are concerned with the inner uncertainty of 
the tormented protagonist. 
Hesse, himself, was quite ready to admit that the ideals he posited in 
his novels remained ideals, and that his "confessions of unusual and, so-to-
speak, ideal experiences" alternated with "confessions of inadequacy, 
weakness, hellish torment and desperation" (VII, 509). Moments of 
positive faith were followed by moments of insecurity and pessimism: 
"That my positive and my negative side, my strength and my weakness 
can only be expressed chronologically in an alternation between bright and 
dark, is something that I cannot change" (VII, 509). 
A meaningful sign that Hesse was still plagued with doubt and still 
exposed to the threat of nihilism when he wrote Demian may be seen in the 
generally conceded fact that in these years he engrossed himself in Nietz-
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sche's ideas. A careful reading makes clear that Demian represents not so 
much an acceptance of, as a debate with Nietzsche, the spokesman of the 
superman and amor Jati, to be sure, but also the spokesman of nihilism. In 
Demian Hesse sought to come to grips with Nietzsche; specifically, he 
sought to overcome nihilism and to integrate the superman into an absolute 
world order. 
When one considers the manner in which God is presented in Demian, 
one notes a similar attempt to reconcile Nietzschean and Christian views. 
Hesse affirms the Nietzschean preeminence of the instincts but exalts these 
to mythical stature in the figure of the God-Mother. How closely the dark 
mother world was associated with Nietzsche in Hesse's thinking may be 
gleaned from the fact that the God-Mother Eva disappeared from his 
writings when he finally rejected Nietzsche's ideas completely in the early 
193o's. The synthesis ofNietzschean and Christian outlooks is suggested in 
Sinclair's ability to regard Frau Eva as "mother, beloved, goddess" (III, 
233). Over a decade later Hesse has Goldmund refer to Frau Eva with 
almost identical words, "mother, madonna and beloved" (V, 65). The 
God-Mother awakens both sensual and spiritual love, she encompasses not 
only the dark sinful world of the mother but also the bright virtuous 
(Christian) world of the father. 
Before leaving this discussion of Demian, it should be pointed out that 
Sinclair himself twice refers to Nietzsche as an important factor in his own 
development. On reading Novalis, Sinclair notes that seldom had an author 
so impressed him "except perhaps Nietzsche" (III, 178). Then at the 
university, although generally disappointed by his philosophical studies, he 
was delighted with his readings in Nietzsche: 
I lived with him, felt the solitude of his soul, sensed the destiny that drove 
him inevitably onward, suffered with him and was blissful, that there had 
been such a person, who went his own way so resolutely. (III, 225) 
Demian also refers to Nietzsche. Speaking of great individuals filled with a 
sense of destiny, he cites Jesus and Nietzsche: "What nature wants from an 
individual, stands written in that individual, in you and in me. It was 
written in Jesus, it was written in Nietzsche" (III, 229). 
The pietistically flavored amor fati of Demian also provides the core of 
two essays written in 1919, both of which reveal Nietzschean inspiration. 
The first of these bears the title "Eigensinn"7 and begins in the pseudo-
7 Hesse plays with the word Eigensinn using it both in its usual sense of"stubbomness" 
and "obstinacy," and its literal meaning of"sense of self," "self-awareness." Thus Eigensinn 
catches the full flavor of the egotistical Nietzschean morality. 
biblical style of Thus Spake Zarathustra: "Eine Tugend gibt es, die liebe ich 
sehr, eine einzige. Sie heiBt Eigensinn" (There is one virtue that I love 
dearly. It is called Eigensinn; VII, 194). The stylistic innuendo is appropriate 
as the essay attacks bourgeois morality and berates its virtues as little more 
than different forms of obedience. The second and longer essay, "Zara-
thustra's Return" ("Zarathustras Wiederkehr") imitates the Zarathustra-
style throughout, admittedly as a means to attract the attention of German 
youth. The skill with which Hesse both recaptured the style and repro-
duced Nietzsche's arguments, while yet modifying them, shows his close 
familiarity with Nietzsche's masterpiece. The smiling sage Zarathustra 
"who has seen much and who no longer has sympathy with tears" (one 
thinks of Hesse's characters-Vasudeva, Buddha, the Music Master-III, 
201) praises the self-love (Eigenliebe) of his disciples. He also lauds solitude 
and suffering as a means of strengthening man and leading him to a realiza-
tion of the necessity to accept destiny (VII, 206). Then, however, shifting to 
Hesse's own line of reasoning Zarathustra asserts, "Whoever has recognized 
destiny will never seek to change destiny" (VII, 207) and mocks the young 
soldiers who had hoped through their suffering to change the course of the 
world (VII, 213). Zarathustra's farewell address is reminiscent of Sinclair's 
words at the moment of realization: "In each of you there is a call, a will, 
a toss of nature, a toss into the future, towards the new and the higher-
there is no God other than dwells within you" (VII, 229). 
The three stories contained in the collection Klinisor' s Last Summer 
(Klingsors Letzter Sommer) contain numerous Nietzschean motifs. All three 
have as their basic theme existential fear and the need to affirm destiny. 
"A Child's Soul" ("Kinderseele") treats the question of whether the 
dark urgings of a child toward the bad are not just as much a call of destiny 
as is the love of order derived from the bright father-world. The author 
reveals his bias by introducing Nietzsche's "noble criminal" into the story. 
The latter is no petty, fearful thief but a proud fellow, pale and smiling, who 
holds his head high while being led along by his guards. The scolding 
citizenry accompanying him are scornfully referred to as "rabble" (Pack 
und Pobel, III, 444), and it is clear that this man is to be regarded as a second 
Cain, as a person who heeds his inner voice. Although destiny has brought 
him into conflict with bourgeois justice, he does not let this disturb his 
inner calm, for he understands and accepts life. 
In the story "Klein and Wagner," one encounters pathologic rejection 
of the bourgeois way oflife, the notion of justifiable homicide and disdain 
for Richard Wagner. Once again the theme is amor fati with new shades of 
meaning. The bank-teller Klein has embezzled funds so that he may flee 
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bourgeois hypocrisy and lead a meaningful existence. He is attracted to a 
beautiful dancer who obeys only her inner law. When Teresina dances, she 
is "like a tree or a mountain or an animal or a star, existing solely for 
herself-regardless of whether this be good or bad" (III, 5m). 
But things go awry. Klein has misunderstood himself and realizes 
belatedly that the trouble lay not in middle-class morality but in his own 
sexual impotence and fear of life. He finds no other recourse than to take 
his life by drowning and does so. At the moment, however, when he "lets 
himself go," when he wills with his whole heart not to will, he suddenly 
realizes that life can be affirmed. Such detachment and abnegation are not 
contrary to pietism, but the setting and vocabulary indicate additionally 
the influence of Schopenhauer. 8 Furthermore, Klein's affirmation, in which 
the world regains its beauty and every woman becomes desirable if not 
necessary, suggests the affirming-negating Hindu Yoga. 
In the title story, the orgiastic artist Klingsor has an intense fear of 
death. Although not prepared to accept the mystical solution of his magi-
cian friend-Schopenhauer's repudiation of time-he summons the 
courage to face reality. Whereupon he draws a self-portrait which reveals 
his very soul: 
It is man, ecce homo, the tired, greedy, wild, childlike and sophisticated man 
of our late era, the dying European, anxious to die ... filled with smoulder-
ing passion and at the same time totally exhausted, resigned to destiny and 
to pain. (III, 610) 
Recognizing his tragic destiny, Klingsor goes his way, having regained 
his inner peace. 
The pathologic Klingsor resembles not only the author in his distress, 
but also in large measure Nietzsche. It may well be that Hesse in his depres-
sion feared that he would suffer a fate similar to Nietzsche's. 
Numerous parallels link Klingsor with Nietzsche. The artist's last 
period of hectic creativity bears a strong resemblance to the comparable 
period of tremendous productivity in Nietzsche's life shortly before he 
went mad. The self-portrait of the artist, "his gigantic confession," provides 
a striking counterpart to the penetrating self-analysis Nietzsche attempted 
8 It would appear more than chance that the last scene in the story parallels closely 
Schopenhauer's famous description of man who, in the face of chaos, relies on the principal 
of individuation, like a boatman who trusts his tiny boat in a threatening sea. Hesse writes, 
"Sein kleines Boot, das war er, das war sein kleines, umgrenztes, kiinstlich versichertes 
Leben-rundum aber das weite Grau, das war die Welt, das war All und Gott ... " (III, 548). 
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in Ecce Homo at the very end of his sane existence. It is probably no chance 
coincidence that hostile critics referred to Ecce Homo in the same way that 
critics spoke of Klingsor's self-portrait, as an indication of "apparent in-
sanity" (III, 609). Like his apparent model, Klingsor experienced a final 
euphoria, living the last days "like one who is ecstatic" (III, 6n) and 
calming his nerves with veronal. 
With the publication of Siddhartha (1919-1922) Hesse had recovered 
his composure and was able to express in quieter fashion the outlook con-
tained in "Klein and Wagner." This amor Jati, which synthesizes the 
thoughts of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer with Hindu Yoga and the 
mystical pantheism of St. Francis, may be said to represent the fundamental 
belief, the mystical ideal, of the mature author. It is of course true that 
Sinclair and Camenzind had a somewhat similar outlook. But as Hesse 
admitted in Resort Guest (Kurgast, 1925), the ideal of his maturity was 
nothing new; although his thoughts had changed slightly in the course of 
twenty years, his hopes and dreams had remained the same (IV, 104). 
After initial failures-experiments in ascetic and sensualistic ways of 
living-Siddhartha triumphs over his ego. He does this in the same way 
that Klein had done, by negating the will in an attempt to drown himself. 
At the crucial moment, however, when he discovers that the complete 
negation oflife can lead to its affirmation, he decides to continue living. But 
his education is not yet finished. He must stand a still further test. He must 
experience the bitter pain of an anguished parent before he can discover the 
full importance of love: 
Love, 0 Govinda, appears to me to be of prime importance .... The only 
thing that now matters to me is to be able to love the world, not to disdain 
it, not to hate it and myself, but to be able to observe it and myself and all 
beings with love and admiration and respect. (III, 729) 
Only now can his sense of totality reach its full culmination, can the river 
teach him of the timeless perfection of the world. Only now "did Siddhar-
tha cease to struggle with destiny, cease to suffer ... " (III, 721). 
The leitmotifin the novel and the symbol of amor fati is the bird whose 
voice transmits the inner commands to the strong and handsome Siddhar-
tha. When the unfortunate hero strays from his path, he dreams the bird 
has died and its voice remains silent. But he hears the bird's voice anew 
when, after negating the will, he is again able to affirm the world and 
achieve a new sense of totality. 
In the novel Resort Guest the hero becomes so enraged at the superficial 
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way of life in a small health resort that he temporarily loses faith in his 
sense of mission. But laughter makes it possible for him to reconcile himself 
with the inevitable (IV, 94), and nature with its immanent Eigensinn offers 
him renewed proof of the inner unity of the world (IV, 53, 102). Once 
again he is prepared to speak oflove (IV, I rn), once again ready to obey the 
"dark commands" within him, once again he will strive to fuse the antithet-
ical poles of his existence (IV, 115). 
Nature is here symbolized by two caged martins. Without being 
inconsistent, these animals are simple and lovable and at the same time 
wild and cruel. Curious and trusting as children, they nevertheless exude 
"the wild, pungent odor of a beast of prey" (IV, 53). In nature there is no 
hypocrisy; the animals remain true to themselves and follow their inner 
law. 
In Resort Guest Hesse's abhorrence for the bourgeois world includes 
even the realm of the intellect, a direction which was already indicated in 
Siddhartha. The enraged resort guest levels his entire wrath at a pedantic 
bourgeois patient: 
You exist, I should like to say, on the level of paper, of money and credit, of 
morality, oflaw, of intellect, of respectability. You are a space-and-time 
contemporary (Raum- und Zeitgenosse) imbued with virtue, the categorical 
imperative, and reason, and perhaps you are even related to the thing-in-
itself and to capitalism. But you don't possess the element of reality that I 
find in every stone and tree. (IV, 98) 
The two references to Nietzsche in the novel indicate that the psycho-
logical and sociological viewpoints presented then' are at least in part 
attributable to him. The resort guest says that he has derived his theory of 
neurosis from Nietzsche and Hamsun. This admission is pertinent as the 
novel is the supposed diary of a neurotic. Nietzsche's name is also mentioned 
in connection with Hesse's ultra-personal problem as to whether a path-
ologic attitude is justified in our time. The resort guest decides not to discuss 
this question which he considers the basic problem "of all sensitive intellec-
tuals since Nietzsche," since it has been the main theme in almost all of 
his earlier writing (IV, 58). 
Resort Guest rejected the intellect and found unity in nature. At first 
glance, Steppenwoif (1927) would seem to demonstrate a diametrically 
opposed point of view, as in this famous novel the earlier innocence and 
unity of nature is declared to be a myth. We are told that the way does not 
lead back to nature and to early childhood, but onward to ever greater 
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guilt and humanity: not back from duality to unity, but on to endless 
dichotomies and to the gradual assumption of the entire universe in one's 
soul. The objective, however, remains the same as before: "return into the 
All, elimination of painful individuation, divinification" (IV, 249-50). 
Although it is no longer possible to return to unity in nature, this does 
not preclude pushing forward along the road to consecrated sensuality; the 
dark mother-world of instinct is not banned from the scene. We learn that 
a man with an inner calling can achieve his aim just as fully by becoming a 
sensualist as by becoming a saint. Had the hero of the novel, Harry Haller, 
pursued either of these routes with sufficient persistence, he would have 
achieved the absolute: 
We see that he had within him a strong impulse not only toward the saint 
but also toward the sensualist. Because of some weakness or lethargy, how-
ever, he could not manage the leap into the free, wild space of the Absolute. 
(IV, 238-39) 
In any case, Hesse considers the duality of nature and spirit as an 
artistic simplification by means of which he can represent the infinite 
possibilities of the human soul (IV, 243). So that we do not misunderstand 
his "wolf's theory," he tells us the wolf also includes the bird of paradise 
(IV, 251). The Nietzschean world of instinct is still complete. 
Not only the metaphysical underpinnings but also the plot of this 
novel makes use of Nietzschean ideas. Thus the polarity burgher versus 
outsider is obviously borrowed from the Nietzschean antithesis of herd 
and master. The burgher is viewed as a weakling who prefers the rule of 
the "herd" (IV, 237), so that he himself need not assume power and 
responsibility: 
The burgher is for that reason essentially a creature of weak instincts, 
anxious, fearful of giving of himself, easy to rule. For this reason he has 
substituted for power the voice of the majority ... for responsibility, the 
vote. (IV, 237) 
Since he has little vitality (Lebensintensitiit), the burgher anxiously seeks 
to effect a compromise between nature and spirit in order to save his 
identity (IV, 237). The ironic description of the burgher's fearful attempts 
to secure peace and security "in a mild and healthful zone without violent 
storms and showers" (IV, 237) is reminiscent of the ironic portrayal of the 
"last man" in Thus Spake Zarathustra. 
The security and very existence of the burgher depends on the vitality 
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of certain "outsiders." These are lonely individuals, "strong and wild 
personalities" who detest law, virtue and "common sense" (IV, 237). The 
stronger among them "break through the atmosphere of the bourgeois 
earth and soar into the cosmic ... achieve the absolute and go to their 
destruction in a way to be admired ... " (IV, 2 3 9). The road of these true 
geniuses is that of amor fati and leads as in Demian to the terrible loneliness 
ofJesus in the Garden of Gethsemane. Mozart is lauded as a suffering genius 
of this sort because of the 
greatness of his dedication and willingness to suffer, because of his indiffer-
ence to the ideas of the burghers and to that state of extreme isolation which 
thins the bourgeois air surrounding the suffering one, the one aspiring to 
true humanity, to icy ether, that state of isolation in the Garden of Geth-
semane. (IV, 248) 
The "remaining outsiders," who number in the thousands but 
represent only a small fraction of mankind, are inspired individuals who 
would like to heed their inner voice and obey the law of amor fati, but who 
cannot bring themselves to spurn such aspects of bourgeois society as 
cleanliness, order, sociability and art. They suffer from a split-personali(y 
and are at one and the same time burgher and outsider, half-man and 
half-wolf. 
Harry Haller is such an individual on the fringe of bourgeois exis-
tence-a wolf of the steppes. He embodies that which is "free, wild, 
untamable, dangerous and strong," yet he is also attracted to the music of 
Mozart and to human idealism (IV, 227). He feels an inner compulsion to 
become either saint or sinner and in his freedom from convention he is 
prepared to love the criminal, the revolutionary and the sophist as if they 
were his own brother; but his bourgeois upbringing prevents him from 
feeling more than pity for the common thief and sex-murderer (IV, 236). 
He is confronted with the weighty decision of whether to venture the "leap 
into the Absolute" to join the immortals or, with the help of humor, to 
come to terms with the bourgeois world (IV, 240). 
The novel thus deals with a kind of Nietzschean superman who 
abhors bourgeois superficiality but who cannot bring himself to tread the 
path of icy isolation of the genius. The author tells us that at issue is the 
"regal man" and not the little man with whom political science and statistics 
is concerned, who may be found by the millions on the streets (IV, 250). 
In a few instances Hesse reinforces a given theme by referring specifi-
cally to Nietzsche. When Haller refuses to go the lonely way of the genius 
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"which would lead me into atmospheric regions where the air grows ever 
thinner," he links his own feeling of utter isolation with the symbol of 
stark loneliness in Nietzsche's poem "Vereinsamt" :-smoke slowly losing 
itself in a bleak, wintry sky. The reference is particularly fitting as Nietz-
sche's obviously autobiographical poem also deals with the outsider 
whose feeling of growing isolation awakens in him an almost uncontrol-
lable desire to return to the security and warmth of bourgeois society. It is 
interesting to note that Nietzsche frequently associated the notion of icy-
cold with the tragic life-view in order to emphasize the isolation of the 
individual engaged in the pursuit of such knowledge. Hesse seems to have 
had a similar idea in mind when he banned the immortals in Steppenwolf 
"to the ice of outer space through which the stars shine" (IV, 407). In the 
quiet words of Hesse's Mozart the notion of cold is linked with the tragical-
ly sublime: 
Cool and without motion is our eternal being, 
Cool and starry bright our eternal laughter. (IV, 407) 
Tragic realization, it was said, derives from suffering; in the affirmation 
of suffering Nietzsche's name is mentioned twice. The fictional editor of 
the diary tells the reader "that Haller was a genius in suffering, that he, in 
conformity with many of Nietzsche's utterances, had developed within 
himself an inspired, unlimited and terrible capacity to suffer" (IV, 193). 
Then Haller himself, after reading the comment by Novalis that suffering 
should be recognized as a sign of human dignity, mentions the philosopher: 
"Fine! Eighty years before Nietzsche!" (IV, 199). 
Nietzsche is referred to also in connection with another basic theme 
of the novel: Haller and his colleagues suffer greatly because their times 
have not produced a unified style. Haller makes it clear that here the key 
to a proper understanding of the story may be found (IV, 205). How 
closely Haller's reasoning is in line with Nietzsche's may be seen from the 
following comparison. Among other things, Halkr had said: 
Human existence becomes truly painful, a hell, when two cultures or two 
religions overlap .... There are times when a whole generation gets caught 
between two eras, between two life-styles, so that it loses everything that 
is commonplace, every custom, every privacy and innocence. (IV, 205-206) 
The parallel to the first essay in Thoughts out of Season is obvious. To cite a 
few lines will suffice: "Culture is above all the unity of artistic style in all 
the vital manifestations of a people ... the German of our time, however, 
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lives in a chaotic melange of all styles .... " 9 Haller is made to appear aware 
of this parallelism of ideas; in the same context he refers to Nietzsche as the 
forerunner of the modern outsider: 
Naturally, not everyone feels this to the same degree. A sensitive person 
like Nietzsche had to experience present-day misery a generation ahead of 
his time-the suffering he had to undergo, lonely and misunderstood, 
thousands experience today. (IV, 206) 
These comments reveal clearly once again, how closely Haller-Hesse, "the 
pathologic hermit" (IV, 235), identified himself with Nietzsche. 
Two further scenes freighted with symbolic import show Nietzschean 
inspiration. The first of these describes man as a narrow bridge between 
nature and spirit: 
Man is by no means a firm and durable configuration (this was the ideal 
of antiquity despite the contrary premonitions of its sages), he is rather an 
experiment and a transition, he is nothing more than the narrow bridge 
between nature and spirit. (IV, 247) 
These lines not only paraphrase Nietzsche's famous saying, "Man is a rope 
stretched between the animal and the superman," they also hint at Nietz-
sche's overthrow of the conventional view of Greek antiquity. 
The carnival may be understood as a symbol of the dionysiac intoxi-
cation and self-forgetfulness which presage the suppression of individua-
tion10 in the "Magic Theater": 
An experience that I had never previously undergone in the fifty years 
of my life ... was mine in this ball: the experience of the festival, the 
intoxication of a celebrating community, the mystery of the immersion of 
the individual in the crowd, of the Unio mystica of joy. (IV, 361-62) 
Death and the Lover (Narzij3 und Goldmund, 1930) discards the possibility 
of bourgeois compromise and concentrates on amor fati as the means to 
achieve mystic unity. In this novel the two poles of human existence are 
presented as independent individuals, the saint and the sinner, NarziB and 
Goldmund. 
The artist Goldmund is a superior man who in his youth resembles 
9 Friedrich Nietzsche, "UnzeitgemaBe Betrachtungen," Werke, ed. Karl Schlechta 
(Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1954-56), I, 40. 
10 This idea was developed by Nietzsche in his Birth of Tragedy (1872). 
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Demian and in later years, Klingsor. He has no regard for virtue or law, 
seduces and murders, as destiny demands. He has the ability of the genius 
"to give himself completely" (V, 43) and obeys the inner voice which 
again is characterized as the "call of the mother" (V, 83, 192). NarziB, on 
the other hand, is Hesse's first truly spiritual protagonist; although he is a 
bit colorless, there is no doubt that he is meant to be a regal person, an 
intellectual genius, destined to "lifelong striving for saintliness" (V, 36). 
The novel treats the familiar theme: the way to self-realization is also 
the way to unity. In their striving for unity the friends, who in their sym-
bolism represent the duality of human nature and of all life, feel a deep bond 
and in the course of time draw ever closer to one another, guided, as it 
were, by a magical destiny. Thus when Goldmund is asked to do a sketch 
for the master, he almost involuntarily sketches a likeness ofNarziB whom 
he has not seen for many years. He carried out the task "which his heart 
had assigned him ... like a sacrificial ritual" (V, 160). The figure he then 
carves using the sketch as a guide, becomes the disciple Johannes of a 
religious group, although it is unknown to Goldmund that NarziB had 
meanwhile become an abbot and assumed the name of Johannes. 
Toward the end of his adventurous life, Goldmund stays for a time 
near the abbey and attains a sense of inner peace in the beneficial proximity 
of his disciplined friend. Here he achieves the highest degree of unity 
possible to him and creates his masterpiece, a soulful Madonna of infinite 
beauty. Then heeding the inner call to chaos, he resumes his wanderings 
and goes to an early death. Outwardly disreputable, his life had been 
inwardly rich and meaningful. 
NarziB had felt a similar yearning for his friend. He confessed to the 
dying Goldmund, "I have loved you, you alone of all mankind" (V, 3 17). 
Goldmund had made his life complete in teaching him what the words 
friend, love and, as Hesse formulated it in a subsequent letter, seduction, 
really meant (VII, 508). 
Unity is of course another way of referring to the mystical totality. 
NarziB had early recognized that their diverse paths led to the same mystical 
goal. His words are almost those of Demian: "Don't you know that one 
of the shortest routes to the life of the saint is the life of the sinner?" (V, 3 8). 
In his portrayal of the two friends, Hesse had for the last time presented the 
world as consisting of two halves, order and chaos, the luminous father-
world and the dark mother-world, the Apollonian and the Dionysian. But 
even here, where he was on the verge of disowning the Dionysian world-
view, he showed a decided preference for the dark world of the mother. 
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This is evident from the fact that the only clear symbol of the totality 
is the God-Mother; and although both men dedicate themselves to amor 
fati and strive toward unity, it is only Goldmund who hears the call of the 
mother (V, 64). He always sees her as the symbol of totality. As a child he 
dreams ofher as "mother, madonnaand beloved" (V, 65); after completing 
the Johannes figure he has had a brief vision of the primeval mother with 
her enigmatic, cruel yet tender smile: 
he saw her smiling over the births, the deaths, the flowers, the rustling fall 
leaves, smiling over art, smiling over decay. 
Everything was equally important to the primeval mother, her 
mysterious smile hung like the moon over everything. (V, 186) 
In death she comes and brings him peace (V, 322). 
Goldmund's amor fati had led to a full life but the same does not seem 
to be quite so true of NarziB. How else can one explain the concerned 
words of the dying vagabond: "But how will you die N arziB, since you 
have no mother? Without a mother one cannot love. Without a mother 
one cannot die" (V, 322). NarziB has no answer to this question. He had 
long missed the "bloody darknesses" in his spotless world of "order and 
discipline," and concluded that Goldmund's path was "not only more 
childlike and human ... it was ultimately more courageous and greater" 
(V, 308). 
In journey to the East (Morgenlandfahrt, 1932), Hesse sharply repudiated 
Nietzschean irrationalism and forever abandoned the concepts of nature and 
mother. However, with obviously altered connotations, amor fati and the 
notion of the creative genius remained constituent elements of his outlook. 
Hesse's rejection of nature in favor of a world of the spirit receives its 
formal expression in the resurgence of a surrealistic literary style and the 
subjective treatment of historical time. The goal of the hero is now depicted 
as the light world of the orient, the land of the rising sun, the luminous 
sphere of the spirit. The importance of the spiritual aspect is apparent from 
the emphasis placed on the temporarily lost "holy pact of the brotherhood" 
(der heilige Bundesbrief) around which the story centers and which sym-
bolizes the mystical aspirations of the great creative spirits of all times. 
The brotherhood of wayfarers is related to the elite of creative spirits 
in Demian. The brotherhood consists of artistic supermen from all eras of 
history, "the strongest (army) in the world" (VI, 35). Few in number, the 
geniuses are born to rule: "There are few who are born to rule, they remain 
at their tasks cheerful and healthy. The others, however, who have become 
masters merely by dint of effort, all end badly" (VI, 28). 
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Rejection of the dark mother world does not mean that Hesse had 
drastically changed his way of thinking. It meant rather that he was again 
oscillating toward the other pole of his dichotomous outlook, that St. 
Francis was once again taking precedence over Nietzsche, that Hesse's 
earlier humanism was being preferred to the worship of instinct and 
Nietzschean immoralism. Thus Leo, the leader of the brotherhood-it will 
be recalled that one of the six disciples of St. Francis was named Leo-
designates service (Dienst) as the highest good. Ruling is interpreted as a 
general guiding of humanity in its development. Strength is viewed as the 
ability to serve, that is, voluntarily to subordinate oneself. Leo has much 
in common with Camenzind and Siddhartha, with his message oflove. 
It is not infrequently asserted that in his last novel, Magister Ludi 
(Glasperlenspiel, 1932-1943), Hesse finally managed to reconcile the 
antithetical elements in his basic outlook. This is true only for his revised 
outlook after 1930. In Magister Ludi, Hesse merely reasserted at greater 
length the theme he had developed in journey to the East that Geist-as in 
the earlier work, referring to spirituality, creativity and intellectuality-
had to be placed in the service of mankind, had to be subordinated to 
Dienen. There is virtually no reference to the true antithesis to Geist, the 
dark Nietzschean world of the mother. Magister Ludi is concerned with 
the opposition of introverted intellectuality and extroverted service. 
Despite this, Nietzsche left his imprint on the novel. 
First of all, Nietzsche's particular explanation of cultural decadence, 
as resulting from the abuse and subsequent loss of creative vigor, provides 
the substance of the lengthy introductory chapter and the substratum of the 
entire narrative. The action is set some 500 years in the future to permit a 
sufficient historical perspective from which to evaluate the excesses and 
follies of our age, this superficial age, which the fictional historian Ziegen-
hals ironically terms the era of the feuilleton (VI, 89). The historian points 
out that our era was a period of"old age and twilight" (VI, 94), in which 
the creative springs had dried up; this was manifest in the "desolate mechan-
ization of life, the worsened morals, the decline in religion among the 
peoples, and the insincerity in art" (VI, 94). The Castalian Order and the 
Bead Game were created by the small remaining elite of intellectuals to 
preserve the cultural heritage, at a time when the creative forces were 
admittedly unable to compete with the achievements of the twentieth 
century (VI, 98). In this monumental fairy-tale Hesse is saying what Nietz-
sche had said, that our superficial way of life is hostile to the creation and 
preservation of true culture, and that we must do something about it before 
it is too late. 
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Nietzsche's thought so permeates virtually every nuance of the 
introductory chapter that it is not surprising to see his name appear several 
times, breaking, as it were, the surface of Hesse's consciousness. In com-
menting on the dissipation of the creative forces, the narrator writes: 
One had just discovered (a discovery that had been occasionally anticipated 
here and there ever since Nietzsche) that youth and the creative spirit were 
a thing of the past, and that old age and dusk had set in ... (VI, 94) 
Nietzsche is also alluded to as one of the great thinkers of our time, in 
connection with the narrator's discussion of the unfortunate tendency of 
the feuilletonistic era to prefer popular and sensational writing about great 
persons to reading these people in the original. Typical of the sort of thing 
our generation liked to read was an article entitled "Friedrich Nietzsche 
and Women's Styles around 1870" (VI, 90), implying that the readers of 
our century had become too effete to appreciate great cultural contributions 
such as the weighty and meaningful ideas of Nietzsche.11 
In the story itself, which follows the conventional format of the 
apprenticeship novel, the autobiographical hero Josef Knecht resembles the 
earlier Nietzschean protagonists. Although he ultimately comes to see in 
service to others the highest good, he is essentially the outsider, the artistic 
genius, the leader of the "intellectual elite" (VI, rn6), who has achieved 
"the highest conceivable level of accomplishment" (VI, 119). He affirms 
life in the sense of amor fati and resigns himself to existence with dignity, by 
feeling "without personal rancor the tragedy inherent in every person 
consecrated to Geist" (VI, 117). His selfless devotion to destiny provides 
the main theme of the novel: 
It is not so much this tragedy itself that has induced us to consider in such 
detail the personality of Josef Knecht; rather it is the quiet, cheerful, even 
radiant manner in which he carried out his destiny, his gift, his mission. 
(VI, 117) 
The narrator Ziegenhals characterizes Knecht's dedication as amor fati and 
Daimonion (-Demian!) : "Like every significant person he has his 
Daimonion and his amor fati, but his amor fati reveals itself as free from gloom 
and fanaticism" (VI, 117). Cheerfully and without hesitation, Knecht 
11 It is amazing to note that some three decades earlier, as mentioned above, Hesse had 
alluded to Nietzsche in an almost identical manner, when exposing the superficiality of the 
tutor Hamburger in Hay-Moon (Heumond, l, 685). 
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gives his life when the call of destiny requires the ultimate sacrifice. 
Not only does Nietzsche provide the thematic substratum of Magister 
Ludi, not only is his name mentioned, not only are Nietzschean motifs in 
evidence, Nietzsche himself is surprisingly introduced into the action as a 
flesh-and-blood character, as an associate of Knecht, who symbolizes one 
of the two main tendencies of the times. These two tendencies, which 
according to the narrator dominated our culture since the Middle Ages, are 
as follows: 
the freeing of thought and faith from every sort of authoritative domina-
tion, i.e., the battle of Reason which had become sovereign and of age 
against the rule of the Roman Catholic Church, and-on the other hand-
the secret, but passionate search for a legitimation of this freedom, for a new 
and adequate authority coming from within itself. (VI, 88) 
The legitimation of human freedom becomes the task of the Benedictine 
monk, Pater Jakobus, in whom one readily recognizes the famed Swiss 
historian Jacob Burckhardt. The freeing of thought and faith from every 
sort of authoritative domination is left to the irresponsible but brilliant 
glassbead-player Fritz Tegularius. The latter is none other than Friedrich 
Nietzsche himself. 
This identification is easy to substantiate as Tegularius corresponds in 
every respect to the picture Hesse repeatedly drew of Nietzsche. A few 
pertinent phrases to indicate the correspondence will suffice (VI, 365-68): 
Tegularius is affectionately referred to as "this Fritz," the familiar form 
of Nietzsche's Christian name. He was pathologically sick, "one who was 
ill throughout his entire life"; "that which one called his sickness was 
ultimately and predominantly ... a completely individualistic attitude and 
way of life." "He was basically incurable, as he didn't really want to be 
cured." Knecht was interested in him not only because of his talent and 
erroneous views but also because of this "sickness." 
Tegularius was an artist and a genius: "the sublime artist of the glass-
bead game, his extraordinary talent, his restless geniality ever receptive to 
the problems of the glassbead game"; "his precious gifts, his melancholy 
genius, his temperamental artistic passion." He was in spirit an aristocrat: 
"not an average person, he was an aristocrat, a very highly talented person." 
He was an outsider who had no regard for conventional views: " ... he 
loved nothing but his freedom, his eternal student-outlook, he preferred to 
remain his life long the sickly, incalculable and stubborn individualist." 
He was a pessimist and nihilist: "where his pessimistic wit sparkled and 
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no one could resist the gloomy splendor of his views"; "the inspired jester 
and nihilist." Although he was an incomparable genius who inspired his 
own time favorably, he was decadent and a danger for later generations: 
"It was marvelous and delightful that this Fritz had lived. But the dissolu-
tion of Castalia into a dreamland populated by nothing but Tegulariusses 
had to be prevented." Tegularius also shares Nietzsche's views, although 
Hesse simplified these somewhat, just as he had simplified the views of 
Burckhardt, to adapt to the simplified thesis of his novel: individual versus 
society. Accordingly, the keen-witted glassbead-player rejects any "con-
cern for history," and considers history itself as unworthy of study (VI, 3 74). 
Just as Nietzsche had done in his second essay in Thoughts out of Season, 
Tegularius admits that "the interpretation of history, the philosophy of 
history, can be carried on in a witty amusing, possibly even highly pathetic 
manner," (VI, 374) but he disdains history per se: 
But the thing itself, the object of this humor, namely history, was some-
thing so hateful, at the same time so banal and devilish, so coarse and boring, 
that he did not understand how anyone could occupy himself with it. 
He is an advocate of "un-historicity and over-historicity," and praises the 
"absolutely unhistorical and contra-historical which is divine and freed 
from time." 
Hesse playfully wove a few further Nietzschean phrases into Tegu-
larius' discourse such as "the exploitation of the weak through the strong," 
"the self-glorifying battle for power which is eternally the same, eternally 
self-overcoming," and a reference to religion and art as "illusory fa~ades." 
The most significant statement for this investigation is, of course, the 
admission by Knecht cited earlier that Tegularius had played a critical role 
in his life as an inspiring force: 
We are of the opinion that in Knecht's life this Tegularius was no less 
necessary and important than Designori and the Pater in Marienfels, and to 
be sure in the same way, as an inspirational force, as an open window to 
new viewpoints. (VI, 367) 
And, as we have said, since Designori shared the views of the Pater, it is 
evident that in the opinion of the old and carefully deliberating Hesse, 
Nietzsche and Burckhardt had provided him with the most significant 
intellectual stimulation.12 
12 A bit further on in the story, Knecht restricts the importance of Tegularius to 
"polishing and minor details" whereas he, Knecht, was responsible for the "basic structure 
and direction" as well as "the meditation sequence" (VI, 369-70). Evidently Hesse on 
II4 
One cannot terminate this discussion without commenting on the 
unusual parallelism between Hesse's Magister Ludi and Thomas Mann's 
Dr. Faustus (1947). Both of these monumental novels evaluating Germany 
and Europe in the Hitler era and war years accomplished the following: 
1) they disowned Nietzsche and declared him dangerous 
2) they used him as a central figure to symbolize the threat he proved 
3) they utilized the problem of creative vigor in the face of decadence as 
their basic substratum 
4) they admitted Nietzsche's genius. 
* * * 
Following this brief survey of Hesse's principal writings, we would 
now like to summarize our findings. It would appear that Nietzsche had 
virtually no effect on the transcendental base of Hesse's outlook. This base 
is the product of Hesse's pietistic upbringing and of the great mystical 
teachings of East and West. Nevertheless, one cannot disregard Nietzsche's 
contribution to Hesse's thought as inconsequential. We hope to have 
shown that Hesse received definite inspiration from Nietzsche with respect 
to: 
1) his conviction that bourgeois culture was decadent 
2) his division of mankind into the strong and the weak 
3) his ideal of a superhuman genius 
4) his conception of pathologic modern man 
5) his belief in the cultural mission of the inspired individual 
6) his acceptance of the notion of amor fati. 
It is conceivable that many of Hesse's stylistic experiments as well as his 
antirationalism may be traced back, at least in part, to Nietzsche. 
All this is important. Furthermore, we have attempted to show that 
Nietzsche, interpreted by Hesse as a nihilist, reinforced the nihilistic doubts 
of the wavering author. This is as evident in Hermann Lauscher as it is in 
Magister Ludi, where Burckhardt as the Pater represented "faith and order" 
(VI, 252), and the "jester and nihilist" Nietzsche symbolized the counter-
pole of chaos and disbelief. 
second thought wanted to make it clear that his basic viewpoint was truly his own. Al-
though this cannot be disputed, "polishing and minor details" does not do full justice to 
Hesse's earlier statements that no writer other than Goethe had caused him to ponder life 
as had Nietzsche. 
Il5 
One need only to reflect for a moment on the frequency with which 
Hesse's heroes are forced to combat nihilism, how often they stand on the 
brink of despair and how often many of them succumb. The inveterate 
nihilists Lauscher and Muoth commit suicide. Klein regains faith only at 
the moment he takes his life. Siddhartha barely rescues himself after 
attempting suicide. The Steppenwolf calls himself a suicidal type and wan-
ders from one torment to the next. Heilner and Camenzind achieve a 
limited affirmation only with great effort. Demian's path is termed a 
"route for desperate individuals" (VII, 519). The resort guest in the story 
of the same name has the bitter taste of despair on his tongue. Goldmund 
temporarily loses his faith in the world and in God and, as he once said, 
seeks to forget the horror and chaos in sensual joy. In similar fashion, 
despairing H.H. temporarily loses faith in the ideals of the East; "nowhere," 
he cries, "is there a unity, a center, a point around which the wheel turns" 
(VI, 35). 
It would not be correct to label Hesse a nihilist. Without doubt he did 
everything in his power to affirm his transcendental ideal. But it was not an 
easy task. Even though his heroes usually won out, they always had a long 
and bitter fight, and each time the battle had to be fought anew. Each time 
the goal was a bit different, too, a clear indication that the previous victory 
had not been quite what he had hoped it would be. In 1932 Hesse wrote: 
And whenever I think that I have expressed my faith in a suitable form, 
it soon appears dubious and foolish, and I am compelled to seek anew for 
confirmations and other forms. At times this is torment and distress, at 
other times it is bliss. (VII, 527) 
We have already cited the letter written in 193 1 in which Hesse 
virtually admitted that faith and nihilism were the two poles ofhis existence 
(VII, 509). We therefore feel justified in viewing Nietzsche as the great 
antagonist in Hesse's life, with whom the writer, according to his own 
statement, had to wrestle again and again. In the concepts of the genius and 
amor fati Nietzsche offered encouragement and a way out of the dilemma, 
but on other occasions his nihilism gravely reinforced Hesse's despair. 
In a word, Hesse's life was a constant battle with Nietzschean nihilism. 
Like so many of his famous literary contemporaries-Hauptmann, Musil, 
Broch, Rilke, George, Kaiser, Morgenstern, to mention a few-~esse 
sought to bridge this abyss with a personal mysticism, for many years with 
only partial success. 
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